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ABSTRACT
The work presented in this dissertation focuses on the design and operation
of electricity markets with an emphasis on modeling the impacts of physical
characteristics of electricity. These characteristics typically introduce uncer-
tainty, inter-temporal dynamics and lumpy costs/benefits into the markets,
and lead to a violation of the fundamental assumptions in the traditional
static economic analysis. Unfortunately, the conclusions from these static
models have been adopted naively in the current electricity market practices,
leading to undesirable consequences, including sudden and large price swings,
difficulties in clearing of markets, significant ex-post side payments, and gam-
ing opportunities for market participants. This dissertation contributes to
the resolution of several challenges: First, we aim to contribute to the evalua-
tion of the suitability of competitive equilibrium as the market design model
in the presence of physical characteristics of electricity system. The standard
conclusions of competitive equilibrium theory are extended in a general dy-
namic setting, but analytical results show that these conclusions hold only on
average. Such results theoretically explain the exotic behavior of competitive
equilibrium prices. Second, this work also contributes to resolving computa-
tional challenges in prescribing prices as well as understanding the strategic
complications introduced by physical characteristics. In particular, pricing
and uplift payment mechanisms for electricity markets with nonconvexities
are discussed. An extreme-point subdifferential (EPSD) algorithm for obtain-
ing a global maximizer of the Lagrangian dual problem, interpreted as the
convex hull price with the potential to reduce or eliminate uplift payments, is
proposed. Numerical experiments illustrate the finite-termination property
and show that the performance of the algorithm compares well with stan-
dard subgradient methods on the examples considered. Finally, the convex
hull pricing scheme is compared with the currently employed marginal-cost
pricing scheme in duopolistic power markets in which firms submit their offer
ii
functions while abiding by capacity constraints. Market participants’ offer-
ing behavior and the corresponding equilibria are studied under these two
pricing mechanisms. Existence of equilibria and numerical solutions of these
equilibria are examined. We conclude with studies of the long-term impact
of pricing mechanisms on capacity expansion, and start-up cost offers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, an overview of the problems of interest is provided and the
stage is set for the work presented in this dissertation. This chapter begins by
discussing the background and the motivation for this research, followed by a
brief overview of an idealized perfectly competitive market model. Issues in
implementing the competitive equilibrium are then discussed, which motivate
the need for extensions to include more practical considerations. The work
reported here can be viewed as a set of extensions to such an idealized model
in the context of electricity industry. The scope of this dissertation and the
major contributions are presented, and we conclude with an outline of the
remainder of this dissertation.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The power system is a fundamental and vital part of a modern society’s in-
frastructure: Its objective is to deliver reliable electrical energy to consumers
efficiently [1, 2]. Reliability has and continues to be the primary concern of
the industry [3]. The lack of a large-scale storage capability leads to the need
to balance production and consumption around the clock. This characteris-
tic of electricity imposes stringent requirements on the design and evolution
of the industry. The industry is also faced by an increasing need for effi-
ciency [4], particularly due to its capital intensive nature. Yet, any effort
at improved efficiency has to be balanced by efforts toward meeting envi-
ronmental regulations, many of which focus on more efficient use of limited
non-renewable natural resources.
Power system reliability and efficiency are typically the responsibility of
the system operator whose job involves the effective management of available
resources to meet the load to withstand sudden disturbances such as unan-
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ticipated losses of facilities [2]. In a vertically integrated industry, system
operation is generally managed by a single regulated utility that owns and
controls all generation, transmission, and distribution assets [5].
However, restructuring and privatization has led to asset divestiture; as a
consequence, the generation market is comprised of a set of self-interested en-
tities [6].1 All of these entities compete in electricity markets for the right to
serve load.2 These markets are usually organized as auctions, in which system
(or market) operators determine the allocation of generation responsibilities
and the associated payments, based on a set of offers provided by the gen-
eration entities. In the current market environment, both the planning and
operation of these facilities are decisions of individual market participants,
and are often a response to the competition in markets. Meanwhile, grid re-
liability, by and large, is still a systemwide property, and is beyond the reach
of any given market participant’s scope and capability. Consequently, co-
ordination among self-interested market participants to achieve systemwide
reliability and efficiency is the main challenge of electricity market design
and operation.
Electricity markets are designed to fulfill a range of goals: the pricing of
electricity, the prescription of supply and demand-side decisions, and the cre-
ation of incentives for enhanced services and better technologies for electricity
generation. The earliest efforts at deregulation appear to have been in Latin
America in the 1980s, and subsequently in the UK in 1990. In the late 1990s,
electricity markets were created in various U.S. zones, such as in California,
New York, New England and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM)
interchange [7]. The last few decades have witnessed many changes in the
design and organization of electricity markets both within the United States
and beyond.
An electricity market may be viewed as a coupling between two constrained
and highly complex dynamical systems, of which the first is purely physical
while the second is financial.
• The physical system is a complex network comprising of power flowing
through transmission lines, modulated by Kirchhoff’s laws, and opera-
1In the United State, the competition is mainly on the generation side, while the
transmission and distribution are still, by and large, monopolized and regulated.
2Demand-side participation in electricity markets is gaining in popularity, and will
lead to competition among the load to be served.
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tional and security constraints. Loads and generation are each subject
to uncertainty. The stability of this network relies on instantaneous bal-
ancing between the production and consumption of electricity. Achiev-
ing this balance in a constrained environment is challenging due to the
combination of uncertainty and a wide range of system constraints.
• The financial system is typically comprised of a coupled set of markets,
such as the forward, day-ahead and real-time auctions. A sequence of
market clearings leads to an associated trajectory of electricity prices
for a specific type of auction. The financial system is also subject to
both constraints and uncertainty: Constraints from the market struc-
ture itself, and uncertainty in the form of unpredictable fuel prices,
volatility in demand, and supply-side stochasticity (e.g., via wind-based
resources).
The presence of such complicating factors in these coupled systems, along
with the often orthogonal relationship between societal needs and the eco-
nomic goals of market players, makes market design a challenging proposi-
tion.
Roughly speaking, there are two distinct philosophies governing the design
of electricity markets. Of these, the first advocates a separation between
the financial system and the physical system, and contends that a well-
functioning market can guarantee system reliability and efficiency through
pricing. Simply put, this philosophy espouses that “the market will take
care of itself”. Along this line of thought, market design should be as sim-
ple as possible to ensure transparency and liquidity in the market. In doing
so, the physical characteristics of the underlying products are not explicitly
considered.3 The Power Exchange market in California before the crisis, for
example, was essentially the same as forward contract markets for any other
commodity [6,8]. In such a market, market participants submit price-quality
pairs as offers/bids for electricity delivered in the next day, and the market
operator ignores the unit commitment problem. Despite advantages from
an economic viewpoint, the main shortcoming of these designs lies in the
inability of market outcomes to ensure reliability, given the limited focus
3Such a philosophy prevails in markets for other commodities and is viewed as relatively
successful. For example, futures markets in the United State are efficient and liquid, while
less than 5% of contracts involve physical delivery.
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on explicit physical considerations in market operation. Furthermore, the
separation between the financial system operation and the physical system
operation may create gaming opportunities for market participants [9].
Much of electricity market design is gravitating toward the second phi-
losophy, reliability by market design [10], which is reflected in the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Standard Market Design guide-
lines [11, 12]. Put differently, the physical characteristics of electricity are
considered explicitly in market design and operation for reliability purposes,
leading to a market operation that is closely coupled with the physical sys-
tem operation. Market designs under this umbrella include multi-settlement
markets, unit-commitment-based day-ahead markets, capacity markets, and
locational pricing. Compared to the “electricity commodity markets” that
largely rely on price signals, these markets specify not only prices, but also
provide a corresponding feasible physical operation of the power system. As
a result, these markets typically entail more complicated operational models.
The reported research focuses on the design and operation of electricity
markets with an emphasis on modeling the physical characteristics of elec-
tricity. Such considerations typically bring uncertainty, inter-temporal dy-
namics and lumpy cost/benefits into market models, which complicate the
clearing of electricity markets, lead to out-of-merit dispatch,4 and result in
significant side payments to generators. Yet, another concern is that spot
prices do not provide sufficient incentives for investment and ignore most of
the physical characteristics of electricity generation.
1.2 An Idealized Model: Perfect Competition
The rationale of introducing markets into the electricity industry is to har-
ness competition so as to stimulate innovations, lower electricity prices and
increase system efficiency [6, 8, 14, 15]. In a market environment, market
forces, a.k.a. the invisible hand, as described by Adam Smith, instead of
the administrative controls from a centralized entity, determine market out-
comes. These forces come from self-interested market participants, whose
objective is in maximizing their individual welfare. Equilibrium analysis
4These dispatch are mainly due to physical or reliability reasons, the readers are re-
ferred to [13] for detailed discussion of its impact on electricity market.
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studies the state of the market in which each individual participant’s efforts
toward individual welfare maximization are balanced. Even though market
outcomes may be distinct from the equilibrium in practice, it is believed by
many economists that the market harbors a tendency to gravitate toward it.
One of the most important equilibrium concepts is the competitive equilib-
rium which captures the outcomes of a perfectly competitive market. To fa-
cilitate the discussion, consider an abstraction of markets in a general setting,
which consists of I suppliers indexed by i = {1, 2, . . . , I}, and J consumers
indexed by j = {1, 2, . . . , J}.
Suppliers: Denote by xi the product produced by supplier i, ci(xi) the
cost of production, and ρ the price at which the supplier gets paid. Then the
welfare of supplier i is the difference between its revenue and costs:
WSi(xi) := ρxi − ci(xi). (1.1)
Consumers: Denote by yj the consumption level, vj(yj) the utility of
consumption, and ρ the price at which the consumer must pay for the product
consumed. Then, the welfare of the consumer j is the signed sum of utility
and payments:
WDj(yj) := vj(yj)− ρyj. (1.2)
In a perfectly competitive market, market participants are assumed to be
price takers. That is, prices are exogenous and unaffected by any individual
market participant’s action. For such a market, the competitive equilibrium
is defined as follows.
Definition 1. The production levels (xe1, x
e
2, . . . , x
e
I), consumption levels
(ye1, y
e
2, . . . , y
e
J), and price ρ
e constitute a competitive equilibrium if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied:
(i) Suppliers’ welfare maximization: For each supplier i, xei solves sup-
plier i’s optimization problem,
xei ∈ arg max
x
WSi(x); (1.3)
(ii) Consumers’ welfare maximization: For each consumer j, yej solves con-
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sumer j’s optimization problem,
yej ∈ arg max
y
WDj(y); (1.4)
(iii) Market clearing: The total supply equals the total demand,∑
∀i
xej =
∑
∀j
yej . (1.5)
Recall that the welfare of both suppliers and consumers are functions of
the price ρ. Consequently, the optimal solutions in conditions (i) and (ii)
depend on ρ. Meanwhile, condition (iii) requires that the equilibrium price
is set in such a way that suppliers and consumers agree on the aggregate
supply and consumption levels identified in conditions (i) and (ii).
From the definition, the competitive equilibrium is a state of the market
from which no price-taker has an incentive to deviate. The process to estab-
lish the equilibrium in the market is referred to as “market clearing;” and
the equilibrium prices and quantities are also called “market clearing prices”
and “market clearing quantities,” respectively.
The competitive equilibrium represents an important benchmark in eco-
nomic analysis and provides outcomes from the a perfectly competitive mar-
ket. Therefore, one of the objectives of market design and operation is to
emulate competitive equilibrium outcomes in more practical settings.
In such an equilibrium, the allocation decisions, including both the pro-
duction and consumption, are optimal from the point of view of individual
market participants by definition. Such an allocation may or may not opti-
mize the resource allocation for the whole market. To analyze the efficiency
of the market, the so-called social planner’s problem (SPP) is introduced as
a benchmark, whose objective is to maximize the economic well-being of the
aggregation of all market participants.
Definition 2. The social planner’s problem is given by,
max
xi,yj ,∀i,j
{∑
∀i
WSi(xi) +
∑
∀j
WDj(yj)
}
subject to
∑
∀i
xi =
∑
∀j
yj.
(1.6)
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In the SPP, the aggregate production also equals the aggregate consump-
tion. However, rather than driven by self-interest, such a requirement is
imposed as a constraint.
The objective function of the SPP can then be written as∑
∀i
WSi(xi) +
∑
∀j
WDj(yj) =
∑
∀i
(ρxi − ci(xi)) +
∑
∀j
(vj(yj)− ρyj)
=
∑
∀j
vj(yj)−
∑
∀i
ci(xi) + ρ
(∑
∀i
xi −
∑
∀j
yj
)
=
∑
∀j
vj(yj)−
∑
∀i
ci(xi).
In effect, the price ρ, which is canceled out due to the supply-demand
balancing, has no impacts on the overall welfare. The solution to the SPP
is interpreted as an efficient allocation, because the product is not only pro-
duced by the least expensive suppliers, but also is consumed by consumers
who value it most.
For such an idealized market, the economic conclusions are summarized as
follows. [16]
Theorem 3. Suppose the utility and cost functions are well-behaved,5 the
following conclusions hold:
(i) Existence of a competitive equilibrium: The market admits at least one
competitive equilibrium.
(ii) Clearing at marginal cost and marginal utility: The equilibrium prices,
the marginal cost of suppliers and the marginal utility of consumers are
identical, or,
ρe =
dc(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=
∑
∀i x
e
i
=
dv(y)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=
∑
∀i y
e
j
where c(x) is the aggregate cost function and v(y) is the aggregate utility
function.
(iii) First Welfare Theorem: Any competitive equilibrium
{(xe1, xe2, . . . , xeI), (ye1, ye2, . . . , yeJ), ρe}
5For example, utility functions are concave and cost functions are convex.
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is efficient, i.e., {(xe1, xe2, . . . , xeI), (ye1, ye2, . . . , yeJ)} solves (1.6).
(iv) Second Welfare Theorem: For any efficient allocation
{(x1, x2, . . . , xI), (y1, y2, . . . , yJ)},
there exists a price ρ, such that {(x1, x2, . . . , xI), (y1, y2, . . . , yJ), ρ} is a
competitive equilibrium.
In reality, especially in the context of the electricity industry, the assump-
tions of such an idealized model may not hold. In fact, the salient character-
istics of the physical power system infrastructure are the main driving forces
of the evolution in the design and operation of electricity markets. In the
presence of these physical characteristics, electricity prices may differ from
those seen in idealized free markets. An efficient price must properly re-
flect and accommodate the impacts of physical characteristics. In addition,
the strategic behavior of the market participants further complicates the
problem. The aims of this dissertation are to address the critical needs to
understand the price behavior and explore alternative pricing rules for elec-
tricity, taking explicitly consideration of physical characteristics and market
participants’ strategic offering behavior. This dissertation introduces several
extensions of the idealized model, and revisits the definition, existence and
computation of equilibria in these extensions.
1.3 Electricity Market Design and Operation
While most electricity markets over the world are designed to stimulate com-
petition, it is still an open question as to how to include competition into elec-
tricity power systems. Market designs vary from the purely financial power
exchange, the prototype of a “free market,” to highly controlled markets such
as in Chile where prices are set to the regulator-estimated “marginal costs.”
While competitive equilibrium studies generally ignore the implementation
aspect, all markets in the real world must be organized by certain market
institutions, which define rules of operation, performance enforcement, etc.
An insight from modern economics is that the competitive equilibrium de-
rived from the “institution-free” market may not be realized, for example,
due to information asymmetry [17].
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Currently, most electricity markets in the United States are organized as
auctions. These auctions are usually sequential, and there may be over-
lapping auctions on different time-scales. For example, wholesale markets
usually consist of hourly day-ahead markets followed by real-time markets
that clear every 5 to 15 minitues.
In auctions, the market participants submit offers. Some of them are ac-
cepted, fully or partially, as successful offers, which are typically defined by
the solution to a certain optimization problem parameterized by the submit-
ted offers. Finally, prices are determined base on which these accepted offers
are settled. Therefore, the market design typically involves the specification
of offer format, quantity determination rules and price determination rules.
Some examples are provided next.
1.3.1 Offer Format
The offer format specifies the information flows from market participants
to the market operator. Roughly speaking, there are two classes of offer
formats [6]. Of those, the first is the single-part offer which only allows mar-
ket players to submit marginal costs and quantities. Such an offer format is
widely adopted in the real-time markets with 5 to 15-minute resolution, which
typically balance the supply and demand around a relatively small neighbor-
hood of the pre-specified schedule under normal conditions. The day-ahead
markets (DAMs) with single-part offer is typically called self-commitment
DAMs to recognize the fact that the generators need to make their own unit
commitment decisions, and the market operator assumes all generators who
submit offers are already committed. By doing so, each generator is required
to internalize the complicated costs and operational constraints into a convex,
usually piecewise linear, offer function.
The other offer format is the multi-part offer which allows more infor-
mation in the offers. Examples include the unit-commitment-based DAMs
which allow the offer prices to explicitly recognize the cost causations, such
as start-up costs, no-load costs in addition to marginal costs, and the need
to operate these units observing physical constraints. From the perspec-
tive of auction theory, the unit-commitment-based DAMs can be viewed as
combinatorial auctions with indivisible commodities: Suppliers are allowed
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to sell bundles of MWhs to observe the salient characteristics of electricity
production. Therefore, the unit-commitment-based DAMs share the advan-
tages of the other combinatorial auctions, allow better expression of private
information and may enhance market competition and efficiency [18]. On
the other hand, some concerns regarding “fairness,” resulting from the unit
commitment considerations, have been observed [19,20].
1.3.2 Quantity Determination
Market outcomes of auctions include quantities and prices. The price and
quantity determination in electricity markets with single-part offer typically
present a relatively easy underlying model. On the other hand, one of the
biggest challenges to incorporate physical consideration into the market de-
sign, such as the unit-commitment-based DAMs, is the difficulties of clearing
the market in nearly all cases of practical interest. Therefore, the market
design must provide a pragmatic mechanism to determine market outcomes.
The current widely adopted mechanism used by various Independent System
Operators (ISOs) first requires the solution of a unit commitment problem
and temporarily ignores pricing issues. The main debate in quantity deter-
mination focuses on the selection of objectives.
One option is to adopt the same objective as originally defined for the
vertical-integrated utility who owns all generators in the system. It aims to
determine the minimal cost schedule of the start-up and shut-down of each
generator to supply the demand for a given period in a manner consistent
with the operational constraints of each generator. Such an objective assumes
offers reflect costs, and consequently, minimizing the as-bid costs leads to a
efficient allocation.
The other option is to minimize the consumers’ payment [21–23]. By choos-
ing this objective, the ISO is in effect no longer “independent” but is in favor
of consumers. The main purpose of this design is to protect consumers. The
main argument in favor of the payment-minimization is that market partici-
pants do not necessarily reveal their true cost in auctions, hence, minimizing
the as-bid costs makes less sense in the market environment.
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1.3.3 Price Determination
Since the quantity determination problem may not necessarily yield appro-
priate price signals explicitly, its solution serves, at most, as the starting
point to determine prices. Due to the complicating factors resulting from
physical considerations, such as non-convexities, the market clearing price
may not even exist. In real-world market operations, the hourly prices are
determined using a set of pre-specified rules that are accepted by market
participants. One of the most widely used rules is the marginal-cost pricing
rule which derives prices from the solution of the corresponding economic dis-
patch problem in which commitment decisions are fixed. The energy-based
payments to a generator in each hour are defined as the product of the hourly
price and the quantity it sells in that hour. The impacts of the start-up cost
and no-load cost offers and the operational constraints are accounted for
only when solving the unit commitment problem, but not considered in the
hourly prices determination. Thus, it is possible that some successful sup-
pliers cannot fully recover the start-up cost or no-load cost offers from the
energy-based payments. Since the offer prices are the lowest prices at which
the supplier is willing to sell by definition, if suppliers are paid less than offer
prices, the ISO may not be able to commit sufficient capacity. The common
practice in North American to overcome this problem is to pay generators
an additional payment that compensates for commitment-dependent costs.
Such payments are introduced as uplift terms that are borne by consumers
on some pro-rata basis.
O’Neill et al. propose a mechanism to price the discrete decisions, in
general, and start-up decisions of each generator in electricity markets, in
particular. By doing so, the market can be cleared even in the presence of
non-convexities [24]. However, this mechanism leads to zero or near-zero
auction surpluses for all players [25]. Gribik and Hogan et al. investigate the
administrative rules to determine the hourly prices [26], [25]. They suggest
that uplift payments may have negative impacts on competitive markets, so
pricing rules should be designed to minimize the amount of total uplift pay-
ments as a proxy of the possible negative impacts. Nonlinear non-anonymous
pricing mechanisms, or generalized uplift mechanisms, to operate the mar-
kets are also proposed [27], [28], while the discriminatory nature of these
pricing mechanisms has also proved controversial.
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To date, all papers discussing clearing mechanisms for electricity markets
with nonconvexities assume truth-revealing offers, which may never hold in
real world practice. A rational player submits truthful offers only if these
offers yield the highest profit or benefit. In fact, price mark-ups are usually
observed in functioning markets [29], as discussed in detail next.
1.3.4 Offering Behavior
The objective of each rational supplier in a market is to maximize its profit.
Over the short term, the costs of the supplier to produce at a specified level
are constant, so it is safe to assume that the supplier has no control over
it. The revenues of the supplier, on the other hand, are determined by the
market mechanism in force and the associated rules. In a market organized
as an auction, such as electricity markets, the only way for a supplier to
impact its revenues is through offer formulation. The supplier may submit
offers dependent of the market mechanism and rules in force, and the offer
need not be its true costs. In other words, different mechanisms and rules
provide different incentives to each supplier on its offering behavior.
The offering behavior in electricity markets without nonconvexities con-
sidered in the market design has been extensively studied. A comprehensive
survey on the computational methods to calculate optimal offering strategy
can be found in [30]. Ignoring the complicating factors arising from the com-
mitment considerations, Fabra et al. investigate the pure and mixed-strategy
equilibria in a duopolistic market under uniform-price and pay-as-bid auc-
tions, assuming the capacity is perfectly divisible and the cost functions are
linear [31]. The application of pay-as-bid auction in self-commitment DAMs
by experimental methods has also been studied in [32].
For the truthful revelation issues in electric markets, Gross et al. for-
mulate the optimal offer strategy for price-takers in unit-commitment based
markets [33]. Under a set of assumptions, offer-at-cost strategy will maxi-
mize the supplier’s profits. Bushnell et al. study the truthful revelation in
the former Qualifying Facility (QF) capacity auction in California, in which
each supplier has both fixed and variable costs, ignoring the “lumpiness”
of capacity [34]. Hobbs et al. view the truthful revelation auction as one
way to achieve allocative efficiency, and apply the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
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(VCG) auction to gas and electricity markets, taking explicitly into account
the non-convexities in these markets [35]. It has been shown that the VCG
auction is revenue deficient and vulnerable to collusion, which prevents it
from practical application.
1.4 Scope and Contributions
The review presented in Section 1.3 indicates some key needs in the research
and application in extending the idealized competitive equilibrium model to
more practical electricity markets. The objective of this dissertation is to
answer two sets of questions. The first set of questions are fundamental to
the suitability of the competitive equilibrium as the market design model in
the presence of physical characteristics of electricity system. The second set
of questions focus on the computational challenges and the strategic com-
plications introduced by including physical considerations in market designs.
More generally, this dissertation contributes to market design and operation
by including dynamics, non-convexities and strategic behavior in the market
modeling, analysis and computation.
1.4.1 Markets with Friction: Dynamic Competitive
Equilibrium Models
One of the most fundamental questions of electricity markets is whether mar-
kets should be designed based on the competitive equilibrium model. The
market model characterized in Definition 1 is essentially a static model that is
able to capture snapshots of the market. Due to the inter-temporal coupling
of markets imposed by operational limits, such a model may be insufficient
for capturing the reality of electricity markets. For power systems, a salient
characteristic is that the generation cannot change instantaneously to any de-
sired level. Rather, the operation of power systems are subject to stringent
intertemporal restrictions. As these restrictions, in effect, limit the possible
productions levels over time, they may also impact market outcomes in turn.
On the other hand, due to the lack of large-scale storage, the variable de-
mand and uncertainties in power system require adjustments in generation
level around the clock to maintain the balance between supply and demand.
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These issues become more acute with the increased deployment of renew-
able resources and smart grid technologies, in which more uncertainties are
introduced into both the power system and the electricity market.
The first goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding
of the impact, viewed from the ideal competitive equilibrium setting, of dy-
namics, constraints, and uncertainty which are inherent to transmission and
generation. The approach is the development of models that are capable to
characterize the competitive equilibria for a power system model that cap-
tures these complexities. This may be regarded as a stepping stone toward
the creation of reliable markets for a smart grid. To achieve this goal, the
perfect competition market model characterized in Definition 1 is extended
in the following aspects.
(i) Consider a continuum of markets over time. By doing so, the model is
able to capture the intertemporal dynamics of the market. Because the
products traded at different instants of time are different, the number
of product trading in the market essentially becomes infinite.
(ii) We introduce the intertemporal ramping constraints on the supply side.
This is possible because of (i): All instants of the market are modeled.
Consequently, constraints that couple these instants can be well-defined
in the market model.
(iii) Next, we introduce network constraints, demand uncertainty and re-
newable resources (modeled as negative demand) into the model, which
is driven by practical interests.
(iv) Finally, we extend the product space from energy only to energy and
reserves. When the demand increases or the renewables decrease unpre-
dictably, the market may have less supply, resulting in higher prices.
Therefore, the supplier has an incentive to keep excess capacity for
these events, and then the excess capacity is referred to as reserve.
The reserve level is determined by market participants spontaneously,
rather than by administrative requirements imposed on the market.
Through these extensions, appropriate models are developed to character-
ize the interactions between the stochastic supply/demand and the intertem-
poral constraints in the physical electricity system. These interactions are
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represented in the market layer by volatile electricity prices. In a general dy-
namic setting, many of the standard conclusions of competitive equilibrium
theory are established: Market equilibria are efficient, and average prices
coincide with average marginal costs. However, these conclusions hold only
on average. Another important contribution is the explanation of the exotic
behavior of electricity prices. Through theory and examples it is explained
why, in the competitive equilibrium, prices can range from negative values,
to values far beyond the “choke up” price, which is usually considered to be
the maximum price consumers are willing to pay. Most importantly, sample-
paths of prices almost never coincide with marginal costs.
1.4.2 Markets with Nonconvexities: Computation of Convex
Hull Prices
The second problem of interest in this dissertation is the pricing problem in
the presence of binary commitment decisions, non-convex costs, and phys-
ical/operational constraints, which are common for electricity markets. In
these cases, the competitive equilibrium may not even exist. The common
practice is to derive prices, referred to as “marginal-cost prices,” from the
solution of the corresponding economic dispatch problem in which commit-
ment decisions are fixed. By doing so, the marginal-cost pricing scheme
essentially assumes the conclusion that prices equal marginal costs in static
competitive equilibrium is still valid. As a result, commitment-dependent
start-up and no-load costs are ignored in these prices. Hence, the payments
collected through the auction may be insufficient to compensate generators.
To overcome this problem, uplift payment mechanisms have been introduced,
through which additional side payments are made to generators in recogni-
tion of the costs incurred due to commitment decisions. The large amount of
uplift brings potentially new difficulties for both the operator and the market
participants. An alternative pricing mechanism known as convex hull pricing
has been proposed. The perfect competition market model characterized in
Definition 1 is extended in the following aspects.
(i) We include generators’ binary commitment decisions and recognize the
costs incurred due to these decisions.
(ii) Second, we weaken the market clearing conditions in Definition 1. In
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fact, under convex hull pricing, the market-clearing conditions are re-
placed by the nonempty intersection of the convex hulls of aggregate
supply and demand.
(iii) Finally, we introduce out-of-market side payments (opportunity-cost
uplift) to restore the welfare maximization conditions in Definition 1.
By doing so, the payment scheme is neither linear with respect to the
quantity of product nor anonymous with respect to generators’ identi-
ties.
Notably, all the three conditions in the definition of the competitive equi-
librium model are modified. The convex hull prices are by no means the
equilibrium prices. In this sense, convex hull prices are not adopted because
they are the “right” prices, but because of their other desirable properties.
The computation of convex hull prices requires the global maximization of
an associated Lagrangian dual problem, which is usually highly ill-conditioned
close to the solution. It has been observed that existing methods display poor
local convergence behavior and premature termination. This dissertation
contributes to the solution of the convex hull pricing problem by proposing
an Extreme-Point Subdifferential (EPSD) Method. A salient advantage of
the EPSD method is the ability to obtain the global maximizer after a finite
number of steps. Numerical experiments show that the EPSD scheme com-
pares well with standard subgradient methods on the examples considered.
1.4.3 Equilibria in Strategic Regimes: Analysis of Duopolistic
Markets
The third contribution of this dissertation is to capture players’ strategic
offering behavior. As previously discussed, the competitive equilibrium may
not exist. Consequently, it may be impossible to derive prices from it. The
common practice is to obtain prices by some pre-specified pricing mecha-
nisms. The choice among different pricing mechanisms are based on more
practical considerations in terms of market performance. On the other hand,
the generation supply in electricity market is usually concentrated into a
handful of market participants, who may act strategically in these markets.
To conduct a thorough comparison of different pricing mechanisms, an im-
portant step is to understand the impacts of different pricing rules in the
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strategic regime. The model used in strategic regimes differs from the per-
fectly competitive market model characterized in Definition 1 in the following
ways.
(i) We include generators’ binary commitment decisions and the associated
start-up costs. As the competitive equilibrium may not exist, prices are
derived from pricing mechanisms instead.
(ii) Next, we relax the price-taking assumptions of market participants.
Instead, the dependence of price and consequently the market par-
ticipants’ payoff on their actions is explicitly modeled. Through this
change, the prices in the model are no longer competitive equilibrium
prices. In fact, Nash equilibrium is investigated as the solution concept.
(iii) Third, we study a duopoly rather than a highly competitive market.
This may better reflect the reality in which the market shares in elec-
tricity markets are usually concentrated in the hands of a few suppliers.
(iv) Fourth, we consider long-term capacity expansion problems. In the long
term, market participants are able to upgrade generators to expand
capacities. Capacity expansion essentially alters the market structure
and impacts participants’ short-term offering behavior.
(v) Finally, we discuss a specific market design problem on whether to
include start-up costs in offers.
For the duopoly, the existence of pure-strategy and/or mixed-strategy
Nash-equilibria for markets under marginal-cost pricing and convex hull pric-
ing mechanisms is established. Furthermore, numerical methods are pro-
posed to identify these equilibria. The numerical results show that with
strategic behavior, convex hull pricing is not necessarily superior to marginal-
cost pricing in terms of efficiency, consumer’s total payments, or amount of
uplift payment. In terms of long-term effects, the numerical study shows that
the two pricing mechanisms incentivize different generators to expand their
capacity, leading to different equilibrium generation mixes. Further, negative
results of including start-up cost offering are also suggested analytically.
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1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation contains six additional chapters. Chapter 2 is devoted to
addressing the economic theory of electricity markets, viewed from an ideal-
ized competitive equilibrium setting, taking into account volatility and the
physical and operational constraints inherent to transmission and generation.
The standard conclusions of competitive equilibrium theory in Theorem 3 are
revisited in a general dynamic setting. Analytical results shows these con-
clusions hold only on average. Furthermore, through theory and examples,
Chapter 2 explains why the sample-paths of competitive equilibrium prices
can vary in ranges beyond consumers’ willingness to pay.
In Chapter 3, pricing and uplift payment mechanisms for electricity mar-
kets with non-convexities are discussed. An alternative pricing mechanism
known as convex hull pricing is introduced to reduce uplift payments. One
important contribution of this chapter is to propose an extreme-point-based
procedure for obtaining a global maximizer which is interpreted as the convex
hull price. Such a computational procedure is named extreme-point subdif-
ferential (EPSD) algorithm which is capable to solve both energy-only and
energy-reserve co-optimize markets.
The numerical performance of the EPSD algorithm is discussed in Chap-
ter 4. The EPSD algorithm is shown to terminate after a finite number
of steps where termination is said to occur when the subdifferential set con-
tains the zero vector. Numerical experiments illustrate the finite-termination
property and show that the performance of the scheme compares well with
standard subgradient methods on the examples considered.
A duopolistic power market with symmetric capacity in which firms sub-
mit their offer functions while abiding by capacity constraints is considered
in Chapter 5. Market participants’ offering behavior and the corresponding
equilibrium are studied under two payment mechanisms, marginal-cost pric-
ing with make-whole uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity cost
uplift. Existence of equilibria and numerical solutions of these equilibria are
provided, which contribute to a framework for further analysis of electricity
markets, and in particular the true value of different payment mechanisms
in a strategic setting.
In Chapter 6, the duopolistic model is extended to include asymmetric
capacity and start-up cost offers. Based on the Nash equilibria for markets
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with asymmetric capacity, market participants’ long-term capacity expan-
sion problem is studied. The numerical results reveal that different pricing
mechanisms lead to different incentives to market participants for capacity
expansion, leading to different equilibrium generation mix. Further, negative
results of including start-up cost offering are also demonstrated analytically.
Concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 7, in which the work presented
in this dissertation is summarized and topics for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA
IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
The electricity power system is radically transforming toward the Smart Grid.
Such a transformation will require not only the creation and integration of
new technologies into the grid, but also the redesign of the market struc-
tures coupled with it. In order to design markets for the grid of the future,
economic models able to capture the new physical reality are the first require-
ment. In this chapter, a general economic equilibrium model is presented.
The model includes dynamics, uncertainty in supply and demand, and other
elements usually not considered in standard economic models.
2.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence reveals that electricity is among the most, if not the
most, price-volatile commodities. Electricity prices in PJM are compared
to the other major commodities based on relative daily price movements in
Fig. 2.1 [36]. As shown in the figure, electricity price is significantly more
volatile than prices of the other commodities.
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Figure 2.1: Price volatility of selected commodities
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In the United States, price swings observed in California in 2000-2001 are
the most famous examples of price volatility. A few years prior, unexpected
and equally dramatic price patterns brought down the Illinois electricity mar-
ket [37]. More recent examples are illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Shown on the left
are prices in ERCOT (the Texas market) for two days in 2011. January 31
was a typical day, with prices ranging from a high near 80$/MWh, and a
low that was just below zero. Two days later on February 2, 2011, unusu-
ally cold weather in Texas resulted in real-time prices hitting the price cap
of 3,000$/MWh, which is about 100 times the average price of 30$/MWh.
Shown on the right is a far more dramatic example drawn from New Zealand
in March 2011, where electricity prices exceeded 20,000$/MWh in one re-
gion of the country, and remained near this extraordinary level for about
six hours. These two incidents resulted in investigations in their respective
communities [38,39]. In New Zealand, the Electricity Authority has recently
responded by retroactively reversing the prices to roughly one-tenth of the
peak value, since these high prices threatened to “undermine confidence in,
and ... damage the integrity and reputation of the wholesale electricity mar-
ket.”
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Figure 2.2: Electricity prices in Texas and New Zealand in 2011
While it is possible that strategic behavior and manipulation resulted in
the wild price swings observed in Texas and New Zealand, in this chapter
such price patterns are demonstrated to be consistent with the efficient com-
petitive equilibrium, where such manipulation is ruled out by assumption.
Models that capture dynamics, constraints, and volatility are needed to
gain any understanding of how to create markets that enhance reliability,
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with stable price profiles, in the face of uncertain generation assets and
volatile demand. Understanding the coupled dynamics of the physical grid
overlaid by a set of sequentially occurring markets is especially important to-
day: There are incentives from the government to make wider use of “smart
meters” to create a “smart grid.” Concomitantly, there has been an impe-
tus to install greater levels of intermittent renewable energy from sun, wind,
and waves, which will bring greater uncertainty to the grid. Until some in-
telligence can be introduced to accommodate the increased complexity and
uncertainty that will come with these changes, we believe that the term en-
tropic grid best describes the power grid envisioned by policy makers and
researchers today in 2011 [40]. A basic message to the power system commu-
nity is that while recognizing the potential benefits of the Smart Grid vision,
we must be aware of the potential issues arising from its entropic character-
istics. With proper design, this uncertainty can be reduced, and the term
Smart Grid will be justified.
In general, the implication of dynamics in market analysis has received
limited attention, in spite of the remarkable volatility seen in electricity mar-
kets around the world. This chapter surveys modest beginnings in the area
of dynamic equilibrium analysis, drawing mainly from [41–44], following Cho
and Meyn [45,46], and also inspired by recent research reported in [47,48].
The focus of this chapter is on developing models to capture the dynamics
associated with the market side of the entropic grid. The goal is to contribute
to the understanding of the impact of dynamics, constraints, and uncertainty
on dynamic competitive equilibria; factors which is expected to become more
acute with the increased deployment of renewable resources. Such sentiment
is aptly conveyed by Smith et al. in the recent article [49], where the authors
write that, “little consideration was given to market design and operation un-
der conditions of high penetrations of remote, variable renewable generation,
such as wind ... and solar energy, which had not yet appeared on the scene in
any significant amounts.” The approach is the development of models that
are able to characterize the competitive equilibria for a power network model
that captures these complexities. This may be regarded as a stepping stone
toward the creation of reliable markets for a smart grid.
A competitive economic equilibrium model is presented to refine standard
economic models (e.g., Theorem 3, [50]), by including dynamics, uncertainty
22
in supply and demand, and operational constraints associated with genera-
tion and transmission. Using a Lagrangian decomposition that is standard
in static economic analysis and certain dynamic economic analyses [16, 51],
conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in this dynamic
setting, and its optimality with regard to suitably defined social planner’s
problem are provided. Many of the conclusions obtained may be predicted
from classical economic theory. In particular, under general conditions, the
average equilibrium price coincides with the average marginal cost. However,
in a competitive equilibrium, the sample path behavior can be as volatile as
seen in the examples shown in Fig. 2.2. Moreover, in the presence of trans-
mission constraints, equilibrium prices may become negative or they may
exceed beyond the “choke-up” price that was predicted in [46].
This chapter also contains a brief economic analysis of a market with mixed
generation sources, in which fast responding, expensive ancillary services are
available to improve reliability. We consider a single example based on [41],
where the solution to the “social planner’s problem” was obtained, but a
market analysis was not considered. We illustrate through numerical exper-
iments that volatile price patterns result in very large variance, which can
negatively impact ancillary service providers. We explore demand response
as a potential solution and demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing price
variance. The models and concepts surveyed in this chapter will open new
pathways for accommodating uncertainty, dynamics, and strategic behavior
in electricity market models.
The remainder of this chapter contains three additional sections and is
organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the economic and physical models for the
electricity market players in a dynamic setting are presented and illustrated
through representative test case examples. Section 2.3 is devoted to the
characterization of the competitive equilibrium of the dynamic electricity
market model using a control-theoretic scaffolding. In particular, conditions
for the existence of a competitive equilibrium are derived in terms of duality
concepts from optimization theory. The two celebrated theorems of welfare
economics are proved, thus establishing the efficiency of market equilibria. In
Section 2.4, the equilibrium prices for the dynamic market are characterized,
and average prices are shown to coincide with average marginal cost under
some general assumptions. However, the test case examples emphasize the
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volatility observed in the sample paths of prices as well as the price range,
which reaches both negative and extremely large positive values. Concluding
remarks and final thoughts are provided in Section 2.5.
2.2 Electricity Market Model
Electricity markets are driven by economic objectives of the market par-
ticipants as well as the reliability constraints associated with the physical
limitations on generation and transmission, which are explicitly considered.
The market model described here is a high-level abstraction of the elec-
tric industry. It is an extension of the equilibrium models found in stan-
dard economic texts, suitably modified to accommodate dynamics, physical
constraints on generation and transmission, and uncertainty in supply and
demand. The model consists of three “players:” As in typical economic anal-
yses, the two main players are the consumers and the suppliers representing
the utility companies and generation owners, respectively. For simplicity, the
discussion is restricted to a single consumer and a single supplier that respec-
tively represent aggregation of all utility companies and generators across the
grid. The third player is the network. The network is introduced as a player
to capture the impacts of transmission constraints and exploit the network
structure. We can think of this third player as corresponding to the trans-
mission grid operator such as the independent system operator (ISO).1 In
what follows, the modeling of the three players is discussed and motivated
through examples.
2.2.1 The Players
The power grid is represented by a graph in which each node represents
a bus (which corresponds to a specific area/location), and each link repre-
sents a transmission line. There are N nodes, indexed as {1, . . . , N}, and
L transmission lines, indexed as {1, . . . , L}. The network is assumed to be
connected. A lossless DC model is used to characterize the relationship be-
1The ISO is an entity independent of the consumers and the suppliers that coordinates,
controls and monitors a large electric power transmission grid and its associated electricity
markets.
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tween nodal generation and demand, and power flow across the various links.
For simplicity, throughout most of this chapter we assume that at each node
there is exactly one source of generation, and one exogenous demand.
The consumer: Denote by Dn(t) the demand at bus n at time t, and
by EDn(t) the energy withdrawn by the consumer at that bus. Assume that
there is no free disposal for energy, which requires that EDn(t) ≤ Dn(t) for
all t. At time t, if sufficient generation is available at bus n, then EDn(t) =
Dn(t). In the event of insufficient generation, we have EDn(t) < Dn(t), i.e.,
the consumer’s demand is not met and the consumer experiences a forced
blackout.
The consumer must pay for energy consumed: The price2 at bus n is
denoted by Pn(t). D(t), ED(t), and P (t) are used to denote the associated
N -dimensional column vectors, and bold face font are used to denote the
entire sample path. For instance, P := {P (t) : t ≥ 0}.
The consumer obtains utility for energy consumption and disutility when
demand is not met: This is modeled by the following two functions,
Utility of consumption: vn(EDn(t)) , (2.1a)
Disutility of blackout: cbon (Dn(t)− EDn(t)) . (2.1b)
The welfare of the consumer at time t is the signed sum of benefits and
costs:
WD(t) :=
∑
n
[
vn(EDn(t)) − cbon (Dn(t)− EDn(t)) − Pn(t)EDn(t)
]
. (2.2)
The supplier: Denote by ESn(t) and RSn(t) the energy and reserve pro-
duced by the supplier at bus n at time t. The generation capacity GS avail-
able online coincides with ES+RS. The operational and physical constraints
on available generation are expressed abstractly as
(ES,RS) ∈ XS . (2.3)
These constraints include minimum up/down-time constraints, ramping con-
straints and capacity constraints imposed by the physical limitations on gen-
2Observe that prices may vary by the location. In the language of electricity markets,
they are locational prices.
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eration.
At each time t, the supplier incurs costs for producing energy as well as
maintaining reserves, which are represented as,
Cost of energy: cEn(ESn(t)) , (2.4a)
Cost of reserve: cRn(RSn(t)) . (2.4b)
The supplier at bus n receives the revenue PnESn(t) for producing energy.
The welfare of the supplier at time t is the difference between the supplier’s
revenue and costs,
WS(t) :=
∑
n
[
PnESn(t)− cEn(ESn(t))− cRn(RSn(t))
]
. (2.5)
The network: The network player can be thought of as a broker, who
buys energy from the supplier and sells it to the consumer. The transactions
brokered by the network player are subject to the physical constraints of
the transmission grid. The first constraint is based on the assumption that
the network is lossless, so it neither generates nor consumes energy. Conse-
quently, the network transactions are subject to the supply-demand balance
constraint,
1TES(t) = 1
TED(t) for t ≥ 0 . (2.6)
The next set of constraints are due to the limitations of power flow through
transmission lines. The DC power flow model is adopted [2] for the power
flows through the lines. Without loss of generality, bus 1 is selected as the
reference bus and the injection shift factor matrix H ∈ [−1, 1]N×L is defined.
Recall that Hnl represents the power that is distributed online l when 1 MW
is injected into bus n and withdrawn at the reference bus. If fmaxl denotes
the capacity of transmission line l and Hl ∈ RN represents the l-th column
of H, the power flow constraint for line l can be expressed as,
−fmaxl ≤ [ES(t)− ED(t)]THl ≤ fmaxl for t ≥ 0 . (2.7)
It is convenient to introduce a “network welfare function” to define a com-
petitive equilibrium for the dynamic market model. The welfare of the net-
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work at time t represents the “brokerage charges” and is defined by,
WT(t) :=
∑
n
[
Pn(EDn(t)− ESn(t))
]
. (2.8)
The introduction of the network welfare function is purely for the sake of
analysis. In Section 2.3, it is assumed that the “network” maximizes its
welfare, subject to the supply-demand balance constraint (2.6) and power
flow constraint (2.7) for each line l, which are collectively summarized by the
notation,
(ED,ES) ∈ XT . (2.9)
2.2.2 Test Case Examples
The following three examples are intended to illustrate the modeling con-
ventions described in the preceding section. These examples are revisited in
Section 2.4 to illustrate the conclusions of Section 2.3.
Example A – Single-Bus Model: In this simple model there is a sin-
gle generator, a single consumer, and no transmission network. The exoge-
nous demand D is scalar valued, and the supply-demand balance constraints
amount to E :=ES = ED. This example is similar to the model of [46].
The simplest constraints on generation, those imposed by limitations on
ramping capabilities, are imposed. The positive constants ζ+ and ζ− repre-
sent the maximum rates for ramping up and down the generators: For each
t1 > t0 ≥ 0,
−ζ− ≤ ES(t1)− ES(t0)
t1 − t0 +
RS(t1)−RS(t0)
t1 − t0 ≤ ζ
+ . (2.10)
The constraint set XS consists of all pairs (ES,RS) which satisfy (2.10).
Piecewise-linear utility, disutility and cost functions take the following
form,
Utility of consumption: vE(t) ,
Disutility of blackout: cbo max(D(t)− E(t), 0) ,
Cost of generation: cE(t) + cR(t) ;
(2.11)
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where v, cbo and c are positive constants. The parameter cbo is the cost
of outage incurred by the consumers for each unit of demand that is not
satisfied. This may be tens of thousands of dollars per megawatt hour, de-
pending on the location and time of day. In typical static analysis, the
quantity (v + cbo) represents the maximum price the consumer is willing to
pay for electricity, and is known as the choke-up price [46].
Line 1 Line 2
Line 3
ED1
ES1
RS1
ED3
ES3 RS3
ED2
ES2RS2
Figure 2.3: Texas model: A 3-bus network
Example B – Texas Model: The network topology is shown in Fig. 2.3.
There are sources of demand and supply at each of the three nodes shown in
the figure, and each node is connected to the other nodes via transmission
lines.
The supply-demand balance constraints (2.6) result in the single equation,
ES1(t) + ES2(t) + ES3(t) =ED1(t) + ED2(t) + ED3(t) for t ≥ 0 . (2.12)
Suppose that the impedances of all three transmission lines are identical.
Further, the arrows indicate the direction of power flow which is assumed to
be positive. Then, with bus 1 chosen as the reference bus, the injection
shift factor matrix is given by
H = 1
3

0 0 0
−2 −1 −1
−1 −2 1
 . (2.13)
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The power flow constraints for the three transmission lines are expressed as
−Fmax ≤
 ES1(t)− ED1(t)ES2(t)− ED2(t)
ES3(t)− ED3(t)

T
H ≤ Fmax for t ≥ 0 , (2.14)
where Fmax = [fmax12 , f
max
13 , f
max
23 ] with f
max
mn representing the capacity limit of
each line l = 1, 2, 3 connected between nodes m and n. Then, the network
constraints set XT consists of all sample paths (ED,ES) which satisfy (2.12)
and (2.14).
2.3 Competitive Equilibria and Efficiency
The competitive equilibrium is used in economic analysis as a vehicle to
study the outcomes of a market under a set of idealized assumptions [16,
50, 52]. It is characterized by the allocation of goods and their prices: for
the given prices, each player maximizes its welfare subject to constraints on
production/consumption of the goods. That is, the competitive equilibrium
characterizes an allocation that is optimal from the point of view of individual
players. In this theory, the solution to the so-called social planner’s problem
(SPP) serves as a benchmark and is an allocation of goods that maximizes
the economic well-being of the aggregation of all players, and is optimal from
the point of view of the entire system. This optimal solution is known as an
efficient allocation.
The fundamental theorems of welfare economics provide a strong link be-
tween competitive equilibria and the SPP. The first theorem states that any
competitive equilibrium leads to an efficient allocation, while the second
states the converse. In this section, the concepts of competitive equilib-
rium and efficiency for the dynamic electricity market model presented in
Section 2.2 are revisited, and the fundamental welfare theorems for such a
market are established.
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2.3.1 Preliminaries
The usual definition of a competitive equilibrium with two players is based
on the respective optimization problems of the consumer and the supplier.
The same convention in the dynamic setting is adopted, but the equilibrium
definition is extended to accommodate the third player – the network. In the
dynamic setting, the long-run discounted expected surplus is adopted as the
consumer’s objective function. With discount rate γ, the long-run discounted
expected consumer welfare is
KD := E
[∫
e−γtWD(t) dt
]
.
The long-run discounted welfare of the supplier and the network are defined
similarly, denoted KS, KT, respectively.
The consumer, supplier, and network each aim to optimize their respec-
tive mean discounted welfare KD, KS, and KT. In general, these quantities
depend on the initial condition of the system; this dependency is suppressed
whenever possible.
The assumptions imposed in this dynamic setting are intended to mirror
those used in equilibrium theory for static economic models. To emphasize
the similarities, the following Hilbert-space notation is adopted: For two
real-valued stochastic processes F and G, the inner product is introduced,
〈F ,G〉 := E
[∫
e−γtF (t)G(t) dt
]
, (2.15)
and write F ∈ L2 if 〈F ,F 〉 < ∞. For example, using this notation, we
have KD = 〈WD,1〉, where 1 denotes the process that is identically unity. It
is assumed throughout that the components of the vector-valued processes
{ED,ES,RS,P } belong to L2.
In the formal definition of a competitive equilibrium given in Definition 4,
the optimization problems of the supplier and of the network are each subject
to physical constraints. However, as in [46], the set of feasible strategies for
the consumer are not subject to the constraints on generation or transmission
specified in (2.3, 2.9).
Several additional assumptions are imposed for the dynamic market model,
each of which is an extension of what is typically assumed in the competitive
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equilibrium analysis of a static model.
(A1) Consumers and suppliers share equal information. This is modeled using
a common filtration: an increasing family of σ-algebras, denoted H =
{Ht : t ≥ 0}. The demand process D, the price process P , and the
decisions of the consumer ED and the supplier (ES,RS) are adapted to
this filtration.
(A2) The components of these vector-valued processes lie in L2: Consumer de-
cisions ED, supplier decisions (ES,RS), and the price process P . More-
over, utility and cost functions are subject to quadratic growth: These
functions are non-negative, and for each n, there exists kn < ∞ such
that for each scalar r, and each e ≥ 0,
vn(e) ≤ kn(1 + e2) cEn(e) ≤ kn(1 + e2)
cbon (r) ≤ kn(1 + r2) cRn(r) ≤ kn(1 + r2)
(A3) Prices are exogenous in the following sense: for each t0 > 0, the future
prices {P (t) : t > t0} are conditionally independent of {ED(t), ES(t) :
t ≤ t0}, given current and past prices {P (t) : t ≤ t0}.
Under assumption (A3), also known as the price-taking assumption, no mar-
ket player is large enough to influence prices and, hence, market manipulation
is eliminated.
A competitive equilibrium for the dynamic market model is defined as
follows.
Definition 4. A competitive equilibrium is a quadruple of process vectors:
consumed energy, supplied energy, supplied reserve, and energy price; denoted
as {EeD,EeS,ReS,P e}, which satisfies the following conditions:
(i) EeD solves the consumer’s optimization problem;
EeD ∈ arg max
ED
〈WD,1〉 . (2.16)
(ii) (EeS,R
e
S) solves the supplier’s optimization problem;
(EeS,R
e
S) ∈ arg max
ES,RS
〈WS,1〉 (2.17)
subject to generation constraints (2.3)
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(iii) (EeD,E
e
S) solves the network’s optimization problem with P
e being
the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.9),
(EeD,E
e
S) ∈ arg max
ED,ES
〈WT,1〉 (2.18)
subject to network constraints (2.9)
The consumer, supplier and network are also subject to the measurability
constraint outlined in assumption (A1) in their respective optimization prob-
lems.
As discussed at the start of this section, to evaluate the market, a so-
cial planner is introduced who aims to maximize the economic well-being of
aggregate representation of the players in the system. It should be stressed
that there is no actual planner — this is another analytical device. The social
planner uses the total welfare, denoted by Wtot(t), to measure the economic
well-being of the system with
Wtot(t) := WS(t) +WD(t) +WT(t) . (2.19)
The total welfare can be expressed,
Wtot(t) =
∑
n
[
vn(EDn(t))− cbon (Dn(t)− EDn(t))− cEn(ESn(t))− cRn(RSn(t))
]
,
which is independent of the price process.
The efficient allocation is derived by solving the social planner’s problem
(SPP) described at the start of this section. It is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5. The social planner’s problem is given by,
max
ED,ES,RS
〈W tot,1〉
subject to generation constraints (2.3) ,
and network constraints (2.9) .
(2.20)
Its solution is called an efficient allocation.
Assume that the SPP (2.20) has a solution, denoted by (E∗D,E
∗
S,R
∗
S).
Given these preliminaries, the stage is set for the two fundamental theo-
rems of welfare economics which link the above two definitions.
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Theorem 6 (First Welfare Theorem). Any competitive equilibrium, if it ex-
ists, is efficient.
Theorem 7 (Second Welfare Theorem). If a market admits a competitive
equilibrium, then any efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive
equilibrium.
The proofs of these results are contained in Section 2.3.2 that follows.
2.3.2 Analysis
The main result here is Theorem 9, that characterizes the existence of a
competitive equilibrium. At the end of this section the first and second
fundamental theorems are established as corollaries to this result.
The analysis in this section is based on the Lagrangian relaxation frame-
work presented in [43]. Lagrange multipliers are scalar processes, denoted
(λ,µ+l ,µ
−
l ), with λ unconstrained, and with µ
+
l (t) ≥ 0 and µ−l (t) ≥ 0 for
all t and l. These processes are assumed to lie in L2, and adapted to H (see
(A1)). The Lagrangian of the SPP is denoted,
L = −〈W tot,1〉+ 〈λ, (1TED − 1TES)〉
+
∑
l
〈µ+l , (ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉
+
∑
l
〈µ−l ,−(ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉 . (2.21)
A key step is to define the candidate price process P as
Pn(t) := λ(t) +
∑
l
(µ−l (t)− µ+l (t))Hln, t ≥ 0, n ≥ 1. (2.22)
The Lagrangian is then expressed as the sum of three terms, each of which
is a sum over the N nodes,
L = −
∑
n
{〈vn(EDn)− cbon (Dn −EDn),1〉 − 〈P n,EDn〉}
−
∑
n
{〈P n,ESn〉 − 〈cEn(ESn) + cRn(RSn),1〉}
−
∑
l
〈µ+l + µ−l , fmaxl 〉 .
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The first two terms correspond to −WD and −WS respectively (the negative
consumer and supplier welfare functions), defined using the price P given in
(2.22).
The dual functional for the SPP is defined as the minimum,
h(λ,µ+,µ−) = min
ED,ES,RS
L . (2.23)
The following weak duality bound follows since the minimization in (2.23)
amounts to a relaxation of the SPP (2.20).
Lemma 8 (Weak Duality). For any allocation {ED,ES,RS} and Lagrangian
multiplier (λ,µ+,µ−) with µ+,µ− ≥ 0, we have
−〈W tot,1〉 ≥ h(λ,µ+,µ−) . (2.24)
Strong duality is said to hold if equality holds in (2.24).
Theorem 9 characterizes the existence of a competitive equilibrium in terms
of strong duality.
Theorem 9 (Existence of Competitive Equilibria). The market admits a
competitive equilibrium if and only if the SPP satisfies strong duality.
Proof. First prove the sufficient condition: strong duality implies existence
of a competitive equilibrium. Since strong duality holds, then
−〈W tot,1〉 = h(λ,µ+,µ−) . (2.25)
Suppose that the allocation {ED,ES,RS} is feasible for the SPP. Then a
competitive equilibrium is constructed with price as given in (2.22).
The feasibility of the triple {ED,ES,RS} for SPP implies 1TES(t) =
1TED(t) for all t, and hence
L = −〈W tot,1〉+
∑
l
〈µ+l , (ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉
+
∑
l
〈µ−l ,−(ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉 .
Furthermore, feasibility also implies −fmaxl ≤ (ES(t) − ED(t))THl ≤ fmaxl ,
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and given the non-negativity of µ+,µ−, we have
〈µ+, (ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉 ≤ 0 ,
and
〈µ−,−(ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉 ≤ 0 .
Therefore, using (2.25), we have L ≤ h(λ,µ+,µ−). But, by the definition
(2.23), we have L ≥ h(λ,µ+,µ−), so that the identity is obtained,
h(λ,µ+,µ−) = L . (2.26)
This identity implies that ED maximizes the consumer’s welfare, {ES,RS}
maximizes the supplier’s welfare, and
〈µ+, (ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉 = 0 ,
and
〈µ−,−(ES −ED)THl − fmaxl 〉 = 0 .
Using the prices defined in (2.22), the network’s optimization objective is
computed as follows,〈∑
n
[P n(EDn −ESn)] ,1
〉
=
〈∑
n
[∑
l
(µ−l − µ+l )Hln(EDn −ESn)
]
,1
〉
=
〈∑
l
(µ+l + µ
−
l )f
max
l ,1
〉
.
The network’s objective function is independent of ED and {ES,RS}, which
implies that the network welfare is maximized under the prices {P n}. Thus,
it is safe to conclude that P as defined in (2.22) is the equilibrium price as
claimed and that {ED,ES,RS,P } constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Next the necessary condition is established: existence of a competitive
equilibrium implies strong duality. Suppose that {EeD,EeS,ReS,P e} is a com-
petitive equilibrium. Then {EeD,EeS} maximizes the network welfare when
the price is P e. The Lagrangian associated with the network’s optimization
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problem is expressed as follows: For any µ+,µ− ≥ 0,
LT = −
∑
n
〈P en, (EeDn −EeSn)〉+ 〈λ, (1TEeD − 1TEeS)〉s
+
∑
l
〈µ+l , (EeS −EeD)THl − fmaxl 〉
+
∑
l
〈µ−l ,−(EeS −EeD)THl − fmaxl 〉 . (2.27)
The network’s optimization problem is a linear program and, hence, the
optimum {EeD,EeS} satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. As
a consequence, associated with the constraints
∂LT
∂EDn
=
∂LT
∂ESn
= 0
at the optimum, there exist {λ,µ+,µ−} such that
P en = λ+
∑
l
(µ−l − µ+l )Hln ;
that is, equilibrium price process P en satisfies (2.22). Moreover, by complementary-
slackness,
〈λ, (1TEeD − 1TEeS)〉 = 0 ,
〈µ+, (EeS −EeD)THl − fmaxl 〉 = 0 ,
〈µ−,−(EeS −EeD)THl − fmaxl 〉 = 0 .
(2.28)
Suppose that the dual function h(·) for the SPP is formulated using the
multipliers λ, µ+, and µ− from the network’s optimization problem. Since
{EeD,EeS,ReS,P e} is a competitive equilibrium,EeD maximizes the consumer’s
welfare, and {EeS,ReS} maximizes the supplier’s welfare. Based on the form
(2.22) for price process P e, it is safe to conclude that
{EeD,EeS,ReS} ∈ arg min
ED,ES,RS
L .
Substituting {EeD,EeS,ReS} into (2.21), and applying the complementary
slackness conditions from (2.28), we have
−〈W tot,1〉 = h(λ,µ+,µ−) .
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That is, strong duality holds.
It should be stressed that Theorem 9 characterizes prices in any competi-
tive equilibrium.
Corollary 10. The only candidates for prices in a competitive equilibrium
are given by (2.22), based on the optimal Lagrange multipliers.
Proof. This is because only the optimal Lagrange multipliers could possibly
lead to strong duality.
Thus, Theorem 9 tells us that computation of prices and quantities can be
decoupled: The quantities {ED,ES,RS} are obtained through the solution
of the SPP, and the price process P e is obtained as a solution to its dual. The
following corollary underlines the fact that if P e supports one competitive
equilibrium, then it supports any other competitive equilibrium.
Corollary 11. If {E1D,E1S,R1S,P 1} and {E2D,E2S, R2S,P 2} are two compet-
itive equilibria, then {E2D,E2S,R2S, P 1} is also a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Due to the necessary condition of Theorem 9, there exist Lagrange
multipliers (λ1,µ
+
1 ,µ
−
1 ) and (λ2,µ
+
2 , µ
−
2 ) corresponding to the two equilib-
ria, such that
h(λ1,µ
+
1 ,µ
−
1 ) = −〈W tot1,1〉 = −〈W tot2,1〉 .
By the sufficient condition of Theorem 9, any of these price and quantity
pairs satisfying strong duality will constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6. From the proof of necessary condition of Theo-
rem 9, for any competitive equilibrium {EeD,EeS,ReS,P e}, there exist dual
variables (λ,µ+,µ−) such that
h(λ,µ+,µ−) = −〈W tot,1〉 .
From weak duality (2.24), both the SPP and its dual problem are optimized.
Therefore, {EeD,EeS,ReS} is an efficient allocation.
Proof of Theorem 7. Assume that a competitive equilibrium exists.
Then, applying Theorem 6, there exists at least one equilibrium price pro-
cess P e that supports one of the efficient allocations. By Theorem 9, the
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existence of a competitive equilibrium implies strong duality. Consequently,
from the sufficient condition of Theorem 9, any of these price and quantity
pairs satisfying strong duality will constitute a competitive equilibrium. In
other words, the price P e supports all efficient allocations.
2.4 Equilibrium Prices for the Test Cases
The dynamic electricity market model of Section 2.2 is an appropriate repre-
sentation of a competitive market as analyzed in a standard economics text.
The dynamic nature of the constraints on generation may lead to volatile
prices that negatively impact the consumers, the suppliers, or both. The
sample path behavior of prices in a competitive equilibrium can look as er-
ratic as the worst days during the crises in Illinois or California in the 1990s,
or in Texas and New Zealand during the early months of 2011.
In this section, the equilibrium prices for the test case examples presented
in Section 2.2.2 are characterized using the Lagrangian relaxation framework
of Section 2.3. The conclusion is that even in the dynamic setting, market
outcomes reflect the standard conclusions for efficient markets: Prices equal
marginal costs, but only on average. How binding transmission constraints
can result in prices that are negative or that exceed the choke-up price is also
illustrated.
2.4.1 Single-Bus Model
Here sample path prices and their mean value for Example A, the single-
bus model, are investigated. Recall that the generation constraint set XS
is defined by the ramp constraints (2.10), and piecewise-linear forms are
assumed for the utility and cost functions. Also, supply-demand balance
necessitates that E :=ES = ED.
A special case of Example A is the model of [46], wherein the equilibrium
price is obtained as
P e(t) = (v + cbo)I{R∗(t) < 0}, (2.29)
withR∗ denoting the reserve process in the solution of the SPP. The quantity
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(v + cbo) is the choke-up price, which can be extremely large in a real power
system. Consequently, equilibrium prices show tremendous volatility. How-
ever, when initial reserves are sufficiently large, the average price coincides
with marginal cost c for generation, in the sense that
γE
[∫
e−γtP e(t) dt
]
= c . (2.30)
These conclusions were first obtained in [46] through direct calculation, based
on specific statistical assumptions on demand. We show here that the same
conclusions can be derived in far greater generality based on a Lagrangian
relaxation technique.
First, the formula for P e is established.
Proposition 12. Suppose that (E∗,R∗) is a solution to the SPP that defines
a competitive equilibrium with price process P e. Then,
P e(t) = ∇v (E∗(t)) +∇cbo (D(t)− E∗(t)), t ≥ 0 . (2.31)
Proof. In the single-bus model we haveWD(t):=v(ED(t))−cbo(D(t)−ED(t))−
P e(t)ED(t). The result (2.31) follows because E
∗ = ED in the competitive
equilibrium, and the consumer is myopic (recall that the consumer does not
consider ramp constraints).
To find the average price, we consider the supplier’s optimization problem.
We then consider a Lagrangian relaxation, in which the constraint ES(0) +
RS(0) = g0 is captured by the Lagrange multiplier ν. The Lagrangian is
denoted,
LS(ES,RS, ν) = E
[∫
e−γtWS(t) dt
]
− ν[ES(0) +RS(0)− g0] . (2.32)
The following result is a consequence of the local Lagrange multiplier theo-
rem [53, Theorem 1 of Sec. 9.3].
Lemma 13. Let Xg0S ⊂ XS represent the set of feasible (ES,RS), subject to
the given initial condition g0. Suppose (E
g0
S ,R
g0
S ) maximizes LS(ES,RS, 0)
over the set Xg0S . Then, there exist ν
∗ ∈ R such that (Eg0S ,Rg0S ) maximizes
LS(ES,RS, ν∗) over the larger set XS.
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The next result is a construction required in the application of the local
Lagrange multiplier result of Lemma 13.
Lemma 14. Suppose that (ES,RS) ∈ XS. Then there exists a family of
solutions {(EαS ,RS) : |α| ≤ 1} ⊂ XS satisfying EαS (0) = max(ES(0) + α, 0);
|EαS (t)−ES(t)| ≤ |α| for all t; and, lim
α→0
1
α
(EαS (t)−ES(t)) = 1+S (t):=I{ES(t) >
0} for t > 0.
The extension of the average-price formula (2.30) is obtained on combining
these results:
Theorem 15. Suppose that (E∗,R∗) is a solution to the SPP that defines
a competitive equilibrium with price process P e. Suppose that E∗(0) > 0.
Moreover, assume that the following strengthening of (A2) holds: The cost
function satisfies cE(e) + |∇cE(e)| ≤ k0(1 + e2) for some k0 > 0 and for all
e ≥ 0. Then,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−γt1+S (t)P
e(t) dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−γt1+S (t)∇cE (E∗(t)) dt
]
+ ν∗ , (2.33)
where ν∗ is the sensitivity term from Lemma 13.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the theorem, the Lagrangian LS(Eα,R∗, ν)
can be differentiated by α so that
d
dα
LS(Eα,R∗, ν∗) = E
[∫
e−γt
d
dα
WαS (t) dt
]
− d
dα
ν∗[Eα(0) +R∗(0)− g0] ,
(2.34)
where WαS (t) := P e(t)EαS (t)− cE(EαS (t))− cR(R∗(t)). In this calculation, the
square integrability assumption and bounds on cE justify taking the derivative
under the expectation and integral in (2.32).
Then, the result follows from two facts. First, the optimality of the La-
grangian at α = 0 gives
d
dα
LS(Eα,R∗, ν) = 0
for α = 0. Second, application of Lemma 14 followed by the chain rule gives,
d
dα
WαS (t)
∣∣∣
α=0
= 1+S (t)
(
P e(t)E∗(t)−∇cE (E∗(t))) .
Evaluating (2.34) at α = 0 then gives the desired result.
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Thus, an extended version of (2.30) can be established. The average price
depends on the initial value g0, and this dependence is captured through the
sensitivity term ν∗. When ramping down is unconstrained, ν∗ ≥ 0.
2.4.2 Network Model
Now study the network-based dynamic market model introduced in Sec-
tion 2.2. In general, the analysis of this model is complicated by the con-
straints imposed on the transmission lines, in addition to the dynamic con-
straints on generation. Therefore, appropriate relaxations are looked for to
proceed with the analysis.
The relaxation introduced here is based on the assumption that the net-
work and the consumer are not subject to dynamic constraints. Conse-
quently, these two players are myopic in their respective optimization prob-
lems. On the other hand, the dynamic nature of the generation constraints
restricts the supplier and, consequently, the social planner from adopting
myopic strategies in their optimization problems.
To characterize the equilibrium prices, a market without any suppliers is
introduced. It is a fictitious model introduced solely for analysis:
Definition 16. The /S-market is defined as follows:
(i) The models for the consumer and network players are unchanged. The
supplier model is modified by relaxing the operational/physical constraints
(2.3) on (ES,RS).
(ii) The welfare functions of the consumer and the network are unchanged.
The welfare function of the supplier is identically zero. This is achieved
by overriding the production cost functions as follows:
cE /Sn (ESn(t)) = P
e
n(t)ESn(t) , c
R/S
n (RSn(t)) = 0 . (2.35)
Since the welfare function W/SS for the supplier is identically zero, the /S-
market essentially reduces to a model consisting of two players: the consumer
and the network. We find that the equilibrium for the original market pro-
vides an equilibrium for this two-player market.
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Lemma 17. A competitive equilibrium for the original three-player market
is a competitive equilibrium for the two-player /S-market.
Proof. Let {EeD,EeS,ReS,P e} be a competitive equilibrium of the original
three-player market. Clearly, the triple {EeD,EeS,ReS} satisfies the supply-
demand balance and the network constraints, and maximizes the consumer
and the network welfare functions under price P e. Since the supplier’s wel-
fare W/SS is always zero by assumption, the pair {EeS,ReS} can be viewed
as maximizing the supplier’s welfare in the /S-market. Thus, the lemma
holds.
Therefore, all equilibrium prices P e in the original market model support
a competitive equilibrium in the /S-market. Hence, it is possible to extract
properties of P e by analyzing the simpler /S-market model. This is the main
motivation behind the introduction of the /S-market.
Recall that in the single-bus model, the characterization of the price in
(2.31) was based on the assumption that consumers are not subject to dy-
namic constraints and are hence myopic. Lemma 18, which follows from the
definition of /S-market, justifies the same approach to analyze the network
model.
Lemma 18. All players, as well as the social planner, are myopic in the
/S-market.
Hence the optimization problems of the consumer and the network in the
/S-market are reduced to a “snapshot model” in which it is possible to fix
a time t to obtain properties of P e(t), exactly similar to the derivation of
(2.31).
With time t fixed, it is safe to suppress the time notation so that the
snapshot version of the SPP is given as the maximization of the total welfare
W/Stot with
W/Stot =
∑
n
[
vn(EDn)− cbon (Dn − EDn)− P enESn
]
, (2.36)
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subject to the following constraints:
1TES = 1
TED ↔ λ ,
−fmaxl ≤ (ES − ED)THl ≤ fmaxl ↔ µ−l , µ+l ≥ 0 for all l ,
0 ≤ EDn ≤ Dn ↔ η−n , η+n ≥ 0 for all n .
The λ, µ−l , µ
+
l , η
−
n , η
+
n are Lagrange multipliers associated with the corre-
sponding constraints. The Lagrangian of the SPP for the /S-market is the
function of static variables:
L/S =−W/Stot + λ(1T(ED − ES))
+
∑
l
µ+l [(ES − ED)THl − fmaxl ]
+
∑
l
µ−l [−(ES − ED)THl − fmaxl ]
+
∑
n
η+n (EDn −Dn)−
∑
n
η+nEDn.
(2.37)
For the fixed time t, the nodal price P en is characterized as follows.
Proposition 19. Consider the SPP for the /S-market with welfare function
defined in (2.36). Suppose that µ−l , µ
+
l , η
−
n , η
+
n are the non-negative, optimal
solutions to the dual with Lagrangian (2.37). Then the equilibrium price has
entries given as follows: For n = 1, . . . , N ,
P en = ∇vn(EeDn) +∇cbon (Dn − EeDn) + Λ , (2.38)
where Λ =

0 , 0 < EeDn < Dn
−η+n , EeDn = Dn
η−n , E
e
Dn = 0
, and, EeDn is the energy consumed in
the equilibrium.
Proof. Since {EeD,EeS,ReS,P e} is a competitive equilibrium for the /S-market,
{EeD,EeS} maximizes the SPP for the /S-market. By the KKT conditions, we
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obtain,
0 =
∂L/S
∂EDn
= −∇vn(EeDn)−∇cbon (Dn − EeDn) + λ
+
∑
l
(µ−ln − µ+ln)Hln + η+n − η−n ;
0 =
∂L/S
∂Esn
= P en − λ−
∑
l
(µ−ln − µ+ln)Hln .
On summing these two equations we obtain,
P en = ∇vn(EeDn) +∇cbon (Dn − EeDn)− η+n + η−n .
The proposition follows from the complementary slackness conditions.
Result (2.38) holds for all equilibria in the two-player /S-market. Conse-
quently, from Lemma 17, it holds for all equilibria in the original three-player
market. Although it appears from (2.38) that prices depend upon the actions
of the players, this is not the case. Similar to the Proposition 12, the price
can be written as
P en(t) = ∇vn(E∗Dn(t)) +∇cbon (Dn(t)− E∗Dn(t)) + Λ∗(t) ,
where {E∗Dn(t)} and, consequently, Λ∗(t)) are obtained from the solution of
the SPP.
To apply Proposition 19, the parameters {η−n , η+n }must be identified, which
represent the sensitivities of the SPP solution with respect to the constraints
EDn ≥ 0 and EDn ≤ Dn respectively. Next, the price computations are
motivated through numerical examples.
2.4.3 Texas Model: Range of Prices
Example B is revisited to illustrate the application of Proposition 19. This
example shows how prices in a network with binding transmission constraints
can go below zero or well above the choke-up price.
For the Texas model shown in Fig. 2.3, assume that a single supplier is
located at bus 1 while buses 2 and 3 are load buses. The buyer has linear
utility of consumption and disutility of blackout (2.1b) at buses 2 and 3,
with identical parameters v and cbo. With identical impedances for the three
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transmission lines and bus 1 chosen as the reference bus, the injection shift
factor matrix H is given by the expression (2.13).
Assume that the supporting price P e1 at bus 1 is zero, and that this is true
not only for the snapshot values {EDi, ESi, RSi} and parameters {fmaxij }, but
also for all values in a neighborhood of these nominal values. This is not
unreasonable based on the results of Section 2.4.1 if the reserves are strictly
positive at bus 1. Under these assumptions, it is possible to then compute the
prices P e2 and P
e
3 at buses 2 and 3 respectively, using the /S-market introduced
in Section 2.4.2.
Recall that the supplier’s welfare function is identically zero in the /S-
market. Suppose that D2 = 170 MW and D3 = 30 MW. Then, the snapshot
SPP for the /S-market is,
min − [v(ED2 + ED3)− cbo(200− ED2 − ED3)]
subject to ES1 = ED2 + ED3
−fmax12 ≤ 23ED2 + 13ED3 ≤ fmax12
−fmax23 ≤ 13ED2 − 13ED3 ≤ fmax23
−fmax13 ≤ 13ED2 + 23ED3 ≤ fmax13
0 ≤ ED2 ≤ 170 , 0 ≤ ED3 ≤ 30 .
Negative prices: Assume that fmax23 = 40 MW, while the other two lines
are unconstrained. Solving the SPP for the /S-market we obtain ED2 =
150 MW and ED3 = 30 MW, and the limit f
max
23 = 40 MW is reached. Since
0 < ED2 < D2 , then P
e
2 = v + c
bo by Proposition 19.
For a given  ∈ R, perturb the constraint on ED3 to obtain 0 ≤ ED3 ≤ 30+.
On re-solving the SPP we obtain ED2 = 150 +  MW and ED3 = 30 +  MW.
Applying Proposition 19, P e3 is given by the limit,
P e3 := v + c
bo + lim
→0
−(180 + 2)v + (20− 2)cbo + 180v − 20cbo

.
That is, P e3 = −(v + cbo), which is clearly negative.
Prices exceeding the choke up price: Assume that fmax13 = 50 MW,
while the other two lines are unconstrained. Again, solving the SPP for the /S-
market gives ED2 = 150 MW and ED3 = 0 MW with the limit f
max
13 = 50 MW
being reached. Proposition 19 gives P e2 = v + c
bo since 0 < ED2 < D2.
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For a given  ∈ R, we perturb the constraint on ED3 to obtain 0 +  ≤
ED3 ≤ 30. On re-solving the SPP, we obtain ED2 = 150 − 2 MW and
ED3 =  MW. Again, applying Proposition 19, P
e
3 is expressed as a limit,
P e3 := v + c
bo + lim
→0
−(180− )v + (20 + )cbo + 180v − 20cbo

.
That is, P e3 = 2(v + c
bo), which is twice the choke-up price.
Thus, when the transmission constraints come into play, the equilibrium
prices are spread over a wide range, encompassing values well below zero as
well as values far exceeding the choke-up price.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a framework for constructing dynamic models for electricity
markets, and methods for characterizing the resulting competitive equilib-
ria are described. The dynamic model is constructed using techniques well
known in the control community and can effectively handle the underlying
physics of the power system while taking into account the economic aspects
of electricity trading.
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CHAPTER 3
AN EXTREME-POINT
SUBDIFFERENTIAL METHOD FOR
CONVEX HULL PRICING: ALGORITHM
STRUCTURE
Prices in electricity markets are given by the dual variables associated with
the supply-demand constraint in the dispatch problem. However, in unit-
commitment-based day-ahead markets, these variables are not easy to ob-
tain. A common approach relies on re-solving the dispatch problem with
the commitment decisions fixed, and utilizing the associated dual variables.
This avenue may lead to inadequate revenues to generators, which has led
to the introduction of uplift payments made by the market operator for fur-
ther compensating the generators. An alternative pricing mechanism known
as convex hull pricing has been proposed to reduce uplift payments. Com-
putation of these prices requires the global maximization of an associated
Lagrangian dual problem.
In this chapter, an extreme-point-based procedure is presented for obtain-
ing a global maximizer which is interpreted as the convex hull price. Unlike
standard subgradient schemes where an arbitrary subgradient is used, an
extreme-point subdifferential (EPSD) algorithm is presented; this is a novel
technique in which the steepest ascent direction is constructed by solving a
continuous quadratic program. The EPSD algorithm initiates a move along
this direction, employing an a priori constant steplength, with the intent of
reaching the boundary of the face. A backtracking scheme selects a steplength
that ensures descent with respect to a suitably defined merit function. As
most electricity markets today co-optimize energy and reserves, an exten-
sion of the proposed convex hull pricing algorithm is provided for such inte-
grated markets. Under suitable assumptions, outcomes of energy-only and
energy-reserve co-optimized markets under different pricing and uplift rules
are compared. In these examples, pricing rules have a major impact on the
total payment while the uplift payment only accounts for a small portion of
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it. It is also observed that it remains unclear whether marginal-cost pricing
or convex hull pricing leads to higher total payment.
3.1 Introduction
Currently, all day-ahead electricity markets in North America employ a unit-
commitment-based model that explicitly incorporates each generator’s physi-
cal/operational constraints. Furthermore, the framework allows for start-up,
no-load and marginal costs in the specification of offers. The operation and
dispatch mechanisms of these markets are similar to those of a tightly reg-
ulated power pool: the quantity sold by each generator is determined by
solving a centralized unit commitment and economic dispatch problem, ex-
cept that the costs in this formulation are overridden by offer prices.
While the best way to determine prices remains an open question, a com-
mon practice is to derive prices, referred to as “marginal-cost prices,” from
the solution of the corresponding economic dispatch problem in which com-
mitment decisions are fixed. These commitment decisions are derived from an
a priori solution of a unit commitment problem. Start-up and no-load costs
that are commitment-dependent are ignored when computing these prices.
As a consequence, the payments collected through the auction may be in-
sufficient to compensate the generators. To overcome this problem, uplift
payment mechanisms have been introduced, through which additional side
payments are made to the generators in recognition of the costs incurred due
to commitment decisions.
The introduction of uplift payments brings potentially new difficulties for
both the operator and the market participants. First, they may lead to al-
locations of payments that are neither transparent nor easy to justify. The
strong dependence of marginal-cost prices on the commitment solution raises
concerns regarding the equity, efficiency and economic rationale of electric-
ity markets [19, 54]. As the size of the unit commitment problems often
precludes computing exact solutions, the dual variables associated with the
corresponding dispatch problems, parameterized by these commitment deci-
sions, may vary dramatically with solution accuracy. Yet another difficulty
is that the marginal-cost prices no longer increase monotonically with de-
mand. In particular, a high price does not necessarily indicate a high level of
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demand, since committed generators with high offers may set the marginal-
cost prices. Accordingly, prices fail to assume their usual economic roles as
indicators of the alignment between supply and demand, or incentives for
adjusting supply and consumption levels [55].
Motivated by the need to develop pricing and uplift models in the pres-
ence of discrete commitment decisions, several alternate payment mecha-
nisms have been proposed. The discrete-decision-pricing approach, as pro-
posed by O’Neill et al. [24], requires constraints be imposed to restrict the
commitment decisions to the levels specified by solving the unit commitment
problem, and uses the associated Lagrange multipliers from this restricted
problem as the prices for discrete decisions. However, this mechanism leads
to zero or near-zero auction surpluses for all players [25]. A continuous for-
mulation is employed by the New York ISO where commitment decisions are
assumed to be continuous; however, the associated multipliers of the supply-
demand constraint may still not support the equilibrium solution. An inno-
vative market clearing scheme that guarantees non-negative auction surplus
of generators has been recently proposed [56]. Under such pricing mecha-
nisms, generators may still not maximize their auction surplus, leading to
an opportunity cost. Nonlinear and non-anonymous pricing mechanisms,
or generalized uplift mechanisms, have been proposed [27, 28]. Despite the
mathematical elegance, the discriminatory and complex nature of these pric-
ing mechanisms may lead to challenges in adoption within this industry.
Convex hull pricing has been introduced to address these undesirable prop-
erties of current pricing mechanisms [25,26,57–60]. Convex hull prices do take
into account start-up and no-load costs, without fixing commitment decisions
a priori. The prices are non-decreasing with respect to demand, and lead to
the minimal total “opportunity-cost” uplift payments [26]. In spite of a more
complicated model, such pricing and uplift mechanisms are being seriously
considered by the industry and may be implemented in the Midwest region
of the United States in the near future. In addition to energy, the system
operator requires reserves to maintain system reliability. A wide consen-
sus has emerged in academia and industry, suggesting the joint operation of
energy-reserves markets, allowing for energy and reserves to be co-optimized.
Motivated by the poor local convergence behavior of existing computa-
tional schemes, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a tool for com-
puting convex hull prices which were first proposed in [25, 26]. A steepest
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ascent method (for piecewise linear concave maximization) is developed, us-
ing the extreme points associated with the solution set of a generator-specific
auction-surplus-maximization problem to construct the subdifferential. As
is customary in the literature (cf. [61]), these extreme points allow for for-
mulating a quadratic program, whose solution represents the steepest as-
cent direction. Additionally, a backtracking scheme allows for determining a
steplength that ensures descent with respect to a suitably defined merit func-
tion. The proposed method is referred to as an extreme-point subdifferential
method (EPSD) for two reasons: (i) First, the subdifferential is constructed
implicitly by aggregating the extreme points of the each individual genera-
tor’s best response to given prices. Working on extreme points of the smaller
problems helps us to extract the subdifferential of L(ρ). (ii) Second, the pro-
posed search mechanism is designed specifically to search over the extreme
points of the faces of L(ρ) which is a polyhedral function. While the scheme
allows for moving to the interior of a face of L(ρ), the polyhedrality of L(ρ)
is explicitly leveraged in moving along the edges between faces through the
backtracking line search. Numerical results show that the proposed method
works well under the assumption that the single generator’s problem remains
computationally tractable.
It should be emphasized that the proposed method bears a strong re-
semblance to bundle methods. Each extreme point of the subdifferential
set (obtained from the aggregate auction-surplus-maximization quantity set)
corresponds to a cutting plane at the point in question. In the rest of this
chapter, extreme points of the subdifferential set and cuts at the point in
question are used interchangeably. Consequently, a bundle of cuts is con-
structed at each iterate. Furthermore, the construction of the subdifferential
allows for coping with the nonsmoothness arising from the piecewise-linear
nature of the dual problem. As one proceeds along the steepest ascent direc-
tion, cutting planes corresponding to new extreme points may be added to
the bundle. In contrast, with most standard implementations, the steplength
along this ascent direction is chosen so as to enable descent with respect to
a prescribed merit function.
Extensions of this scheme to co-optimized markets are also provided. Un-
der some assumptions, this scheme is shown to display a finite termination
property and compares well with traditional subgradient schemes. Both as-
pects are discussed in Chapter 4.
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The remainder of this chapter contains six additional sections and is orga-
nized as follows. In Section 3.2, a mathematical model for convex hull pricing
is presented in energy markets. Section 3.3 is devoted to analyzing the struc-
ture of the convex hull pricing problem. The structural characteristics of
the problem are exploited in Section 3.4 to develop an effective and effi-
cient algorithm to compute convex hull prices for which a finite-termination
convergence result is provided. Section 3.5 extends the algorithm to energy-
reserve co-optimized markets. Economic analysis of market outcomes under
convex hull pricing scheme are presented in Section 3.6, and the chapter con-
cludes with some remarks and final thoughts in Section 3.7. Convergence
analysis and numerical tests are provided in detail in Chapter 4.
3.2 Convex Hull Pricing Model for Energy
In this section, a mathematical model is formulate for pricing and allocation
in day-ahead energy markets, such as those currently prevalent in North
America. On the basis of this model, the determination of convex hull prices
is described. The same model is subsequently extended to energy-reserve
co-optimized markets in Section 3.5.
Consider an H-period Day-Ahead Market (DAM) with S generators. Let
fs(us, ps) be the offer function of generator s, where us ∈ {0, 1}H denotes the
commitment status of generator s (on or off ) over the H periods. Further-
more, ps ∈ ({0}∪ [pmins , pmaxs ])H denotes generator s’s energy dispatch levels,
which could be zero (if off) or between pmins and p
max
s (if on) (the maximal
and minimal power output levels of generator s, both non-negative). Cur-
rently, all DAMs in the United States adopt an offer format where fs(us, ps)
is piecewise linear with respect to ps; the same offer conventions is used in
this chapter.
Let Xs be the operational region defined by resource-based physical and/or
operational constraints imposed on generator s, which is typically character-
ized by polyhedral constraints and binary and continuous variables. Let
d ∈ RH denote the demand vector over the H periods. Then, the Unit
Commitment Problem (UCP) requires a set of commitment and dispatch
decisions to satisfy the demand in the least “bid cost” manner, while being
feasible with respect to physical and operational constraints.
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Definition 20 (UCP). The UCP is defined as
min
us,ps
S∑
s=1
fs(us, ps)
subject to
∑S
s=1 ps = d,
(us, ps) ∈ Xs, ∀s.
(3.1)
Denote the value function by v(d): This is the optimal value of the mixed-
integer linear program (3.1), parameterized by the demand d.
A salient characteristic of the value function is that, on the set of d for
which (UCP) is feasible, the value function is lower semicontinuous and dif-
ferentiable almost everywhere. The widely adopted marginal-cost pricing
model uses gradient or subgradient information associated with the value
function as a candidate price.
On the other hand, the convex hull pricing scheme derives prices from the
convex hull of the value function rather than the value function itself. The
convex hull of a nonconvex function is the largest convex function that does
not exceed the given function at any point in the domain [62]:
Definition 21 (Convex Hull of the Value Function). The convex hull of v(d)
is defined as
vh(d) , inf{µ|(d, µ) ∈ conv(epi(v(d)))}, (3.2)
where epi(f) is the epigraph of a function f , and conv(K) denotes the convex
hull of set K.
A convex hull price is defined next.
Definition 22 (Convex Hull Price). A convex hull price, denoted by ρh(d),
is defined as a subgradient of the convex hull of the value function:
ρh(d) ∈ ∂vh(d). (3.3)
To simplify notation, the dependence of the convex hull price on d is sup-
pressed through the remainder of this chapter.
The value function and its convex hull for a two-generator, 1-hour market
are illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Note that v(0) = 0 is part of the value function.
In this example, the value function is defined on a discontinuous domain
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Figure 3.1: Value function and its convex hull
because of the minimal generating output constraints. The value function
is characterized by nonconvexity and jump, due to the changes in commit-
ment decisions as demand changes. The convex hull is the closest convex
approximation from below.
3.3 Analysis of Convex Hull Pricing Problem
In this section, the structural characteristics of the convex hull price problem
for DAMs is investigated.
3.3.1 Convex Hull Price and Lagrangian Dual Problem
Obtaining the subdifferential of vh(d) is a challenging proposition, since it
necessitates computing the convex hull of a function. To exacerbate matters,
every point in the hull requires the solution of a unit commitment problem,
or effectively a mixed-integer linear program. An alternate tack based on
solving the Lagrangian Dual Problem is pursued instead, which is defined
next.
Definition 23 (Lagrangian Dual Problem of the UCP). Suppose the La-
grangian dual function, L(ρ) is defined as
L(ρ) , min
(us,ps)∈Xs,∀s
{
S∑
s=1
fs(us, ps) + ρ
T
(
d−
S∑
s=1
ps
)}
.
Then the Lagrangian dual problem is given by
max
ρ
L(ρ). (3.4)
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The relationship between the Lagrangian dual problem and the original
convex hull pricing problem is made precise by the next proposition [26],
which is provided without a proof.
Proposition 24. Let ρ∗ be an optimal solution to (3.4). Then
ρ∗ ∈ ∂vh(d). (3.5)
3.3.2 Characteristics of the Lagrangian Dual Problem
It is obvious that the Lagrangian dual function, L(ρ), is separable with re-
spect to generators, and thus, the computation of L(ρ) can be reduced to a
collection of S sub-problems with smaller scale. Furthermore, the Lagrangian
dual function is concave and allows for the use of cutting plane methods. And
the piecewise linear format of the offer functions is a market design feature
allows for the development of computational schemes. For the error analysis
of such approximation, the readers are referred to [63].
In the Lagrangian dual problem, by relaxing the supply-demand balance
constraint, the generators are in fact decoupled. Specifically,
L(ρ) = ρTd−
S∑
s=1
max
(us,ps)∈Xs
{
ρTps − fs(us, ps)
}
.
To facilitate the discussion, define Bs(ρ) as follows.
Definition 25 (Generator’s Auction-Surplus-Maximization Quantity Set).
Given a price vector ρ, the auction-surplus-maximization quantity set asso-
ciated with generator s is defined as
Bs(ρ) ,
{
ps|(us, ps) ∈ arg max
(us,ps)∈Xs
[ρTps − fs(us, ps)]
}
. (3.6)
The optimization problem specified in (3.6) involves H binary and H con-
tinuous decision variables. Thus, CPLEX [64], a commercial solver for large-
scale mixed-integer linear and quadratic programs, capable of generating and
storing multiple solutions, may be used to obtain all extreme points of Bs(ρ).
While obtaining the extreme points is generally a challenging problem, these
points are required only for a generator-specific problem, namely Bs(ρ), and
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this problem is assumed to be tractable. CPLEX is employed as a proof of
concept because it is typically easier to implement. In practice, dynamic
programming (DP) may be a more computationally efficient choice for an
individual generator’s problem. Further, DP is capable of obtaining all dis-
crete solutions because it enumerates all possible discrete states in each hour.
Recall that Bs(ρ) comprises generator s’ dispatch levels, which is bounded.
Next, define the aggregate quantity set B(ρ) as follows.
Definition 26 (Aggregate Auction-Surplus-Maximization Quantity Set).
Given a price vector ρ, the aggregate auction-surplus-maximization quantity
set is defined as
B(ρ) ,
{
S∑
s=1
ps|ps ∈ Bs(ρ), s = 1, . . . , S
}
. (3.7)
The convex hull of B(ρ) essentially captures the subdifferential of the dual
function, which is leveraged by the proposed method. Bs(ρ) and B(ρ) may
have infinite cardinality, as a consequence of the degeneracies in the auction-
surplus maximization problem. For example, if price coincides with marginal
cost for a certain segment of a generator’s piecewise linear offer, then the
generator is indifferent toward operating at any point within the segment. As
a result, the generator’s auction surplus may be maximized over an interval,
rather than a point. Fortunately, given the piecewise linear format, no matter
what prices may be, the convex hull of the auction-surplus-maximization
quantity sets has a finite number of extreme points. As a consequence, the
maximization problem in (3.6) becomes a finite-dimensional linear program,
once the commitment decisions, denoted by us, are given. The feasible region
of such an LP is determined by us and Xs which is compact. Let Θ(us)
denote the set of all vertices of the feasible region. Then, a solution to the
linear program is attained at either a vertex, which is in Θ(us), or a convex
combination of vertices, which is in conv(Θ(us)). Define Φs as the union of
vertices over all possible commitment schedule us for generator s and let Φ
be the aggregation of these vertices.
Φs , ∪Θ(us) and Φ ,
{
S∑
s=1
ps|ps ∈ Φs,∀s
}
, (3.8)
respectively. Next, the convex hulls of Bs and B are related to Bs ∩ Φs and
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B ∩ Φ.
Lemma 27. Given bounded generating capacity, suppose Φs and Φ are de-
fined by (3.8). Then, Φs and Φ have finite cardinality. Furthermore, conv(Bs(ρ)) =
conv(Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs) and conv(B(ρ)) = conv(B(ρ) ∩ Φ).
Proof. The finiteness of Φs follows from the finite number of vertices in a
finite-dimensional LP. Since the number of commitment decisions is finite,
Φs is also finite since the union is over a finite set.
Since Bs ∩ Φ ⊆ Bs, it follows that conv(Bs(ρ)) ⊇ conv(Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs). It
suffices to show that conv(Bs(ρ)) ⊆ conv(Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs). Remember Bs(ρ) ∩
Φs gives all extreme-point solutions. By the fundamental theorem of lin-
ear programming, Bs(ρ) ⊆ conv(Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs), consequently, conv(Bs(ρ)) ⊆
conv(Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs). Likewise, it can be proved that the same conclusions
hold for Φ, which is obtained by aggregating elements in each generator’s
Bs(ρ).
The readers are referred to [62] for a general proof of the concavity of the
dual. The concavity and piecewise linearity of L(ρ) for the present problem
is shown next. It is likely that such a result may have been proved elsewhere,
given its simplicity, yet no precise reference is found.
Lemma 28. Consider L(ρ) as defined in Def. 23. Then L(ρ) is a concave
and piecewise linear function of ρ with a finite number of nondifferentiabili-
ties.
Proof. By definition, L(ρ) is given by
min
(us,ps)∈Xs,∀s
{∑S
s=1 fs(us, ps) + ρ
T (d−∑Ss=1 ps)}
= ρTd+
∑S
s=1 min
(us,ps)∈Xs
{
fs(us, ps)− ρTps
}
= ρTd+
∑S
s=1 min
(us,ps)∈Xs,ps∈Φs
{
fs(us, ps)− ρTps
}
.
where the last equality holds since the optimum occurs at least in one of the
vertices. For any given element in Φs, fs(us, ps) − ρTps becomes an affine
function with respect to ρ. Therefore L(ρ) is a point-wise minimization of
a finite number of affine functions, which is concave and piecewise linear.
Furthermore, due to the finiteness of Φs, L(ρ) has a finite number of nondif-
ferentiabilities.
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The maximization of a concave and piecewise linear function may be for-
mulated as an LP, whose optimum, if it exists, is always attained at extreme
points; however, the constraint set requires enumerating all possible extreme
points and such an avenue is generally inadvisable.
Proposition 29 (Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Convex
Hull Price). Given a demand vector d, ρ is a convex hull price for d if and
only if
d ∈ conv(B(ρ)). (3.9)
Proof. From Lemma 28, for any element in Φs, fs(us, ps)− ρTps is an affine
function of ρ with gradient −ps. Also, because set Φs is finite, by Corollary
2.6 in [65], we obtain
∂L(ρ) = d−∑Ss=1 conv{ps|ps ∈ Bs(ρ)}
= {d− dˆ|dˆ ∈ conv(B(ρ))}.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for ρ to be optimal are 0 ∈ ∂L(ρ) [66],
which is equivalent to d ∈ conv(B(ρ)).
3.4 An Extreme-Point Subdifferential Algorithm
Based on the analysis in Section 3.3, it emerges that a convex hull price,
denoted by ρ, is obtained when the load vector lies in the convex hull of B(ρ).
Intuitively, if this were not the case, then this suggests a method in which
a sequence of convex hulls of the aggregate auction-surplus-maximization
quantity set is constructed such that in the limit, the convex hull will contain
the the demand vector. A new element of this sequence is based on updates
of the price vector. In section 3.4.1, an outline of the EPSD algorithm and
how search directions for ρ may be efficiently computed are provided. In
section 3.4.2, an overview of steplength choice and backtracking schemes is
provided. The ESPG method is characterized by finite-termination behavior.
Readers are referred to Chapter 4 for illustrative examples and convergence
analysis.
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3.4.1 Description of the EPSD Scheme
In iterative schemes for nonlinear programming, where one is often trading off
between feasibility and optimality, one often uses a merit function to obtain
a measure of progress [67]. In this particular instance, the iterates are always
feasible and the merit function is effectively a measure of the departure from
optimality. A merit function given by the Euclidean distance between the
demand and the convex hull of the aggregate auction-surplus-maximization
quantity set is considered. Notably, this merit function is non-negative for
any iterate and is zero at optimality.
Definition 30 (Merit Function). The distance between d and conv(B(ρ)),
denoted by γ(ρ), is defined as
γ(ρ) , ‖dp(ρ)− d‖, (3.10)
where dp(ρ) is the projection of d onto conv(B(ρ)), and defined as
dp(ρ) , arg min
dˆ(ρ)∈conv(B(ρ))
‖d− dˆ‖. (3.11)
The value of the merit function γ(ρ) is uniquely determined by a quadratic
program whose constraint set corresponds to the bundle of cuts that exact
capture the value of the objective function at ρ. It is proposed to update the
prices along the direction of vector d − dp(ρ), which is a descent direction
associated with the merit function γ(ρ). Surprisingly, this direction also rep-
resents the steepest ascent direction of L(ρ), as the next proposition shows.
More specifically, problem (11) is closely related to problem (1.2.1) on page
347 in [61] and Proposition 12 follows from Theorem 1.2.2 and Corollary
1.2.3 on page 349 in [61].
Proposition 31. Suppose d(ρ) is defined as (3.11). Then the vector d−dp(ρ)
is the steepest ascent direction of L(ρ).
Proof. See Theorem 1.11 in [66].
Subgradient methods appear to have been first developed in the 1970s by
Shor [66] and can be combined with a host of steplength rules. An oft-used
rule is a steplength sequence that is square summable but not summable.
Yet, in practice, such methods often display poor local convergence behavior.
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Unlike in standard differentiable nonlinear programs, the gradient direction
is not cheaply computable; instead, it is proposed to compute the steepest
ascent direction by solving the projection problem in (3.11). This is gener-
ally a challenging task since it requires the computation of conv(B(ρ)). By
computing conv(B(ρ)), the subdifferential of the piecewise-linear objective
function is implicitly obtained through the extreme points. To facilitate this
computation, the extreme points of conv(B(ρ)) are employed. In order to
further reduce the computational burden, the extreme points of conv(B(ρ))
are obtained as an aggregation of the extreme points of conv(Bs(ρ)).
Define {psk} , Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs with cardinality Ks, then by Lemma 27, it
contains all extreme points of conv(Bs(ρ)). Through this decomposition, S
smaller MIP sub-problems are solved, one for each generator, in each itera-
tion instead of a large MIP problem over S generators. Such decomposition
is analogous to that utilized during a Lagrangian relaxation based on the sep-
arability across generators. An extreme-point representation of conv(B(ρ))
may incur significant computational effort since the number of extreme points
may grow to an exponential level as the number of generators increases. The
proposed method further leverages on the fact that the aggregation of con-
vex hulls preserves separability across generators: The resulting projection
problem can be cast as the following convex quadratic program.
min
λsk,∀s,k
‖d −∑Ss=1∑Ksk=1 λskpsk‖2
subject to
∑Ks
k=1 λsk = 1, ∀s
λsk ≥ 0, ∀s, k.
(3.12)
The solution to (3.12) provides us with the requisite projection. Essentially,
B(ρ) is not constructed explicitly, since only its convex hull is needed. As
shown later, this avenue avoids the need to contend with a direct specification
of B(ρ), a combinatorially challenging task.
Proposition 32. Suppose {λsk} solves (3.12) for k = 1, . . . , Ks and s =
1, . . . , S. Then dp(ρ), a solution of (3.11), is given by
dp(ρ) =
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
k=1
λskpsk.
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Proof. By the commutability of the convex hull and sum operation, we have
conv(B(ρ)) = conv
({
S∑
s=1
ps|ps ∈ Bs(ρ),∀s
})
=
{
S∑
s=1
ps|ps ∈ conv(Bs(ρ)),∀s
}
=
{
S∑
s=1
ps|ps ∈ conv(Bs(ρ) ∩ Φs),∀s
}
=
{
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
k=1
λskpsk|
Ks∑
k=1
λsk = 1,∀s;λsk ≥ 0,∀s, k
}
, (3.13)
where the third equality holds by Lemma 27 and the fourth equality holds
by the definition of {psk}.
If {λsk} solves (3.12), then for a given s and k, λsk > 0 or λsk = 0. Denote
these strictly positive ones by {λ˜sk} and their associated coefficients in (3.12)
by {p˜sk}, and define
{d˜} , {
S∑
s=1
p˜sk}. (3.14)
It is obvious that dp(ρ) ∈ conv({d˜}), because essentially just the zero terms
are eliminated in the optimal objective function of (3.12).
The number of decision variables in (3.12),
∑S
s=1 Ks, increases at a linear
rate with respect to the number of generators. Given the offers from electric-
ity markets under normal conditions, Ks = 1 for most generators: due to the
large distinctions of different generating technologies in terms of economic
merits and operational flexibility, most generators are either operated at the
maximum, or priced themselves out of the markets. Accordingly, the scale
of (3.12) remains small and can be easily solved. It is now ready to state the
algorithm. The steplength selection scheme (Algorithm 34) is described in
the next section.
Algorithm 33 (Extreme-Point Subdifferential Scheme (EPSD)).
1: Initialization: price ρ1, max steplength c > 0; iteration index ν = 1;
merit measure γ0 =∞; search direction ∆0 = 0; Tolerance: .
2: while γν−1≥  do
3: for s = 1 : S do
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4: Obtain Bs(ρ
ν) ∩ Φs from (3.6);
5: end for
6: Compute dp(ρν) from (3.12);
7: Compute d˜ν from (3.14) ;
8: Set γν = ‖d− dp(ρν)‖;
9: if γν < γν−1 or dp(ρν) = dp(ρν−1) then
10: Phase I:
11: αν = c, ∆ν =
d− dp(ρν)
‖d− dp(ρν)‖ ;
12: ρν+1 = ρν + αν∆ν , ν = ν + 1;
13: else
14: Phase II:
15: [ρν , γν , d˜ν , ν] = Backtrack(∆ν−1, ρν−1, d˜ν , d˜ν−1, γν , γν−1, ν);
16: end if
17: end while
It should be recalled that that the merit function γ is determined by the
bundle of cuts that captures the exact value of the point in question. In
a non-degenerate setting, a decrease in γ implies a jump from one face of
the dual function to a strictly better face. In this instance, the elements of
the previous underlying bundle are totally discarded. On the other hand,
an unchanged value of γ implies that the underlying bundle has remained
unchanged, and suggests that the two points in question are at either the
same face or the same edge of the polytope. Consequently, it is reasonable
to keep searching over the same (steepest) ascent direction.
3.4.2 Steplength Selection
Given a projection direction ∆ν , the key question is how one may choose the
steplength. Standard subgradient schemes rely on diminishing steplength
rules (cf. [66]) that require a steplength sequence satisfying
∞∑
ν=1
αν =∞ and
∞∑
ν=1
(αν)2 <∞.
Such steplength choices are particularly useful since they are easy to imple-
ment. Here, an alternate approach is chose to take advantage of the descent
direction with respect to γ. In general, such a descent requirement is not
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guaranteed when an arbitrary subgradient is selected. Given such a prop-
erty, the EPSD method conducts a line search along the obtained search
direction to ensure a monotonically decreasing γ. This search process could
be a simple one, based on reducing the steplength by specific amounts. Al-
ternately, it could be a more intricate process that relies on using function
values to develop a model of the function and subsequently minimizing this
model over the steplength [67].
In this setting, a user-specified upper bound, denoted by c, is chosen as
the point from which the steplength may be reduced till sufficient descent is
made with respect to a suitably defined merit function.
Algorithm 34 (Backtrack(∆ν−1, ρν−1, d˜ν , d˜ν−1, γν , γν−1, ν)).
1: Initialization: flag := ν − 1;
2: while γν ≥ γflag do
3: Obtain α by solving
(ρflag + α(∆flag))T d˜ν − v(d˜ν) = (ρflag + α(∆flag))T d˜flag − v(d˜flag);
4: ρν+1 := ρflag + α∆flag;
5: ν := ν + 1;
6: for s = 1 : S do
7: Obtain Bs(ρ
ν) ∩ Φs from (3.6);
8: end for
9: Compute dp(ρν) from (3.12);
10: Obtain d˜ν from (3.14) ;
11: γν = ‖d− dp(ρν)‖;
12: end while
13: Return ρν , γν , d˜ν , ν.
The search process is triggered if the new candidate iterate lies in a face
that is characterized by a higher γ; in effect, the merit function has increased.
In fact, this implies that the new iterate has overshot the current face and
entered a new face. In this case, the faces of L(ρ) crossed by this over-
shooting are investigated in the hope of reducing γ. From the perspective of
the underlying bundle of cuts, the backtracking procedure looks for points
whose bundle contains both the set of exact cuts of the flag-th iterate and
that of the ν-th iterate, excluding those cuts corresponding to the inactive
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constraints in the quadratic program to computing γ. Specifically, the
search process entails determining the steplength required to reach the edges
common to neighboring faces. This is effectively a backtracking process but
one in which the steplength is not reduced by a constant ratio; in fact, the
steplength takes values in accordance with the distance of the edges from
the current iterate. When descent in the merit function is achieved, the
backtracking subroutine terminates. Finally, it is worth noting that ν, the
index, is incremented during the backtracking phase as well; in effect, upon
termination, ν specifies the total number of steps, both standard and back-
tracking, that the algorithm has produced. Algorithm 34 makes the steps of
the subroutine precise and the next example illustrates these ideas.
3.5 Energy-Reserve Co-Optimized Markets
Power systems are prone to failures of generators and transmission lines, as
well as unanticipated changes in demand. In order to maintain system relia-
bility, capacity which can be quickly dispatched is procured. The capacity is
referred to as “reserves,” and may be viewed as an insurance policy against
contingencies. Typically, reserve requirements are imposed on the system
operation and these requirements introduce market mechanisms for reserves.
Early generations of electricity markets traded reserves separately from en-
ergy markets while more recently several markets trade both energy and
reserves. In these markets, energy and reserves are cleared simultaneously
to minimize the total as-bid costs. In this chapter, the ramp-up spinning
reserves are considered, which can be provided by online generators. The
available reserves that generator s may provide at period h is bounded as
rs ≤ us,h min(rmaxs , pmaxs − ps,h), (3.15)
where rmaxs is a physical characteristic of the generator based on its ramping
capacity, pmaxs denotes the generator’s capacity and ps,h denotes the energy
generating level. This indicates that generation capacity could be used to
provide either energy or reserve, but not both. A salient feature of reserves
is that it shares the capacity constraint with energy.
Whether to impose the reserve requirement as an equality constraint or
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inequality constraint is a market design issue. When the requirement is
modeled as equality constraint, the extension from the energy only mar-
ket to the integrated market is relatively straightforward, as the underly-
ing mathematical programming model remains unchanged. However, if in-
equality constraints of reserve requirement are imposed, this leads to a non-
negativity bound on the resulting reserve prices in the Lagrangian dual prob-
lem. However, we proceed to show that the EPSD method always produces
non-negative reserves prices without the direct introduction of nonnegativity
bounds.
Depending on the market design, the generator may or may not be allowed
to submit price and availability offers for reserve [4]. One alternative lies
in allowing generators to submit price and availability offers for reserves
f rs (us, rs) ≥ 0, while the available reserve are not necessarily be cleared.
Definition 35 (Co-optimization Model with explicit reserve offers). The
Co-optimization Model with explicit reserve offers is defined as
min
us,ps,∀s
∑S
s=1 (f
e
s (us, ps) + f
r
s (us, rs))
subject to
∑S
s=1 ps = d
e,∑S
s=1 rs ≥ dr,
(us, ps) ∈ Xs, ∀s,
rs,h ≥ 0, ∀s, h,
rs,h ≤ us,h min(rmaxs , pmaxs − ps,h),∀s, h.
(3.16)
The other option is to impose an obligation on all generators to provide
all available reserves, the underlying rationale being that reserves involves
little, if any, variable cost but much higher opportunity costs.
Definition 36 (Co-Optimization Model without reserve offers). The Co-
Optimization Model without reserve offers is defined as
min
us,ps,∀s
∑S
s=1 f
e
s (us, ps)
subject to
∑S
s=1 ps = d
e,∑S
s=1 rs ≥ dr,
(us, ps) ∈ Xs, ∀s,
rs,h = us,h min(r
max
s , p
max
s − ps,h),∀s, h.
(3.17)
The analysis is begun by considering the following problem:
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Definition 37 (Computational Model). The Computational Model is defined
as
min
us,ps,∀s
∑S
s=1 (f
e
s (us, ps) + f
r
s (us, rs))
subject to
∑S
s=1 ps = d
e,∑S
s=1 rs = d
r,
(us, ps) ∈ Xs, ∀s,
rs,h ≥ 0 ∀s, h,
rs,h ≤ us,h min(rmaxs , pmaxs − ps,h),∀s, h.
(3.18)
The only difference between the (3.18) and (3.16) is that the inequality
constraints on reserve requirement are replaced by equalities.
Proposition 38. Given non-negative reserve offers f rs (us, rs) and non-negative
reserve requirements dr, models (3.18) and (3.16) yield the same convex hull
prices.
Proof. Both models share the same dual problem, with the exception that
model (3.16) is subject to nonnegativity bounds on the dual variables. It
suffices to show that the reserve prices from model (3.18) are always non-
negative.
Also note for any given energy allocation, the reserve sold by an online
generator in both models can vary from 0 to min(rmaxs , p
max
s − ps,h) with-
out violating any individual constraint. Accordingly, if the reserve price at
some hour is less than zero, then all generators will supply zero reserves to
maximize their auction surplus.
Suppose, at the optimum, the reserve price at some hour is less than zero
from model (3.18), then the reserve requirement dr must belong to the convex
hull of the best response set. However, dr > 0 while the best response of all
generators is to provide zero reserve and we have a contradiction. Therefore,
reserve prices from model (3.18) are always non-negative.
Proposition 39. Consider models (3.18) and (3.17). Then, the convex hull
price arising from (3.18) with zero reserve offer price is identical to the convex
hull price arising from (3.17).
Proof. Suppose f rs (us, rs) = 0 in model (3.16) and (3.18). From Proposi-
tion 38, it is known that models (3.16) and (3.18) shares the same convex
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hull prices, therefore, a sufficient condition for this result is that models (3.16)
and (3.17) have a common dual function. The remainder of the proof shows
that this is indeed the case.
Suppose the reserve price is strictly positive. Then for any given energy
allocation, an online generator in models (3.16) and (3.17), can choose any
reserve from [0,min(rmaxs , p
max
s −ps,h)] and min(rmaxs , pmaxs −ps,h), respectively.
However, min(rmaxs , p
max
s −ps,h) maximizes auction surplus and such a choice
is feasible for both models. Furthermore, since the dual functions in both
instances are continuous, they assume the same value at zero reserve prices.
As shown in Proposition 38 and Proposition 39, by allowing availability
offers, the solution of the constrained dual problem coincides with that from
an unconstrained problem for which the EPSD method can apply. Such
conclusions only apply to pricing rather than the allocation: the solutions to
(3.16), (3.17), and (3.18) may differ, despite yielding the same convex hull
prices.
3.6 Economic Analysis
In this section, outcomes of energy only and energy-reserve co-optimized
markets under different pricing and uplift mechanisms are analyzed. Two
uplift mechanisms are considered. Make-whole uplift pays the difference be-
tween an individual generator’s price-based revenues and its as-bid costs.
Opportunity-cost uplift compensates the difference between the realized sur-
plus of an individual generator following the ISO’s schedule and the maxi-
mal auction surplus if it were operated otherwise, assuming the same prices.
Although the convex hull pricing and opportunity-cost uplift are usually
discussed collectively, the possibility of combining either pricing mechanism
(convex hull or marginal-cost) with either uplift scheme (opportunity-cost or
make-whole) is explored.
Case 1 uses the 26-unit data from [68], while cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 are
generated based on case 1 with (1) perturbed offer prices, and (2) duplicated
units and scaled demand, as one, two, three and four times of the original
system, respectively. By doing so, test systems with up to 104 units are
constructed.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: (a) Total payment and uplift payment in energy markets; (b)
Total payment and uplift payment in energy-reserve co-optimized markets
(Bars represent total payments (left axis) and lines represent the uplifts
(right axis))
The total payments and the uplift payments for the test systems under
different pricing and uplift schemes are compared, assuming the same set of
offers. Bars are used to denote the total payments and lines for uplift pay-
ments under different payment mechanisms in Fig. 3.2. As the plot shows,
uplift payments are at least two orders of magnitude less than the total pay-
ments. Thus, the differences in total payments under different schemes are
mainly due to the change of pricing rules. The maximal deviation in total
payment for the same system is up to 5% in the tests, and it is unclear if
marginal-cost pricing or convex hull pricing lead to higher payments in gen-
eral. While uplift payments may represent a relatively small percentage
of total energy costs, as shown in the test cases, the difference in revenues
between the diverse mechanisms may be non-trivial. Further, the impact
of changing mechanisms may have contrasting effects across stakeholders.
Some generators, specifically marginal and block-loaded, rely heavily on up-
lift payments. In a competitive regime, inherently selfish firms are motivated
by profits, implying that the underlying pricing and allocation mechanisms
are of prime concern. Given the non-convexities and discreteness in the elec-
tricity markets, there appears to be no “correct” sensitivity metric available
(which in turn corresponds to prices) and both mechanisms are essentially
based on approximations.
The total payments increase in proportion to the size of the system: the
ratios of total payments between the 104-unit system and the 26-unit system
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vary from 3.92 to 4.05. On the other hand, the uplift payments, except the
opportunity-cost uplift under marginal-cost pricing, grow at a much slower
pace. It is worth noting that opportunity-cost uplift payments under con-
vex hull pricing tend to decrease as systems are scaled up. By definition,
opportunity-cost uplift payments are always no less than the make-whole
uplift payments. The plots reaffirm this fact and indicate the opportunity-
cost uplift payments may be much higher than the make-whole uplift pay-
ments, especially for co-optimized markets with marginal-cost pricing. In
co-optimized markets, more capacity is called online to provide reserves, lead-
ing to higher marginal-cost prices. The high prices result in less or even zero
make-whole uplift payment. However, under such high prices, the commit-
ment and dispatch schedules are not optimal from the individual player’s
view point, which requires the opportunity-cost uplift payments. Also note
the convex hull pricing minimizes the opportunity-cost uplift, rather than
the make-whole uplift payment.
3.7 Conclusions
Convex hull pricing has been introduced recently for electricity markets.
While this technique results in a concave optimization problem to deter-
mine prices, the objective function is not differentiable. In this chapter, an
extreme-point subdifferential algorithm is introduced to efficiently compute
prices. The finite-termination property and numerical performance of the
EPSD method is presented in Chapter 4. A prescription of prices is a key
component of any market design. Extant designs require ex-post uplift pay-
ments that may be difficult to justify, and the proposed convex hull pricing
appears to be far more elegant. However, further research is needed to un-
derstand the possible outcomes of the market.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EXTREME-POINT
SUBDIFFERENTIAL METHOD FOR
CONVEX HULL PRICING:
CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS AND
NUMERICAL PERFORMANCE
Motivated by the poor local convergence behavior of existing computation
schemes, an extreme-point subdifferential method (EPSD) is proposed to cal-
culate convex hull energy and reserve prices in Chapter 3. In this chapter,
the EPSD algorithm is shown to terminate in finite time where termination
is said to occur when the subdifferential set contains the zero vector. Numer-
ical experiments illustrate the finite-termination property and show that the
performance of the scheme compares well with standard subgradient methods
on the examples considered.
4.1 Introduction
Convex hull pricing has been proposed to address the undesirable properties
of current marginal-cost pricing mechanisms [25,26]. It has been shown in [26]
that convex hull prices can be obtained by solving the Lagrangian dual of
the the unit commitment problem (cf. [69]).
Subgradient methods have proved useful for solving this class of dual prob-
lems. In such schemes, subdifferential in the dual space is obtained by evalu-
ating constraint violations in the primal space, while associated primal vari-
ables are obtained by minimizing the Lagrangian. Traditionally, convergence
is guaranteed under a suitably defined diminishing steplength rule [66]. These
techniques tend to exhibit numerical difficulties particularly when the dual
function is ill-conditioned [70]. Various enhancements have been incorporated
into the subgradient-based framework to improve performance, through the
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use of cutting-plane methods [71], bundle methods [72,73], and surrogate gra-
dient methods [74]. To the best of my knowledge, recent work by Wang et
al. [75,76] appears to be the only work focusing specifically on the computa-
tional tools for convex hull pricing. In their pioneering work, subgradient and
simplex techniques are adopted in central cutting-plane methods to generate
“interior” points with less computational burden, and redundant constraints
are pruned to further increase efficiency.
The EPSD method shares some of the ideas articulated in terms of updat-
ing direction and explicitly searching for extreme points, as the “steepest-
descent trajectory – piecewise affine case” (SDTPAC) method (c.f. Algorithm
3.4.6 in p.382 [61]). However, the SDTPAC method solves problems of a min-
max form where the maximization is over a set of affine functions that are
known. This property is exploited in the SDTPAC method. In the setting
in question, these functions are unknown a priori and such knowledge is not
exploited. Besides, the SDTPAC method is a descent method and results in
a move to an adjacent face at each iterate. In contrast, the EPSD method
allows either for jumping to a non-adjacent face or allows for residing in the
same face. Such feasibility in the EPSD method may significantly improve
the computational efficiency over the SDTPAC method when the number of
faces grows to be large.
In Chapter 3, the extreme-point subdifferential method (EPSD) for com-
puting convex hull energy and reserve prices is introduced. This scheme
relies on a steepest ascent direction computed through the solution of a
quadratic program. Additionally, a backtracking scheme allows for deter-
mining a steplength that ensures descent with respect to a suitably defined
merit function. In both energy-only and energy-reserve co-optimized mar-
kets, the EPSD method is shown to display finite termination properties.
Preliminary numerical results suggest that the method compares well with
standard subgradient schemes.
The remainder of this chapter contains four additional sections and is orga-
nized as follows. An illustration of the workings of the algorithm is provided
in Section 4.2, where a comparison of convergence behavior between the
EPSD and standard subgradient is also presented. Section 4.3 is devoted to
discussing the theoretical foundation of the finite-termination behavior of the
EPSD algorithm. Preliminary numerical results are presented in Section 4.4.
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4.2 An Illustrative Example
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Figure 4.1: (a) Trajectory of query points of the EPSD method; (b)
Trajectory of query points of subgradient method
To illustrate how the proposed EPSD method works, the trajectory of iter-
ates for a two-hour example in the space of L(ρ) is plotted (cf. Definition 23),
as shown in Fig. 4.1(a). Figure 4.1(b) represents the progress of a standard
subgradient method on the same problem. Since L(ρ) is piecewise linear, the
four sets of parallel lines in the contour represent four faces of L(ρ), which
correspond to four different allocations, each of which maximizes the total
auction surplus in the primal space under a different price. The intersections
of these faces are characterized by degeneracies in the auction-surplus maxi-
mization. As shown in the plot, starting from prices of 80 $/MWh for both
hours, the proposed method attains the global optimum after eight iterations.
L(ρ) is differentiable at the first four iterates, and these points are generated
along the gradient direction. The first three iterates are Phase I: The first
and second iterates lie in the same face, consequently dp(ρ1) = dp(ρ2) , while
the third iterate moves to a new face with a reduced γ, where dp(ρ) is defined
in (3.11).
The fourth iterate returns to the same face of L(ρ) as the starting point,
leading to an increase in γ. This signals the commencement of Phase II and
backtracking is triggered.
In Phase II, steplength is selected specifically to reach a price under which
both the allocations of third and fourth iterations maximize the total auction
surplus. Through backtracking, the fifth point is reached which lies at the
intersection of the two faces. L(ρ) is actually non-differentiable at the fifth
point. In traditional subgradient methods without backtracking, the iterates
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may likely oscillate between these two faces.
From the fifth iterate, the EPSD determines the steepest ascent direction
that lies at the intersection of the faces. This direction is a convex com-
bination of the gradients obtained from the third and fourth iterates. The
sixth iterate is Phase I as γ decreases. Then, the EPSD overshoots the opti-
mal solution and returns to the seventh point which is identical to the 5th.
However, since the merit function increases upon the return, backtracking
is triggered again and based on the information of the sixth and seventh
query points, the global optimum is achieved in the next iteration. When
employing a standard subgradient scheme as in Fig. 4.1(b), it is observed
that the scheme takes a significantly longer time to converge. The efficiency
improvement can be largely assigned to the improvements in steplength and
direction selection. The algorithm updates solutions with the explicit purpose
of evaluating the extreme points of the dual function.
4.3 Convergence Analysis
Intuitively, the finite-termination property of the EPSD method stems from
the fact the number of extreme-points of conv(B(ρ)) is finite, where B(ρ)
is defined in (3.7). This conclusion may be drawn from observing that the
finiteness of the extreme points of conv(B(ρ)) follows from the finiteness of
the extreme points of a simplex, as seen in Chapter 3. As long as traversing
the faces and edges defined by these extreme points without cycling, the
global optimizer is attained after a finite number of iterations. In the next
two sections, the behavior of the scheme in Phases I and II are analyzed
respectively.
4.3.1 Finiteness of Phase I
The EPSD method requires that Phase I is initiated whenever the merit
function reduces or if dp(ρν) = dp(ρν−1). It can be shown that neither of the
conditions is satisfied infinitely often implying that Phase I of the algorithm
is triggered a finite number of times.
Lemma 40. Consider Algorithm 33 in Chapter 3. Then, the condition γν <
γν−1 in Phase I is not satisfied infinitely often.
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Proof. By Carathe´odory’s theorem, dp(ρ) can be written as a convex com-
bination of at most H + 1 elements in Φ, where Φ is defined by (3.8). By
Lemma 27, Φ has a finite cardinality, implying that dp(ρ) may take on a
finite number of values. Since γ is given by the distance between dp(ρ) and
d, γ may take on a finite number of values. By design, γ is non-increasing
in post-Phase-II iterates and it follows that γν < γν−1 cannot be satisfied
infinitely often.
Next, investigate the second requirement that leads to initiation of Phase
I: The EPSD method will not search along any direction forever without
improvement, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 41. Suppose the UCP is feasible, i.e., v(d) < +∞. Then, for any
constant steplength c > 0, there exists a finite number 0 < M < +∞, such
that dp(ρ) 6= dp(ρ+Mc∆).
Proof. This result is proven by contradiction. Suppose dp(ρ) = dp(ρ +
Mc∆),∀M> 0. Then the algorithm always updates ρ along ∆. Define
Lc(α) , L(ρ+ α∆), then Lc(α) is a cross section of a concave and piecewise
linear function L at ρ along ∆, and is univariate in nature. Therefore, it is
concave and piecewise linear in α.
By the definition of subgradients, d− dp(ρ) ∈ ∂L(ρ). It follows that
L(ρ+ α∆) ≤ L(ρ) + (d− dp(ρ))T (α∆)
= L(ρ) + ‖d− dp(ρν)‖α,
through invoking the definition of ∆. This is equivalent to Lc(α) ≤ Lc(0) +
‖d − dp(ρν)‖α. Thus, ‖d − dp(ρν)‖ ∈ ∂Lc(0). Likewise, it can be proved
that ‖d − dp(ρν)‖ ∈ ∂Lc(Mc). For Lc(α), a concave and piecewise one-
dimensional linear function, to have constant subgradient, it must be linear
between [0,Mc], and ‖d−dp(ρν)‖ is the gradient of this linear segment. Since
‖d − dp(ρν)‖ > 0, Lc(Mc) can be made arbitrarily large by increasing M .
However, this is impossible since by weak duality, the feasibility of UCP, we
have that L(ρ), as well as Lc(α), is bounded above by v(d).
As a consequence of Lemma 41, after at most M iterations along one
direction, a different projection dp is obtained. If the new projection leads
to a strict decrease in γ, searching along a different direction is initialized;
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otherwise, Phase II, the backtracking phase, is triggered. Next, Phase II is
shown to terminate in a finite number of iterations.
4.3.2 Finiteness of Phase II
First, study the impact of updating prices on the auction surplus. Suppose
the demand and initial price are denoted by d and ρ, respectively. Then the
projection is given by dp(ρ), the updating direction is ∆ =
d− dp(ρ)
‖d− dp(ρ)‖ , and
the steplength is α. Suppose 0 6∈ ∂L(ρ). Denote the difference between the
maximal auction surplus associated with demands d1 and d2 by ω(d1, d2, α)
which is defined as
ω(d1, d2, α) , (ρ+ α∆)Td1 − v(d1)− ((ρ+ α∆)Td2 − v(d2)).
The dependence of ω on initial prices ρ and updating directions ∆ , both
of which are given, is suppressed. After some algebra, it is shown that
ω(d1, d2, α) = ω(d1, d2, 0)− α∆T (d2 − d1), (4.1)
which is linear in α. It is easy to see, for example, ω(d1, d2, α) is strictly
decreasing with α if and only if ∆T (d2 − d1) > 0. Moreover, in the next
result, some properties of ω are listed without proof.
Lemma 42. Suppose ω(d1, d2, α)is defined by (4.1). Then, the following
hold:
(i) ω(d1, d2, α) = −ω(d2, d1, α),
(ii) ω(d1, d2, α) + ω(d2, d3, α) = ω(d1, d3, α),
(iii) B(ρ+ α∆) = {d2|ω(d1, d2, α) ≤ 0, ∀d1}.
Recall that dp(ρ) is the projection of d onto conv(B(ρ)). Accordingly, the
hyperplane H separates the quantity space into two half-spaces H1 and H2,
defined as
H , {x|(d− dp(ρ))T (x− dp(ρ)) = 0}, (4.2)
H1 , {x|(d− dp(ρ))T (x− dp(ρ)) ≤ 0}, (4.3)
and H2 , {x|(d− dp(ρ))T (x− dp(ρ)) ≥ 0}, (4.4)
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respectively. Furthermore, B(ρ) ∈ H1. The next lemma gives the impacts of
updating price on the aggregate auction-surplus-maximization quantity set
B.
Lemma 43. Consider Algorithm 33 in Chapter 3. Then for a strictly positive
steplength α, the following hold:
(i) B(ρ+ α∆)⊆H2;
(ii) if conv(B(ρ))∩ conv(B(ρ+α∆)) 6= ∅, then B(ρ)∩H2 ⊆ B(ρ+α∆),
(iii) if conv(B(ρ))∩ conv(B(ρ+α∆)) 6= ∅ and B(ρ+α∆)∩ int(H2) 6= ∅,
then γ(ρ+ α∆) < γ(ρ).
Proof. By definition, the hyperplane H supports B(ρ) at least at one point,
say d˜. Then, d˜ ∈ B(ρ) ∩H.
(i) Suppose d2 ∈ B(ρ + α∆). Then by Lemma 42 (iii), we have that
ω(d˜, d2, α) ≤ 0 . Likewise, because d˜ ∈ B(ρ), we have that ω(d˜, d2, 0) ≥
0. By (4.1), a necessary condition for these two equalities to hold is that
∆T (d2 − d˜) ≥ 0. But this implies that
0 ≤ ∆T (d2 − d˜) = ∆T (d2 − dp(ρ)) + ∆T (dp(ρ)− d˜)
= ∆T (d2 − dp(ρ)).
Therefore, ∆T (d2 − dp) ≥ 0, i.e., d2 ∈ H2.
(ii) If conv(B(ρ)) ∩ conv(B(ρ + α∆)) 6= ∅, then there exists at least one
point in conv(B(ρ+ α∆)), say d2, lies in H. Since, d˜ and d2 both lie in
H, we have ∆T (d2 − d˜) = 0. Therefore
ω(d˜, d2, α) = ω(d˜, d2, 0) + α∆
T (d2 − d˜)
= ω(d˜, d2, 0) ≥ 0.
(4.5)
Again, Lemma 42 (iii), d˜ ∈ B(ρ+ α∆), i.e., B(ρ) ∩H2 ⊆ B(ρ+ α∆).
(iii) dp(ρ) can be written as a convex combination of points lies in B(ρ)∩
H2. By claim (ii), if conv(B(ρ)) ∩ conv(B(ρ + α∆)) 6= ∅, B(ρ) ∩ H2 ∈
B(ρ+ α∆). Consequently, γ(ρ+ α∆) ≤ γ(ρ) as B(ρ+ α∆) contains all
points in B(ρ) that constitute a convex combination of dp(ρ). dp also
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lies in the interior of H2, therefore, if one point of B(ρ+ α∆) lies in the
interior of H2, then γ(ρ+ α∆) < γ(ρ).
Next, show in Phase II, a steplength satisfying the conditions of Lemma 43
(iii) is obtained after a finite number of iterates.
Lemma 44. Consider Algorithm 33 in Chapter 3. Then, Phase II terminates
after a finite number of iterations.
Proof. Suppose Phase II is triggered when the price is updated from ρ to
ρ + α1∆. Furthermore, suppose the steplength generated by Phase II is
given by αν , where ν is the iteration index.
First, show that B(ρ + αν∆) lies in the interior of H2 unless Phase II
terminates, by induction. This is true for ν = 1, otherwise, we either have
dp(ρ) = dp(ρ + α1∆) or γ(ρ) > γ(ρ + α1∆), which contradicts the fact that
Phase II is triggered. For ν ≥ 2, if B(ρ+αν−1∆)∩H1 6= ∅, then by claim (ii) of
Lemma 43, B(ρ)∩H2 ∈ B(ρ+αν−1∆). The steplength is updated by setting
ω(d˜, dν−1, α) = 0, where d˜ ∈ B(ρ) ∩H2 and dν−1 ∈ B(ρ+ αν−1∆) which lies
in the interior of H2. By doing so, if conv(B(ρ)) ∩ conv(B(ρ + α∆)) 6= ∅,
then by claim (ii) of Lemma 43 we have d˜ ∈ B(ρ + αν∆). And because the
steplength is updated such that d˜ and dν−1 lead to the same total auction
surplus, we have dν−1 ∈ B(ρ + αν∆). By claim (iii) of Lemma 43, we have
γ(ρ) > γ(ρ+ αν∆), which is the termination condition of Phase II.
Next, prove the steplengths generated by the backtracking decrease strictly
throughout iterations, i.e., αν < αν−1. As shown first in this proof, if Phase
II does not terminate, B(ρ) ∩ B(ρ + αν∆) = ∅. Thereby, for d˜ ∈ B(ρ) ∩H2
and dν−1 ∈ B(ρ+ αν−1∆),
ω(d˜, dν−1, 0) > 0 and ω(d˜, dν−1, αν−1) < 0. (4.6)
By the continuity of ω w.r.t. α, there exists 0 < αν < αν−1 such that
ω(d˜, dν−1, αν) = 0.
Now, it is prepared to show the finiteness of Phase II. Recall that the
steplength selection is conducted by solving ω(d˜, dν , α) = 0, where d˜ is known
and dν belongs to a finite set Φ , the resulting steplength belongs to a finite
set. The strict decrease requirement in steplength ensures that cycling cannot
occur. Therefore, Phase II terminates after a finite number of iterations.
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Lemma 44 ensures that backtracking will yield improvements in terms of
γ. It suffices to that the number of iterations with improvements in terms
of γ is bounded. By combining Lemma 40, Lemma 41 and Lemma 44, the
finite-termination property of the EPSD method may be claimed.1
Proposition 45. Suppose the UCP is feasible, then the EPSD method ter-
minates after finite iterations.
4.4 Numerical Performance
Preliminary numerical results for the EPSD method are presented in this
section. The behavior of the EPSD method is examined and a comparison
with more standard subgradient schemes is provided. All the numerical tests
were carried out on a PC with Intel Core i5 2.66 GHz processor and 6 GB
RAM.
4.4.1 Comparison with Alternate Convex Hull Pricing
Computational Schemes
First, the EPSD method is used to solve a three-generator test problem given
in [76]. These examples were carefully designed such that the duality gaps
are always zero. Furthermore, in these problems, there are no inter-temporal
constraint, such as the minimal up/down time constraints. The performance
of the EPSD method is compared to the results of subgradient-simplex based
cutting plane method (SSCPM) and the analytic center cutting plane method
(ACCPM) from [76], which, to the best of my knowledge, are the only meth-
ods explicitly designed to solve the convex hull pricing problem. The number
of iterations is adopted as a measure of efficiency, because the complexity of
each iteration is almost the same for all subgradient-based methods. There-
fore, the CPU time is expected to be proportional to the number of iterations.
The initial guess of the convex hull prices is set to be 80 $/MWh for all
hours in these examples, and the maximal steplength is 5 for these examples.
The optimal solutions are omitted here since the EPSD method achieves the
same solutions given in [76]. The comparative results given in Table 4.1 show
1An alternative way to show the finiteness of the EPSD method is by Theorem
3.4.8 [61], Lemma 40, Lemma 41 and a variant of Lemma 44.
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Table 4.1: Number of iterations to converge to global optimum
SSCPM ACCPM EPSD method
2-h problem 41 – 8
10-h problem 75 216 38
24-h problem 347 300 61
that the EPSD method requires fewer major iterations than either SSCPM
or ACCPM. The major iterations within the EPSD scheme require solving
quadratic programs, while the other two methods require solutions to linear
programs.
4.4.2 Comparison with Subgradient Schemes
The EPSD method is also compared with the general subgradient method and
the steepest ascent subgradient method for the 24-hour problem. The sub-
gradient schemes employ a steplength sequence of the form 20/ν diminishing
steplength. Results of the first 300 iterations are shown since these general
methods converge asymptotically but display poor local convergence behav-
ior. In Fig. 4.2, It is observed that all three methods obtain, or at least ap-
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Figure 4.2: Value of the dual function through iterations
proach, the global optimal dual value. However, the EPSD method displays
a finite termination property and more rapid convergence on the problems
tested. With the same diminishing steplength rules, steepest ascent subgra-
dient schemes performs almost the same as general subgradient schemes in
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terms of the value. The dual optimal values from the EPSD method need not
be monotonically increasing for two reasons: first, the EPSD method adopts
backtracking and the dual function may increase during this phase; second,
the EPSD method may jump from one face of the dual function to the other
one, these jumps are kept as long as γ decreases.
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Figure 4.3: Price errors through iterations
Since the three-generator problems are relatively straightforward, it can
be independently verified that such problems admit unique solutions. In
Fig. 4.3, the norm of the Euclidean distance from these solutions is plotted.
It is seen that the general methods display poor local convergence behavior
and premature termination may lead to significant error, as a consequence of
the flatness of the value function around the optimum. Consequently, a small
change in value may correspond to a huge difference in the solution. This fact
also suggests that the methods effective for obtaining good approximations
to the optimal dual value may not always be suitable for the convex hull
pricing problem.
To illustrate why the EPSD method is more efficient, γ, the Euclidean
distance between the convex hull of aggregate auction-surplus-maximization
quantity set and demand, is plotted in Fig. 4.4. It can be seen that all the
methods display a non-monotone property while the EPSD method corrects
this through backtracking. All points that lead to increased γ function are
discarded in the EPSD method. Furthermore, the lower envelope of the plot
is representative of the accepted iterates for the EPSD method. When only
the accepted iterates are considered (post backtracking), the EPSD does dis-
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Figure 4.4: Errors in terms of γ through iterations
play a monotonically decreasing behavior in error. In contrast, the traditional
methods make little progress after 100 iterations. It is also worth mentioning
that under the same diminishing steplength rules, the steepest ascent direc-
tion is slightly better than the arbitrary subgradient direction, which implies
a small number of iterations hit the null measure non-differentiable points.
This can be explained by the fact that the “zigzagging” is generally around
the non-differentiable points. With a diminishing steplength rule, the general
methods are more and more likely to arrive at these points. Such observa-
tions can be viewed as a numerical evidence of the convergence behavior of
these general methods, but the required number of iterations makes them
less practical.
4.4.3 Comparison with Bundle Methods
The EPSD method is compared with a standard bundle method which also
exploits past information and updates points upon improvement. In bundle
methods, the past information is exploited to construct a piecewise linear
approximation while regularizations are introduced to stabilize the scheme.
With the extra information and effort, bundle methods are expected to be
more efficient compared to standard subgradient and cutting-plane methods.
A bundle method is implemented with a quadratic penalty with no bound
on bundle size. The results are summarized in Table 4.2. To better char-
acterize the computational behavior of both methods, it is been presented
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the number of iterations needed for both methods to attain a solution within
0.01% relative error in dual objective value (denoted by N1) and the number
of iterations needed to attain the global optimum (denoted by N2). In effect,
the effort needed to move from former to the latter is given by N2−N1. For
small systems with 26 or 52 units, both methods attain the global optimum
with similar effort, while the bundle method fails to achieve the global opti-
mum for markets with larger number of units within a reasonable number of
iterations. On the other hand, if a good solution in terms of dual objective
value, say a suboptimal objective with 0.01% error, is the main goal, the
performance of bundle methods is relatively robust: the number iterations
needed increases slowly from 95 to 196 with the system size from 26 units to
104 units. In contrast, the number iterations needed of the EPSD method
for the same error appears to increase faster with system size but the trend
is not consistent. Such differences reflect the fact that the bundle method
is a descent method and adopts the objective value as the merit function.
An interesting observation is that, with a good solution in hand, it takes the
bundle method far more iterations to obtain the global solution, while the
EPSD method does a better job in moving from a good solution to the best
solution. The computational results suggest that the bundle method may
provide a warm start point for the EPSD method. Of course, such results
may be problem dependent and deserve further investigation.
Table 4.2: Comparison with bundle methods
N1 N2 N2 −N1
Bun EPSD Bun EPSD Bun EPSD
26-unit system 1 100 98 106 102 6 3
26-unit system 2 95 151 148 168 53 17
52-unit system 154 280 270 287 116 7
74-unit system 193 239 > 1000 255 > 807 16
104-unit system 196 290 > 1000 305 > 804 15
4.4.4 Scalability of the EPSD Method
A particularly important question is whether the EPSD scheme scales well
with problem size. Motivated by this question, numerical tests are carried on
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the widely used IEEE 10-unit and 26-unit systems, which include all standard
constraints of unit commitment problem. Necessary technical data are given
in [77] and [68], respectively. The quadratic cost curves in the original data
are approximated by 4-segment piecewise linear offer functions.
Table 4.3: Scalability of the EPSD method to power systems size
3-unit 10-unit 26-unit
number of total iterations 61 236 102
number of backtracking iterations 26 181 60
CPU time (s) 73.1 990.2 1057.4
The scalability of the method is numerically demonstrated by the com-
parison of the results of the 3-unit, 10-unit, and 26-unit testing systems, as
shown in Table 4.3. It is observed that the CPU time is roughly proportional
to the number of units times the number of iterations. This is because most
of the CPU time is spent on solving the optimization problem (3.6) and this
problem is solved for every unit during every iteration. It is also observed
that the number of iterations does not grow significantly with the size of
problem. The 3-unit system requires the least number of iterations, and a
smaller fraction of backtracking iterations. This is because the generators in
this system are less constrained. In fact, there is no inter-temporal constraint
in the 3-unit system, making the hourly prices independent of each other. For
more realistic systems, such as the 10-unit and 26-unit systems, the commit-
ment decisions are strongly coupled from a temporal standpoint. Therefore,
both the total number of iterations and the fraction of backtracking itera-
tions increase. Another interesting observation is that the 26-unit system
actually converges faster than the 10-unit one. While appearing counter in-
tuitive, this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 26-unit system
has a wider generation technology mix, leading to a wider offer price range,
than the 10-unit system. Consequently, a lot of generators either price them-
selves out of the market or operate as base units, despite changing prices. In
contrast, the offer prices of each generator in the 10-unit system are much
closer to each other, which makes the system far more sensitive to the prices
changes across the iterations.
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4.4.5 Performance on Energy-Reserve Markets
Finally, tests are included to reflect the performance of the EPSD method
on more realistic systems with both energy and energy-reserve co-optimized
markets as shown in Table 4.4. Case 1 uses the 26-unit data from [68],
while cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 are generated based on case 1 with (1) perturbed
offer prices, and (2) duplicated units and scaled demand, as one, two, three
and four times of the original system, respectively. By doing so, testing
systems with up to 104 units are constructed. For the same systems, it is
observed that the energy-reserve model requires nearly double the number
of iterations compared to the energy-only model. Such a result reflects the
fact that in energy-reserve models, the number of decision variables doubles.
Moreover, the energy prices and the reserve prices are strongly coupled in
co-optimization markets.
Table 4.4: Tests for large-scale energy and energy-reserve co-optimized
markets
system case model
number of
iterations
number of
backtrackings
1 energy-only 102 60
1 energy-reserve 247 164
2 energy-only 168 117
2 energy-reserve 523 410
3 energy-only 287 219
3 energy-reserve 575 456
4 energy-only 255 194
4 energy-reserve 569 460
5 energy-only 305 233
5 energy-reserve 711 572
Yet, another interesting observation is that with perturbed offer prices,
the numbers of iterations needed by the EPSD method increases. The main
reason behind such increase is that the original system consists of several
groups of identical units. Trivially, identical generators respond to the price
identically, which renders it easier to tune the prices. This is also why the
numerical results on scaled systems with unperturbed offer prices are not
shown, which are identical to the 26-generator system. On the other hand,
the perturbation on offer prices differentiates all generators from each other
83
slightly, and the increase in number of iterations represents the additional
effort needed. In practical settings, similar but not identical offer prices
are expected from the sellers due to the same generating technologies and
different cost structure and offering strategies. Therefore, it is believed that
the perturbed offer prices reflect more realistic settings.
4.5 Conclusions
The finite-termination property and numerical performance of the EPSD
method are discussed. It is shown that the algorithm terminates in a finite
number of iterations, and can accommodate both energy and energy-reserves
markets. Preliminary numerical evidence suggests that the method performs
well in comparison with standard subgradient schemes. Besides calculating
the convex hull prices, the EPSD is also an effective tool for maximizing
the Lagrangian dual of a general class of mixed-integer linear programming
problems, which may then be used to recover the primal solution.
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CHAPTER 5
ON NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DUOPOLISTIC
POWER MARKETS WITH SYMMETRIC
CAPACITY
In this chapter, a duopolistic power market is considered in which firms
with symmetric capacity bid their offer functions while abiding by capacity
constraints. Minimal cost allocation decisions and marginal-cost prices are
determined through the consecutive solutions of two optimization problems,
the first a mixed-integer linear program (the unit commitment problem) and
the second a related linear program (the economic dispatch problem) that
has constraints derived from the solution of the commitment problem. Tra-
ditional marginal-cost pricing mechanisms have relied on using the dual vari-
ables associated with the supply-demand constraints from the dispatch prob-
lem. Unfortunately, such mechanisms fail to cover the start-up and energy
costs faced by dispatched generators. This problem is remedied by providing
every dispatched generator with an ex-post settlement called a make-whole
uplift. To reduce or eliminate the need for uplift payment, convex hull pric-
ing, which may lead to the minimal total “opportunity-cost” uplift payments,
has been introduced. Yet, little is known regarding the nature of equilibria
arising from duopolies in which firms make offers in power markets under
these two mechanisms. Such an analysis is complicated by the intricacy of
allocation decisions given a set of bids.
In this chapter, the existence of pure-strategy and/or mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria for duopolistic markets is established, and numerical methods are
proposed to identify these equilibria. The numerical results show that with
strategic behavior, convex hull pricing is not necessarily superior to marginal-
cost pricing in terms of efficiency, consumers’ total payments, or amount of
uplift payment.
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5.1 Introduction
Currently, most organized electricity markets in North America allow for
multi-part offers that include marginal costs and start-up costs [78–83]. These
offers are considered in the determination of production schedules. A salient
characteristic of start-up costs is that these costs depend only on whether
a generator is on or off (commitment) and is independent of the generation
output level. In some markets, payoff functions completely characterize the
benefit of a strategy, given specified adversarial decisions. However, in power
markets, a firm’s payoff is a consequence of an intermediate allocation and
pricing decision [24]. Such a decision is usually derived from solving two sets
of optimization problems. Of these, the first is a mixed-integer linear pro-
gram that prescribes which generators should be on during dispatch. Next,
given these on/off decisions, the precise dispatch levels of the committed gen-
erators is obtained by solving a linear program (called the economic dispatch
problem). Additionally, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the nodal
supply-demand constraint in the dispatch problem provides the locational
marginal or the marginal-cost price at that node.
Start-up costs are commitment-dependent and are ignored when computing
these prices. As a consequence, the payments collected through the auction
may be insufficient to compensate the generators. To overcome this problem,
uplift payment mechanisms have been introduced, through which additional
side payments are made to generators in recognition of the costs incurred
due to commitment decisions.
The introduction of uplift payments brings potentially new issues for both
the market operator and market participants. These issues include the sig-
nificant amount of uplift payments that are neither transparent nor easy
to justify, concerns regarding the fairness, efficiency of the market result-
ing from the sub-optimal nature of the unit commitment solutions and the
non-monotonic behavior of prices with respect to demand.
To overcome these undesirable properties of the current marginal-cost pric-
ing mechanism, convex hull pricing has been introduced and may be imple-
mented in the Midwest ISO in the near future [25,26]. Compared to marginal-
cost prices, convex hull prices are monotonically increasing in demand, in-
dependent of computational error in unit commitment problems. More im-
portantly, such a pricing mechanism minimizes the total “opportunity-cost”
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uplift payments, assuming identical offering behavior under different pricing
rules.
However, the objective of each rational seller in a market is to maximize
its profit, which depends highly on the market mechanism in force and the
associated pricing rules, especially in concentrated markets, such as electric-
ity markets. The offer need not constitute its true cost of generation, and
different pricing rules provide different incentives to seller on its offering be-
havior [84]. Consequently, it is unclear whether the claimed advantages of
convex hull pricing hold in presence of strategic behavior.
Strategic behavior in electricity markets without nonconvexities has been
extensively studied. A comprehensive survey on the computational meth-
ods to calculate optimal offering strategy can be found in [30]. Ignoring
the commitment decisions, Fabra et al. investigate the pure-strategy and
mixed-strategy equilibria in a duopoly under uniform-price and pay-as-bid
auctions, assuming the capacity is perfectly divisible and the cost functions
are linear [31]. The application of the pay-as-bid auction is also studied
by an experimental method in [32]. Supply function equilibrium (SFE) [85]
approaches have also been applied and allow more realistic considerations
of market rules. Green and Newbery [86] apply an SFE model to the Eng-
land and Wales market and obtain consistent results with the empirical data.
Players with heterogeneous cost functions and capacity constraints are stud-
ied in [87], which also studies the stability of the SFEs. The optimal of-
fering strategy with uncertain demand and competitor’s behavior is studied
in [88,89]. Although the SFE approach provides more sophisticated models,
to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing studies consider commit-
ment decisions and the associated pricing or uplift payment schemes within
a strategic regime.
The duopoly studied in this chapter belongs to the class of discontinuous
games. The existence of equilibria in such games has been studied extensively.
Most known conditions depend on the properties of tie-breaking rules. For
example, the pioneering work by Dasgupta and Maskin provides a sufficient
condition that requires weak lower semi-continuity in an individual player’s
payoff and lower semi-continuity in the aggregate payoff [90]. In electricity
market design, the tie-breaking rules are usually not specified for purposes of
establishing the existence of equilibria, but for engineering considerations, or
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out of convention and convenience.1 Compared with Dasgupta and Maskin’s
results, another advantage of the work lies in this chapter is the ability to
assess the equilibria quantitatively.
This chapter makes two sets of contributions in the context of duopolistic
power markets with symmetric capacity subject to marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift:
(i) In the low-demand regime in which either firm can independently meet
the entire demand, the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under
both mechanisms is established, and their structure is characterized.
The equilibrium offering strategy and total payment are also shown
to be identical across both mechanisms, despite different energy prices
and uplift payments.
(ii) In the high demand regime, both generators must be dispatched to meet
the demand. In this case it is shown that a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium cannot exist under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift.
However, the existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria is proven. In
contrast, under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift, pure-
strategy Nash equilibria are shown to be exist. Further, the market per-
formance comparison of these two mechanisms, in terms of efficiency,
resulting prices and total payment are ambiguous in the high demand
regime.
The model presented in this chapter could be viewed as an extension of the
uniform-price duopoly model studied in [31] by including the start-up costs
and the associated uplift payment mechanisms. However, the impacts of
start-up costs are profound. As Fabra et al. show, without the consideration
of start-up costs, pure-strategy equilibria always exist under marginal-cost
pricing, which is not the case for the electricity market model in question.
The remainder of this chapter contains five additional sections and is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 5.2, a mathematical model is presented for
a duopolistic power market under two distinct pricing and uplift mecha-
nisms. Section 5.3 is devoted to characterizing prices, uplift payments and
payoff functions. In Section 5.4, the form of equilibria that emerge under
1For example, the price-tied regulation offers in PJM are dispatched in order of their
MW values (cf. PJM OATT, Attachment K – Appendix, §1.11.4(b)).
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the marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift mechanism and convex
hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift mechanism in low and high demand
regimes are characterized. Numerical tests are provided in Section 5.5 and
the chapter concludes with some remarks and final thoughts in Section 5.6.
5.2 Duopolistic Electricity Market Model
Consider a duopoly in which two generators with capacities K1 and K2 com-
pete to serve an inelastic demand d. It is assumed that capacity is perfectly
divisible and K1 = K2 = K. Generator i could be either off-line, denoted by
ui = 0, or online, as specified by ui = 1. In the instance of the latter, the
ith generator can produce ki MWh during a given hour, where ki ∈ [0, K].
Recall that the generator can provide positive electricity output only if it is
online. Suppose generator i’s cost of generating ki MWh is given by an affine
function si + ciki, where si and ci are positive parameters that denote the
start-up cost and the marginal cost, respectively. Without loss of generality,
assume that s1 ≤ s2.
5.2.1 Firm Strategies
In the duopolistic regime, the action or strategy of each generator is given
by a single marginal cost offer pi ∈ [0, pmax] for its entire capacity, which
does not necessarily reflect its true cost, i ∈ {1, 2}. Recall that pmax denotes
the price cap which is assumed to be greater than either c1 or c2. Assume
that both firms are rational profit-maximizing firms and have access to their
payoffs as well as that of their rivals.
5.2.2 Allocation Mechanism
Consider an electricity market organized as a sealed-bid auction. The auc-
tion allocation and payment rules specify which bids are accepted, fully or
partially, and at what price the transaction is settled. This allocation is usu-
ally determined by solving the unit commitment problem and the economic
dispatch problem. Furthermore, assume that the auctioneer determines the
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allocation to minimize the total “as-bid” cost based on not only the marginal
cost offers, but also the start-up costs.
Definition 46 (Allocation Model). The auctioneer determines allocation by
solving the mixed-integer linear program:
min
u1,k1,u2,k2
u1(s1 + p1k1) + u2(s2 + p2k2)
subject to u1k1 + u2k2 = d,
ui ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2,
ki ∈ [0, K], i = 1, 2.
(5.1)
Such a model is prototypical of currently operational day-ahead markets in
North America. In practice, other factors, such as a more complicated cost
structure and physical/operational constraints, may result in discontinuities
and lumpiness in cost. These impacts are similar to those arising from the
presence of start-up costs in the model in question.
It is possible that problem (5.1) yields multiple solutions. A tie-breaking
rule that favors the allocations with lower actual cost is adopted; if a tie still
persists, player 1 is dispatched first. Such rules differ from the commonly
used pro-rata tie-breaking rules employed elsewhere, because with positive
start-up cost, a convex combination of multiple solutions, in general, is not
a solution. Such rules are adopted solely for identifying the existence of
pure-strategy equilibria. When studying the mixed-strategy equilibria, the
probability of a tie is zero and hence the tie-breaking rule has no impacts
on market outcomes. In terms of prices, if a pricing rule leads to multiple
solutions, the minimal one is selected.
Suppose the solution to (5.1) is denoted by {u∗1, k∗1, u∗2, k∗2}, based on which
a payment scheme is considered and comprises of a pricing rule and an uplift
rule.
5.2.3 Marginal-Cost Pricing with Make-Whole Uplift
Consider a payment scheme based on marginal-cost pricing with a make-
whole uplift. This scheme is currently adopted in most day-ahead markets
in North America.
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Definition 47 (Marginal-Cost Price). The marginal-cost price is determined
by the optimal dual variable ρmc associated with the supply-demand balance
constraint in the following linear programming problem,
min
k1,k2
u∗1(s1 + p1k1) + u
∗
2(s2 + p2k2)
subject to u∗1k1 + u
∗
2k2 = d, (ρ
mc)
ki ∈ [0, K], i = 1, 2.
(5.2)
In the linear program (5.2), u∗1s1 and u
∗
2s2 are constants, and have no im-
pact on the problem. Therefore, marginal-cost pricing may be insufficient in
reimbursing the start-up cost. In such cases, a “make-whole” uplift payment
is introduced to compensate the generators.
Definition 48 (Make-Whole Uplift). The make-whole uplift payment wi to
generator i is defined as wi, where
wi , max{0, u∗i (si + pik∗i − ρmck∗i )}. (5.3)
In effect, this uplift ensures the successful firms to get at least their total
offered prices. Given the allocation and payment rules, the player’s problem
under marginal-cost pricing and make-whole uplift is defined as follows.
Definition 49 (Player’s Problem under Marginal-Cost Pricing with Make-
Whole Uplift).
Gmci (p−i) :
max
pi∈[0,pmax]
ρmcu∗i k
∗
i + wi − u∗i (si + cik∗i )
subject to {u∗1, k∗1, u∗2, k∗2} solves (5.1),
ρmc solves (5.2).
5.2.4 Convex Hull Pricing with Opportunity-Cost Uplift
Another optional payment scheme that has been recently suggested, adopts
the convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift. Instead of fixing the
discrete decisions, the convex hull prices are derived from the closest convex
approximation, or the convex hull, of the allocation problem.
Definition 50 (Convex Hull Price). The convex hull price, denoted by ρch,
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is defined as the subgradient of the convex hull of the value function or
ρch ∈ ∂vch(d), (5.4)
where vch(d) is defined by
vch(d) , min {µ|(d, µ) ∈ conv(epi(v(d)))} , (5.5)
value function v(d) is given by
v(d) , min
ui,pi,i=1,2
u1(s1 + p1k1) + u2(s2 + p2k2)
subject to u1k1 + u2k2 = d,
ui ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2.
and epi(f) denotes the epigraph of a function f and conv(A) denotes the
convex hull of set A.
The opportunity-cost uplift payment is designed explicitly to emulate the
auction surplus realized by price-takers in free markets. Due to the dis-
crete nature of (5.1), in general there is no allocation that can maximize all
players’ auction surpluses under any linear price scheme. Consequently, the
opportunity-cost uplift payment is added as a side payment such that the
surplus of each player is the same as that when individually maximized under
linear prices ρch.
Definition 51 (Opportunity-Cost Uplift). Opportunity-cost uplift payment
oi to generator i is defined as
oi , max
ui∈{0,1},ki∈[0,Ki]
(
ui(ρ
chki − si − piki)
)− u∗i (ρchk∗i − si − pik∗i ) . (5.6)
With the opportunity-cost uplift payment, the surplus of generator i is
added to
max
ui∈{0,1},ki∈[0,Ki]
{
ui(ρ
chki − si − piki)
}
, (5.7)
which is the maximal surplus of generator i under price ρch. Likewise, the
the player’s problem under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift
rules is defined.
Definition 52 (Player’s Problem under Convex Hull Pricing with Opportu-
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nity-Cost Uplift).
Gchi (p−i) :
max
pi∈[0,pmax]
ρchu∗i k
∗
i + wi − u∗i (si + cik∗i )
subject to {u∗1, k∗1, u∗2, k∗2} solves (5.1),
ρch solves (5.4).
(5.8)
5.2.5 Nash Equilibrium Concepts
Definition 53 (Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). Suppose players 1 and
2 with symmetric capacity K are characterized by start-up costs s1 and s2,
and marginal cost c1 and c2, respectively. If the system level demand is d,
then:
(i) Under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift, the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium is given by the tuple of offers {p∗i }2i=1, where p∗i solves
Gmci (p
∗
−i) for i = 1, 2 where p−i , {pj}j 6=i.
(ii) Under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift, the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium is given by the tuple of offers {p∗i }2i=1, where p∗i solves
Gchi (p
∗
−i) for i = 1, 2 where p−i , {pj}j 6=i.
As pure-strategy Nash equilibria may not always exist, the mixed exten-
sion of the original game and the associated mixed-strategy equilibrium are
studied. In this case, the player’s strategy is a probability measure on the
Borel subsets of the pure strategy action set, [0, pmax]. Since the pure strategy
action set is just a closed range of the real line, the player’s mixed strategy
can be captured by a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of its offer
price, denoted by Fi(pi).
For this game, the conditions of the existence theorem 5 in [90] do not hold.
First, depending the tie-breaking rules, the total payoff of the game may not
be upper semi-continuous;2 Second, no matter what tie-breaking rules are
used, at least one of the players’ payoff is not weakly lower semi-continuous
at zero.
Consider the expected payoff function of player i adopts strategy fi(pi) as
2For example, the total payoff under pro-rata tie-breaking rules is neither upper semi-
continuous nor lower semi-continuous.
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follows:
pii(Fi(p), Fj(p)) ,
∫ pmax
0
pii(pi, Fj(p))dFi(p),
where pii(pi, Fj(p)) ,
∫ pmax
0
pii(pi, pj)dFj(p).
where pii(pi, pj) is the payoff of player i in the pure strategy game. By doing
so, the player’s problem is extended to the mixed-strategy regime, in which
the player’s objective is to maximize its expected payoff:
G¯i(F−i) : max
Fi(p)
[pii(Fi(p), F−i(p))].
Definition 54 (Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). Suppose players 1 and
2 with symmetric capacity K are characterized by start-up costs s1 and s2,
and marginal cost c1 and c2, respectively. If the system level demand is d,
then:
(i) Under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift, the mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium is given by the tuple of generalized probability den-
sities of offers {F ∗i }2i=1, where F ∗i solves G¯mci (F ∗−i) for i = 1, 2 where
F−i , {Fj}j 6=i.
(ii) Under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift, the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium is given by the tuple of generalized probability
densities of offers {F ∗i }2i=1, where F ∗i solves G¯chi (F ∗−i) for i = 1, 2 where
F−i , {Fj}j 6=i.
5.3 Analysis of Payoff Functions
This section is devoted to the analysis of allocation and payment with respect
to players’ offers, based on which players’ payoffs are analyzed. As introduced
before, the allocation outcome is a solution to an MILP. For a stylized market
as the model in question, the allocation is relatively straightforward: Due to
the positive start-up costs and tie-breaking rules, if 0 < d ≤ K, or in the low
demand case, in the allocation outcomes, exactly one generator is online to
serve the demand; In contrast, in the high demand case, with K < d ≤ 2K,
both generators are online, and the one with the lower marginal cost offer
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operates at full capacity. By leveraging these insights, analytical expressions
for the payoff functions are provided in the context of marginal-cost pricing
with make-whole uplift (Section 5.3.1) as well as convex hull pricing with
opportunity-cost uplift (Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 Firms’ Payoff under Marginal Cost Pricing with
Make-Whole Uplift
We begin by characterizing the marginal cost price for given allocation and
offers in the following lemma.
Lemma 55. Given commitment decisions u∗1 and u
∗
2, and offer prices p1 and
p2, the marginal-cost price is given by,
ρmc =
{
u∗1p1 + u
∗
2p2, if 0 < d ≤ K,
max(p1, p2) , if K < d ≤ 2K.
(5.9)
Proof. Based on the allocation outcome, under marginal-cost pricing, in the
low demand case, the price is set at the marginal cost offer price of the online
generator, while in the high demand case, since both generators are online,
the marginal-cost price is set to be the maximal of these two generators’
marginal cost offers, max(p1, p2).
With the allocation and price outcomes in hand, the resulting uplift pay-
ment and profit of each player can be easily analyzed. Depending on the
tie-breaking rules, the profit function may be upper semicontinuous or lower
semicontinuous. For simplicity, the profit at the point pi = pj is not specified.
Lemma 56 (Payoff function under marginal-cost pricing). Given commit-
ment decisions u∗1 and u
∗
2, and offer prices p1 and p2, in low demand cases,
0 < d ≤ K, the profit of player i under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole
uplift, pimc−mwi , is given by
pimc−mwi = u
∗
i (pi − ci)d. (5.10)
In high demand cases, K < d ≤ 2K, the profit of player i under such a
95
payment mechanism is
pimc−mwi =

(pj − ci)K − si, if pi ≤ pj − si
K
,
(pi − ci)K, if pj − si
K
< pi < pj,
(pi − ci)(d−K), if pi > pj.
(5.11)
Proof. In low demand cases, 0 < d ≤ K, the price is set at the offer price of
the online generator, and its start-up cost is fully compensated by the uplift
payment. The profit of the online generator is the product of its markup
in marginal-cost and the demand. By definition of the make-whole uplift
payment, the off-line generator is not eligible to receive any payment, so its
profit is zero.
For the high demand case, K < d ≤ 2K, consider three scenarios, corre-
sponding to the three linear segments in Fig. 5.1:
pi
pii
(pj − ci)K
(pj − ci)K − si
(pj − ci)(d−K)
pj0
Figure 5.1: Payoff under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift
(i) pi ≤ pj − si
K
: In this case, due to the lower offer price, generator i
is fully dispatched and the price is set at pj. Furthermore, pj is high
enough to cover generator i’s start-up cost, hence no make-whole uplift
payment is made to generator i. As a result, generator i’s revenue is
pjK. Also note that the actual cost of generator i is ciK+si. Therefore,
its profit is the difference between the revenue and the true cost, which
is (pj − ci)K − si.
(ii) pj − si
K
< pi < pj: Then, generator i is also fully dispatched and
the price remains pj. However, pj is no longer high enough to cover
generator i’s start-up cost, and the remainder is si− (pj − pi)K. This is
the exact amount that will be compensated by the uplift payment. Since
the uplift payment to generator i now depends on its own offer, its profit
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is a function of its offer and is a product of its markup in marginal-cost
and its capacity.
(iii) pi > pj: Then, generator i sets the price but only gets dispatched at
d−K. Meanwhile, generator i receives si uplift payment since the price
is the same as its marginal cost offer. So, its profit is the product of its
markup in marginal-cost and its dispatch level.
Therefore, the lemma is proved.
5.3.2 Players’ Payoff under Convex Hull Pricing with
Opportunity-Cost Uplift
Unlike marginal-cost prices, the convex hull prices do not depend directly
on the allocation at the current demand level. The convex hull prices are
characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 57 (Convex hull price). Given offer prices p1 and p2, the convex
hull price ρch is given by the following:
ρch =
 min
(s1
K
+ p1,
s2
K
+ p2
)
, if 0 < d ≤ K,
max
(s1
K
+ p1,
s2
K
+ p2
)
, if K < d ≤ 2K.
(5.12)
Proof. The allocation problem can be viewed as a two-step optimization
problem: first to determine the 0-1 commitment decisions and then the gen-
erating levels. Accordingly, the value function can be obtained by enumerate
the minimal dispatch costs for all possible commitment decisions.
v(d) = min{v00(d), v01(d), v10(d), v11(d)} (5.13)
where v00, v01, v10, v11 denote the minimal dispatch cost under four possible
commitment decisions, respectively.
v00 is zero at d = 0 and infinite otherwise; v01 and v10 are linear in [0, K]
and infinite otherwise; and v11 includes two linear pieces in [0, K] and [K, 2K]
respectively. Therefore, the convex hull of the value function, vch(d), has
only three extreme points, at d = 0, d = K and d = 2K. The values at
these points are v(0) = 0, v(K) = min(s1 + p1K, s2 + p2K), and v(2K) =
s1 + p1K + s2 + p2K, respectively.
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With the allocation and price outcomes, the profit of each player is char-
acterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 58. Given commitment decisions u∗1 and u
∗
2, and offer prices p1 and
p2, in low demand cases, 0 < d ≤ K, the profit of player i under convex hull
pricing with opportunity-cost uplift, pich−oci , is given by
pich−oci = u
∗
i (pi − ci)d. (5.14)
In high demand cases, K < d ≤ 2K, the profit of player 1, i.e., the gener-
ator with lower start-up cost, under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost
uplift is
pich−oc1 =

(s2
K
+ p2 − c1
)
K − s1, if p1 < p2,(s2
K
+ p2 − p1
)
K − s1
+(p1 − c1)(d−K), if p2 < p1 < p2 + s2 − s1
K
,
(p1 − c1)(d−K), if p1 ≥ p2 + s2 − s1
K
,
while the profit of player 2, i.e., the generator with higher start-up cost, under
convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift is
pich−oc2 =

(
s1
K
+ p1 − c2)K − s2, if p2 ≤ p1 − s2 − s1
K
,
(p2 − c2)K, if p1 − s2 − s1
K
< p2 < p1,
(p2 − c2)(d−K), if p2 > p1.
Proof. To study the opportunity-cost uplift payment, first, the auction-surplus-
maximization is analyzed for player i under price ρch, i.e., optimization prob-
lem3
max
ui∈{0,1},ki∈[0,Ki]
{
ui(ρ
chki − si − piki)
}
.
Due to positive start-up costs, there are only two candidate solutions to this
problem: {ui = 0, ki = 0} and {ui = 1, ki = K}.
In low demand cases, as the price is min(s1/K + p1, s2/K + p2), staying
off-line, or {ui = 0, ki = 0} is optimal to both generators’ auction-surplus-
maximization problems, leading to a zero auction surplus. Thus, the off-line
3This problem is from the market operator’s perspective, whose solution may not
maximize individual player’s profit.
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generator gets zero opportunity-cost uplift payment and the online generator
gets 0 − (ρchd − si − pid) uplift. In summary, the profit of player i in low
demand cases is u∗i (pi − ci)d.
In high demand cases, {ui = 1, ki = K} optimize both generators’ auction
surplus. If generator i is fully dispatched, then its allocation is already opti-
mized in terms of auction surplus; otherwise, it will receive (ρch−pi)(2K−d)
as the opportunity-cost uplift payment.
Thus, the opportunity-cost uplift payment can be written as
ochi =
{
0, if pi < pj,
(ρch − pi)(2K − d), if pi > pj.
And the profit of player i is
pich−oci =
{
(ρch − ci)K − si, if pi < pj,
(ρch − ci)(d−K)− si + (ρch − pi)(2K − d, ) if pi > pj.
The dependence of the profit on the convex hull prices ρch, which is a func-
tion of both players’ offers, is further eliminated. Essentially, there are two
conditions to be considered: (1) whether the generator in question gets fully
dispatched, and (2) whether the generator sets the price. The combination
of these two conditions leads to at most four scenarios. However, because
p1 < p2 and
s1
K
+ p1 >
s2
K
+ p2 cannot hold simultaneously, generator 1
with lower start-up cost cannot get fully dispatched and set the price si-
multaneously, and generator 2 with higher start-up cost cannot get partially
dispatched and not set the price. Therefore, one scenario is eliminated for
each generator. Consider three scenarios for each generator, the conclusion
specified in the lemma can be reached. The profit of each player is illustrated
in Fig. 5.2(a) and Fig. 5.2(b), respectively.
5.4 Analysis and Computation of Equilibria
This section is devoted to the analysis and computation of Nash equilibria
arising from the duopolistic interactions. It is observed that the structure of
the equilibrium offers varies significantly when demand is beyond the capacity
of a single generator. In Section 5.4.1, the nature of equilibria in a low
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pi1
p1p0 2
(p2 − c1 + s2/K)K − s1
(p2 − c1)(d−K)
p2 + (s2 − s1)/K
+s2 − s1
(p2 − c1)(d−K)
(a)
pi2
p2p0 1
(p1 − c2)K
(p1 − c2 + s1/K)K − s2
(p2 − c2)(d−K)
p1 − (s2 − s1)/K
(b)
Figure 5.2: (a) Payoff of player 1 under convex hull pricing with
opportunity-cost uplift; (b) Payoff of player 2 under convex hull pricing
with opportunity-cost uplift
demand regime is examined while in Section 5.4.2, the focus is on a high
demand regime. Following in Section 5.4.3, how mixed-strategy equilibria
may be computed is discussed.
5.4.1 Analysis of Low Demand Regime
When the demand may be satisfied by either player, the equilibrium can be
captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 59. Suppose 0 < d ≤ K and i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. Then the following
hold:
(a) Suppose si + cid < sj + cjd. Both marginal-cost pricing with make-
whole uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift mecha-
nisms admit a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium given by (p∗i , p
∗
j), where
p∗i = cj +
sj − si
d
, and p∗j = cj.
(b) Suppose si + cid = sj + cjd. Then, p
∗
i = ci, p
∗
j = cj, and player 1 is
dispatched.
Proof. By Lemma 56 and Lemma 58, the payoff under two mechanisms is
identical. Consequently, the offering strategies are also identical at equilib-
rium.
Case (a): When 0 < d ≤ K, one generator is on with a possibly positive
profit while the other is off with zero profit. Consequently, the best response
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of each generator is to undercut its rival’s offer in terms of total as-bid cost
including the start-up cost, until under-cutting is unprofitable (or the of-
fer is less than its true marginal cost). Consider the marginal cost pricing
mechanism with make-whole uplift. Suppose generator i is dispatched, then
by (5.9), the marginal-cost price is set to be pi. Consequently, generator
i gets an energy-based payment of pid with a make-whole uplift payment
of si leading to a profit of (pi − ci)d while generator j obtains zero profit.
Consequently, the best response4 of generator j is to undercut generator i
by submitting an offer pj such that si + pid < sj + pjd, until pj < cj. This
implies that pi = (sj − si)/d+ cj when pj = cj. In summary, the equilibrium
strategy is given by
(p∗i , p
∗
j) =
(
cj +
sj − si
d
, cj
)
.
This is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and leads to a price ρmc, where
ρmc = p∗i = cj +
sj − si
d
,
with a total payment to generator i of sj + cjd.
Case (b): As part of a tie-breaking rule, player 1 is dispatched first.
The equilibrium in the low demand case resembles the Bertrand outcome.
This corresponds well with economic intuition, when with excess capacity,
competition forces players to offer close to actual costs, and hence drives the
price close to actual marginal cost. In a low demand regime, the pricing
rules have little impact on allocation, total payment or generators’ profits.
Furthermore, if si + cid = sj + cjd, then both players offer at marginal costs.
5.4.2 Analysis of High Demand Regime
Next, consider a high demand case where demand exceeds capacity of either
player, as specified by K < d < 2K. Due to the tight capacity margin,
players may have far more market power. As a consequence, the clearing
price may be well above the actual cost. It is trivial that when d = 2K, both
generators need to supply at full capacity and hence, offering at pmax is the
4For generator 1, ≤ is enough.
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pure strategy equilibrium in both mechanisms. In this section, only the cases
when demand exceeds capacity of either player but is strictly less than the
total capacity are considered.
Marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift
By Lemma 56, under marginal-cost pricing with a make-whole uplift pay-
ment, the profit of player i is given by the following:
pii(p) =

(pj − ci)K − si, if pi ≤ pj − si
K
(pi − ci)K, if pj − si
K
< pi < pj
(pi − ci)(d−K). if pi > pj.
(5.15)
By inspecting the payoff functions, the only candidate strategies for gener-
ator i in response to pj are to offer either at pi = p
max or at pi = pj, and the
same argument holds for player j. In the next proposition, these strategies
are examined and the absence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria is concluded.
Proposition 60 (Absence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria). Suppose K <
d < 2K, then there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for marginal-cost
pricing with make-whole uplift payment mechanism.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume tie-breaking favors generator i.
The profit of player i is a piecewise continuous function with non-decreasing
pieces [0, pj) and (pj, p
max], respectively. Therefore, the only candidate strate-
gies for generator i in response to pj are to (i) either offer at pi = p
max; (ii) or
to offer at pi = pj. Likewise, generator j’s best response is either pj = p
max
or pj = pi. As a result, the candidate equilibria are pi = pj < p
max or
pi = pj = p
max. It can be shown by contradiction that neither candidate can
be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium:
(i) pi = pj < p
max: Since generator j’s payoff function is increasing over
(pi, p
max], generator j is better off by offering at pmax. Consequently, this
strategy-tuple cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) pi = pj = p
max: Since generator j is better off by offering slightly be-
low pmax as seen by the structure of the payoff function in (5.15). In this
case, unilateral deviations are profitable and this tuple cannot be a Nash
equilibrium.
As pure-strategy Nash equilibria do not exist, mixed strategy equilibria,
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given by a tuple of cumulative distribution functions {F1(p), F2(p)}, are in
question. Consider the expected payoff function pii, i ∈ {1, 2} as follows:
pii(Fi(p), Fj(p)) ,
∫ pmax
0
pii(pi, Fj(p))dFi(p),
where
pii(pi, Fj(p)) ,
∫ pmax
0
pii(pi, pj)dFj(p).
A road-map of the arguments leading to the existence and computation of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium are presented.
(i) Necessary conditions of any mixed-strategy equilibrium, if it exists, are
established by Lemma 61.
(ii) Based on these necessary conditions, the differentiability of any mixed-
strategy equilibrium, if it exists, is claimed in Proposition 62 and the
first-order differential equations are derived in Proposition 63.
(iii) The solvability of the first-order differential equations are shown in
Proposition 66. The differential equations specify a family of solutions,
depending on the boundary conditions.
(iv) Prove that among the family of solutions, at least a pair of solutions
to players’ respective first-order differential equations are distribution
functions as shown in Lemma 67. Furthermore, it is shown to satisfy
all the necessary conditions specified in Lemma 68.
(v) Finally, prove such a pair of solutions is shown to be indeed a mixed-
strategy equilibrium by definition in Theorem 70.
Let S1 and S2 denote the supports of generators 1 and 2 in their respective
mixed-strategy densities.5 And define Smaxi , max{p|p ∈ Si} and Smini ,
min{p|p ∈ Si}, i = 1, 2. It is known that all pure strategies in their respective
supports are best responses to the rival’s mixed strategy. In other words,
suppose {F ∗1 (p), F ∗2 (p)} denotes the mixed strategy equilibrium, then, for
i = 1 and 2, pi ∈ Si if and only if [91]
pi ∈ arg max
pi∈[0,pmax]
pii(pi, F
∗
−i(p)).
5The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies used to construct the
mixed strategy.
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We begin with an intermediate result that prescribes some properties of
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, if indeed it exists. Those properties
are shown by contradiction arguments.
Lemma 61. Suppose K < d < 2K and consider any mixed strategy equilib-
rium denoted by {F ∗1 , F ∗2 }. Then, this equilibrium has the following proper-
ties:
(i) Both F ∗1 (p) and F
∗
2 (p) have no point masses on (max(c1, c2), p
max);
(ii) Smax1 = S
max
2 = p
max;
(iii) Smin1 = S
min
2 ≥ max(c1, c2);
(iv) ∀p′ ∈ S1 ∩ S2,P(p1 = p′ and p2 = p′) = 0; and
(v) For i = 1, 2, Si is non-disjoint, i.e. for any two points a, b such that
Smini < a < b < S
max
i , Fi(b)− Fi(a) > 0.
Proof. (i): We proceed by contradiction and assume that there exists a p′ ∈
(max(c1, c2), p
max) where p′ is a point mass on the density player j’s support.
First show that there exists an δ > 0, such that player i does not randomize
its strategy over (p′, p′+δ]. Then show that if this is indeed the case, player j
can leverage this fact and find a strategy that strictly dominates the offering
strategy at p′. Any pure strategy that is strictly dominated by the other pure
strategy does not belong to the support, which contradicts to the assumption
that p′ is a point mass on the support of player j’s equilibrium strategy.
In order to show that player i does not randomize its strategy over (p′, p′+
δ], it is sufficient to find a pure strategy that strictly dominates the offer
prices in this interval. Select p′ − δ as the pure strategy and formally, then
it is needed to prove for all  ≤ δ,
pii(p
′ + , Fj(p))− pii(p′ − δ, Fj(p)) < 0.
Since any probability distribution has a finite number of point masses, there
exists a δ ∈ (0, si/K) such that no other point masses of Fj(p) exist either
on interval [p′ − δ, p′ + δ] or on[
p′ − δ + si
K
, p′ + δ +
si
K
]
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except p′ and, if it exists, p′ + si/K, respectively. Next, the expression
pii(p
′ + , Fj(p))− pii(p′ − δ, Fj(p))
is examined, which can be expressed as
pii(p
′ + , Fj(p))− pii(p′ − δ, Fj(p))
=
∫ p′−δ
0
[pii(p
′ + , pj)− pii(p′ − δ, pj)]dFj(p)
+
∫ p′+
p′−δ
[pii(p
′ + , pj)− pii(p′ − δ, pj)]dFj(p)
+
∫ p′−δ+ si
K
p′+
[pii(p
′ + , pj)− pii(p′ − δ, pj)]dFj(p)
+
∫ p′++ si
K
p′−δ+ si
K
[pii(p
′ + , pj)− pii(p′ − δ, pj)]dFj(p)
+
∫ pmax
p′++ si
K
[pii(p
′ + , pj)− pii(p′ − δ, pj)]dFj(p).
The definition of the payoff function allows us to rewrite the sum of integrals
as follows:
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pii(p
′ + , Fj(p))− pii(p′ − δ, Fj(p))
=
term 1︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ p′−δ
0
[[(p′ + − ci)− (p′ − δ − ci)](d−K)]dFj(p)
+
term 2︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ p′+
p′−δ
[(p′ + − ci)(d−K)− (p′ − δ − ci)K]dFj(p)
+
term 3︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ p′−δ+ si
K
p′+
[(+ δ)K]dFj(p)
+
term 4︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ p′++ si
K
p′−δ+
si
K
[(p′ + − ci)K − (pj − ci)K + si]dFj(p)
+
term 5︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ pmax
p′++ si
K
[pii(p
′ + , pj)− pii(p′ − δ, pj)]dFj(p).
Of these, term 1 reduces to P(pj ≤ p′ − δ)( + δ)(d−K), while term 2 may
be simplified by noting that
(p′ + − ci)(d−K)− (p′ − δ − ci)K = (p′ − ci)(d− 2K) + (d−K) + δK.
When considering term 4, recall that for pj ∈ [p′ − δ + si/K, p′ +  + si/K],
allowing us to bound the difference as follows:
0 ≤ (p′ + − ci)K − (pj − ci)K + si ≤ (+ δ)K.
By Lemma 56, when pj > p
′++si/K, pii(p′+, pj) = pii(p′−δ, pj), implying
that term 5 is zero. Therefore, the entire summation may be rewritten as
follows:
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pii(p
′ + , Fj(p))− pii(p′ − δ, Fj(p)) ≤
terma︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(pj ≤ p′ − δ)(+ δ)(d−K)
+
term b︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p′ − ci)(d− 2K)
∫ p′+
p′−δ
dFj(p) +
term c︷ ︸︸ ︷
[(d−K) + δK]
∫ p′+
p′−δ
dFj(p)
+
termd︷ ︸︸ ︷
[(+ δ)K]
∫ p′−δ+ si
K
p′+
dFj(p) +
terme︷ ︸︸ ︷
[(+ δ)K]
∫ p′++ si
K
p′−δ+
si
K
dFj(p) .
Since all terms in the summation are bounded by 1 for sufficiently small δ
and , (note  ≤ δ), except term (b) on the right, all of the remaining terms
can be made arbitrarily small by reducing δ and . Since p′ > max(c1, c2)
and d < 2K, it follows that (p′ − ci)(d− 2K) < 0 and∫ p′+
p′−δ
dFj(p) ≥ P(pj = p′) > 0,
implying that term (b) is negative. Therefore, there exists a δ such that for
all  ≤ δ,
pii(p
′ + , Fj(p))− pii(p′ − δ, Fj(p)) < 0.
Consequently (p′, p′ + δ] 6⊆ Si, since any pure strategy in this set is strictly
dominated by an offer at p′ − δ for player i. As a result,
Fi(p
′ + δ)− Fi(p′) = 0.
In this case, due to the piecewise non-decreasing nature of the payoff func-
tion, p′+δ/2 strictly dominates p′ for generator j, unless it sets the price or re-
ceives uplift payments with probability 0. In this case, Fi (p
′ + δ/2 + sj/K) =
0. However, if this is the case, p′ is strictly dominated by min(Si)− ˆ, where
ˆ is an arbitrarily small positive number, for generator j. In either case, p′
cannot be in the support of player j.
(ii): We proceed by contradiction and assume that Smaxi < p
max and let
a , pmax − Smaxi . Trivially, a > 0. This implies that generator j will not
randomize its strategy over the open set (pmax − a, pmax), since any offer in
this set is dominated by an offer at pmax. On the other hand, since a pure
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strategy equilibrium does not exist, the probability of offering pmax is less
than 1 or P(pj = pmax) < 1. We proceeded to show by contradiction that
there exists δ ∈ [0, si/K] such that [pmax−a− δ, pmax−a] 6⊆ Si. Such a claim
is proven by showing for all  ∈ [0, δ], we have that
pii(p
max − a− , Fj(p))− pii(pmax − a
2
, Fj(p)) < 0. (5.16)
The left-hand side of Inequality (5.16) can be examined by considering
three possibilities for p = pj: (a) pj ≤ pmax − a − ; (b) pj = pmax; and (c)
pmax − a−  < pj ≤ pmax − a.
Case (a): When pj ≤ pmax − a− , by Lemma 56,
pii(p
max − a− , pj)− pii
(
pmax − a
2
, pj
)
= (pmax − a− − ci) (d−K)−
(
pmax − a
2
− ci
)
(d−K)
= −
(a
2
+ 
)
(d−K).
Case (b): If pj = p
max, then the clearing price is set at pmax. In this case,
pii(p
max − a− , pj) ≤ pii(pmax − a/2, pj),
because with same clearing price pmax and a higher offer price pmax − a/2,
player i is eligible for the same or a higher uplift payment. Denote the profit
difference of these two offers by −M , where M ≥ 0.
Case (c): If pmax − a−  < pj ≤ pmax − a, by Lemma 56,
pii(p
max − a− , pj)− pii
(
pmax − a
2
, pj
)
= (pmax − a− − ci)K −
(
pmax − a
2
− ci
)
(d−K)
<
(
pmax − a
2
− ci
)
K −
(
pmax − a
2
− ci
)
(d−K)
=
(
pmax − a
2
− ci
)
(2K − d).
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By utilizing the expressions obtained in cases (a), (b) and (c), we have that
pii(p
max − a− , Fj(p))− pii
(
pmax − a
2
, Fj(p)
)
≤− P(pj ≤ pmax − a− )
(a
2
+ 
)
(d−K)− P(pj = pmax)M
+ P(pmax − a−  < pj ≤ pmax − a)
(
pmax − a
2
− ci
)
(2K − d).
Since it has been proved that Fj does not have a point mass (p
max − a −
, pmax − a) in (i), the third term on the right can be made arbitrarily small
with sufficiently small δ. On the other hand, with small δ, we have
P(pj ≤ pmax − a− ) + P(pj = pmax) ≈ 1.
Furthermore, since (a/2 + )(d − K) > 0, P(pj = pmax) < 1, and M ≥ 0,
there exists a δ, such that for all  ∈ [0, δ],
pii(p
max − a− , Fj(p))− pii(pmax − a
2
, Fj(p)) < 0.
Accordingly, [pmax − a− δ, pmax − a] 6⊆ Si, contradicting the assertion that
max{p : p ∈ Si} = pmax − a. Therefore, max{p|p ∈ Si} = pmax. Likewise,
max{p|p ∈ Sj} = pmax and the result holds.
(iii): We begin by showing that Smin1 = S
min
2 . Without loss of generality,
assume that Smini < S
min
j . Then, for all p
′ ∈ (Smini , Sminj ), p′ is dominated by
by min(Sj) − ˆ, where ˆ is an arbitrarily small positive number, in terms of
generator i’s payoff. This contradicts Smini < S
min
j . It can be also shown that
Smini ≥ ci, since for any p′ < ci, the strategy p′ is strictly dominated by ci for
player i.
(iv): By (i), the only possible point masses are pmax and max(c1, c2). With-
out loss of generality, suppose all ties are broken in favor of i. If both gener-
ators have a point mass at pmax, then generator j would profit from reducing
the location of the point mass to below pmax. Consequently, pmax cannot
be a point mass in the strategies of both generators 1 and 2. Likewise, if
max(c1, c2) is a point mass for both players, then generator j will profit from
moving the point mass above max(c1, c2) and max(c1, c2) cannot be a point
mass on the strategies of both generators.
(v): Suppose there exists an open interval (a, b) such that Fi(b)−Fi(a) = 0
and Fi(a) > 0. Following the proof of (ii), it can be shown that there exists
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a positive δ, such that for all  ∈ [0, δ], we have that
pii(a− , Fj(p))− pii
(
a+ b
2
, Fj(p)
)
< 0.
This contradicts the assertion that a is a boundary of the hole and the result
follows.
One of the main benefits of Lemma 61 is that the absence of point masses
in the interior of the support allows one to claim the absolute continuity of
F ∗i over the interior, if it exits. Equivalently, one can claim the existence of
a density function.
Proposition 62. Suppose K < d < 2K and the mixed strategy equilibrium
exists, then on the open set (max(c1, c2), p
max), F ∗i (p) is absolutely continu-
ous. Further, the probability density function exists and except on a set of
zero Lebesgue measure, the following equation holds
f ∗i (p) =
dF ∗i (p)
dp
, for i ∈ {1, 2}. (5.17)
Proof. As proved in (i) of Lemma 61, there is no point mass on the open set
(max(c1, c2), p
max). By Theorem 31.7 in [92], F ∗i (p) is absolutely continuous
on such an open set. Further, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, the density
function is well defined.
Leveraging the facts that F ∗1 (p) and F
∗
2 (p), are differentiable in the interior
of their respective non-disjoint supports, the following proposition articulates
the structure of the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to the
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, deriving from the first-order necessary con-
ditions.
Proposition 63. Suppose K < d < 2K and the mixed strategy equilibrium
exists, then for any p ∈ (min(S1), pmax), the mixed strategy equilibrium sat-
isfies the following equations:
F2(p)(d− 2K) + F2
(
p+
s1
K
)
K − f2(p)(p− c1)(2K − d) = 0, (5.18)
and
F1(p)(d− 2K) + F1
(
p+
s2
K
)
K − f1(p)(p− c2)(2K − d) = 0. (5.19)
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Proof. Suppose player 1 offers p while player 2 adopts a mixed strategy f2(p).
Then player 1’s expected profit is given by
pi1(p, F2(p)) =
∫
p2
pi1(p, p2)f2(p2)dp2
=
∫
p2<p
pi1(p, p2)f2(p2)dp2 +
∫
p<p2<p+s1/K
pi1(p, p2)f2(p2)dp2
+
∫
p2>p+s1/K
pi1(p, p2)f2(p2)dp2
= F2(p)(p− c1)(d−K) + [F2(p+ s1
K
)− F2(p)](p− c1)K
+
∫ pmax
p+
s1
K
[(p− c1)K − s1]f2(p)dp.
In the interior of S1, since F2(p) is differentiable almost everywhere (a.e.)
in p, the payoff function pi1(p, F2(p)) is also differentiable a.e. in p. For all
p ∈ S1, the payoff function pi1(p, F2(p)) is constant since player 1 randomizes
over this set. Consequently, we have that
dpi1(p, F2(p))
dp
= 0
in the interior of S1. It follows a.e. that for p ∈ int(S1)
0 =
dpi1(p, F2(p))
dp
= f2(p)(p− c1)(d−K) + F2(p)(d−K) + [f2(p+ s1
K
)− f2(p)](p− c1)K
+
[
F2(p+
s1
K
)− F2(p)
]
K −
[
(p+
s1
K
− c1)K − s1
]
f2
(
p+
s1
K
)
= F2(p)(d− 2K) + F2
(
p+
s1
K
)
K − f2(p)(p− c1)(2K − d).
Recall that the set of points where F2(p) or F2(p+s1/K) is non-differentiable
has zero Lebesgue measure. Accordingly, f2(p) over these non-differentiable
points can be chosen to satisfy (5.18) as their values are insignificant. There-
fore, (5.18) holds and (5.19) can be seen to hold in a similar fashion.
(5.18) and (5.19) appear to be decoupled, and may be solved independently.
However, we will proceed to show later in the chapter that player strategies
are implicitly coupled through boundary conditions.
To establish the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we need
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to first derive cumulative distribution functions F1(p) and F2(p) that solve
the differential equations given by (5.18) and (5.19). It may be recalled
that cumulative distribution functions are right-continuous. To simplify the
notation, denote the left-hand limit by F (a−), where
F (a−) , lim
x→a−
F (x).
The solutions to differential equations depend on the initial or boundary
values. For (5.18) and (5.19), because of the constant delay of −si/K,
boundary values in an interval with the length of si/K need to be specified.
For the equations in question, the boundary values in the following interval
are used, [pmax−, pmax− + si/K]. In the context of cumulative distribution
functions, only a scalar value Fi(p
max−) needs to be specified, while the
values of the rest of the interval is given by Fi(p) = 1, p ≥ pmax. In effect, the
point mass at pmax is given by (1 − Fi(pmax−)). To facilitate the discussion
and highlight the dependence of Fi(p) on the initial value, Fi(p
max−) can
be viewed as a variable Ii, where Ii , Fi(pmax−). Given this dependence,
denote the distribution function associated with player i as Fi(p, Ii). Next,
the solvability of Fi(p, Ii) in (5.18) and (5.19) is shown.
Given p > max(ci, cj) and d < 2K, both (5.18) and (5.19) may be written
as
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − dFi
(
p+
sj
K
)
− Fi(p)
]
, (5.20)
where i = 1 or 2. This relationship can be viewed as a nonlinear system
x˙ = g(x, t, λ), where λ denotes a parameter. For such nonlinear systems, a
well known condition for existence and uniqueness is given by Theorem 3.2
of [93].
Theorem 64 (Solution of a Nonlinear System). If g(x, t, λ) is piecewise
continuous in t and Lipschitz continuous in x for all t ∈ [t0, t1]. Then, the
nonlinear system x˙ = g(x, t, λ) with a boundary condition x(t0) = x0 admits
a unique solution over [t0, t1].
The continuous dependence of the solution to a parameterized nonlinear
system on its initial conditions is given by the following theorem (cf. Theorem
3.5 of [93]).
Theorem 65 (Continuous dependence on right-hand side). Suppose x is
defined on an open connected set, t ∈ [t0, t1] and λ is bounded. Let y(t, λ)
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be a solution to the nonlinear system x˙ = g(x, t, λ) with boundary condition
y(t0, λ) = y0. Suppose g(x, t, λ) is continuous in (x, t, λ) and locally Lipschitz
in x. Furthermore, given  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that if
||y′0 − y0|| < δ, ||λ′ − λ|| < δ.
Then there is a unique solution y′(t, λ′) of x˙ = g(x, t, λ′) with y′(t0, λ′) = y′0,
and y′(t, λ′) satisfies
||y′(t, λ′)− y(t, λ)|| < , ∀t ∈ [t0, t1]
However, (5.20) is more complicated due to the constant delay of −sj/K
in the differential equations and the possible jump of Fi(p) at p
max.
Next the existence, uniqueness and continuity with respect to the boundary
value by using mathematical induction are proven. From now on, Fi(p, Ii) is
used to denote the solution to the delay differential equation (DDE) (5.20).
The solution is not guaranteed to be a distribution function and this issue is
resolved subsequently after Proposition 66.
Proposition 66. Suppose Fi(p, Ii) = 1, p ≥ pmax and Fi(p, Ii) is continuous
in p on the open interval (Smini , p
max). Then for all p ∈ (Smini , pmax), Fi(p, Ii)
exists and is unique and continuous with respect to Ii.
Proof. To leverage nonlinear system theory, divide the open interval (Smini , p
max)
into subintervals as shown in Fig. 5.3. By doing so, Fi(p + sj/K) can be
viewed as a time-varying parameter determined by the subinterval on the
immediate right of the subinterval in question. Accordingly, within a sin-
gle subinterval, the delay differential equation (DDE) is converted into an
ordinary differential equation (ODE). Due to the continuity of Fi, the right
boundary values of each of these subintervals are given by the left boundary
of the subinterval adjacent to it on the right.
It is sufficient to study an interval that contains the open interval (Smini , p
max).
Consider m subintervals with length sj/K starting backwards from p
max.
More specifically, the n-th subinterval is given by[
pmax − nsj
K
, pmax − (n− 1) sj
K
)
∩ (Smini , pmax), n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, (5.21)
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and m is an integer that satisfies
m , min
{
n|pmax − nsj
K
< Smini
}
. (5.22)
It is obvious that the union of these subintervals is the open interval (Smini , p
max)
in question. We proceed to prove the result by induction.
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Figure 5.3: Visualization of the proof by subintervals
(i) n = 1: Consider the first subinterval [pmax − sj/K, pmax). If p ∈
[pmax−sj/K, pmax), then p+sj/K ≥ pmax, consequently, Fi(p+sj/K, Ii) = 1.
Accordingly, the DDE given by (5.20) reduces to the following ODE
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − d − Fi(p)
]
,
with initial condition Fi(p
max−, Ii) = 1 − Ii. By Lemma 61, if p > min(Si),
we have p > cj. Thus, the right-hand side is Lipschitz continuous in Fi(p).
By Theorem 64 and Theorem 65, for all p ∈ [pmax− sj/K, pmax), the solution
Fi(p, Ii) exists and is unique and continuous with respect to Ii.
For the left boundary of this subinterval, from the continuity of Fi(p)
with respect to p, Fi (p
max − sj/K, Ii) , which is unique and continuous with
respect to Ii, defines the initial condition of the second subinterval.
(ii) Inductive step: Suppose that the value of Fi(p, Ii) is uniquely deter-
mined for any point in the (n − 1)-th subinterval and is continuous with
respect to Ii. Now consider the n-th subinterval
[pmax − nsj/K, pmax − (n− 1)sj/K) .
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If p ∈ [pmax − nsj/K, pmax − (n− 1)sj/K), we have
p+ sj/K ∈ [pmax − (n− 1)sj/K, pmax − (n− 2)sj/K) ,
which belongs to the (n−1)-th subinterval. Consequently, Fi(p+sj/K, Ii) can
be viewed as a time-varying parameter in the n-th subinterval in question.
To highlight the continuity of Fi(p+ sj/K, Ii) with respect to Ii, define
λ(p, Ii) , Fi(p+ sj/K, Ii). (5.23)
Then the DDE (5.20) reduces to the following ODE,
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − dλ(p, Ii)− Fi(p)
]
, (5.24)
in which the right-hand side is Lipschitz continuous with respect to Fi(p).
Due to the continuity of Fi(p, Ii) with respect to p, the boundary condition
of the ODE (5.24) is given by Fi(p
max − (n − 1)sj/K, Ii). Thus, Fi(p, Ii) in
the n-th subinterval exists and is unique and continuous with respect to the
parameter λ(p, Ii) and the boundary condition Fi(p
max − (n− 1)sj/K, Ii).
Both λ(p, Ii) and the Fi(p
max−(n−1)sj/K, Ii) are continuous with respect
to Ii. Since a composition of continuous functions is still continuous, it is
proved that Fi(p, Ii) in the n-th subinterval is continuous with respect to Ii.
Combining the base step and the inductive step, it is proved that for all
p ∈ (Smini , pmax), Fi(p, Ii) exists and is unique and continuous with respect
to Ii.
In general, a solution to a differential equation may or may not be a cu-
mulative distribution function. To show the solution Fi(p, Ii) in question is
indeed a cumulative distribution function, we first prove it is monotonically
increasing with respect to p.
Lemma 67. Suppose that Fi(p, Ii) = 1, for all p ≥ pmax, and Fi(p, Ii)
is continuous in p over the open interval (Smini , p
max). Suppose Fi(p, Ii)
solves (5.20) with initial condition Ii ∈ [0, 1], and there exists a point pˆ ∈
(Smini , p
max), for all point p > pˆ, such that Fi(p, Ii) > 0.
(i) if pˆ > pmax− sj/k, Fi(p, Ii) is strictly increasing with respect to p over
(max(pˆ, ci, cj), p
max);
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(ii) if pˆ ≤ pmax−sj/k, Fi(p, Ii) is strictly increasing with respect to p over
(max(pˆ− sj/k, ci, cj), pmax).
Proof. The lemma is proved by showing that fi(p) > 0 over (max(pˆ −
sj/k, ci, cj), p
max), and leverage the fact that fi(p) is piecewise continuous.
In fact, the only possible jump of fi(p) is at p
max− sj/K, due to the possible
jump of Fi(p) is at p
max. Consider two subintervals: [pmax − sj/K, pmax) and
(max(pˆ − sj/k, ci, cj), pmax − sj
K
). If pˆ ≥ pmax − sj/K, the interval in ques-
tion will be a subset of the first subinterval, and the discussion in (i) of this
proof is sufficient. As shown later, fi(p) is continuous within both subinter-
vals. For Fi(p, Ii) to be non-strictly-increasing, fi(p, Ii) has to be 0 at some
point, which is impossible. For simplicity, the dependence of Fi(p, Ii) on Ii
is suppressed in this proof.
(i) If p ∈ [pmax − sj
K
, pmax), (5.20) reduces to an ODE:
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − d − Fi(p)
]
.
Because of the continuity of Fi(p) in p, fi(p) is also continuous with respect
to p in this subinterval. Since K < d < 2K,
K
2K − d > 1. As a result,
fi(p
max−) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − d − Fi(p
max−)
]
> 0.
Suppose Fi(p) is not strictly increasing with respect to p at point p¯ ∈
(pmax − sj
K
, pmax). Thus, fi(p¯) ≤ 0 and by the intermediate value theorem,
there must exist a point p˜ ∈ [p¯, pmax) such that fi(p˜) = 0 and for all p > p˜,
fi(p) ≥ 0. Then, at p˜, we have
fi(p˜) = 0 =
1
p˜− cj
[
K
2K − d − Fi(p˜)
]
.
Thus,
Fi(p˜) =
K
2K − d > 1 > Fi(p
max−), (5.25)
which cannot hold because for all p > p˜, fi(p) ≥ 0, implying that Fi(p˜) <
Fi(p
max−). A contradiction follows and Fi(p) is strictly increasing in p in the
subinterval in question.
(ii) If pˆ ≥ pmax − sj/K, the discussion in (i) is sufficient. Otherwise,
116
consider the case where pˆ < pmax− sj/K. In this case, Fi(pmax− sj/K) > 0.
If p ∈ (max(pˆ−sj/k, ci, cj), pmax−sj/K), then both Fi(p) and Fi(p+sj/K)
are continuous in p. Therefore fi(p) is continuous in p in this subinterval.
By (i), fi(p
max − sj/K) > 0 and 0 < Fi(pmax − sj/K) < Fi(pmax−) ≤ 1.
Suppose Fi(p) is not strictly increasing in p, then by intermediate value
theorem, there must exist a point p˜ ∈ (Smini , pmax−sj/K) such that fi(p˜) = 0
and for all p > p˜, fi(p) ≥ 0. Then
fi(p˜) = 0 =
1
p˜− cj
[
K
2K − dFi
(
p˜+
sj
K
)
− Fi(p˜)
]
. (5.26)
Then
Fi(p˜) =
K
2K − dFi
(
p˜+
sj
K
)
> Fi
(
p˜+
sj
K
)
, (5.27)
which cannot hold because for all p > p˜, fi(p) ≥ 0, as a result 0 < Fi(p˜) <
Fi
(
p˜+
sj
K
)
.
By combining (i) and (ii), and the continuity at (pmax − sj/K), Fi(p) is
strictly increasing in p in (max(pˆ− sj/k, ci, cj), pmax).
Due to the strictly increasing nature, Fi(p) can be guaranteed to be less
than 1 over an interval with right boundary pmax by selecting Ii ∈ [0, 1].
Further, Fi(p) can be guaranteed to be larger than 0 by defining the left
boundary of the support denoted by Smini (Ii) as follows
Smini (Ii) , max{inf {pˆ|Fi(p, Ii) ≥ 0,∀p ≥ pˆ} , ci}.
Recall that by construction, the solution to the DDE are continuous in the
interior of the support and right-continuous at the boundary. Therefore,
we could obtain a family of solutions to the DDE which are distribution
functions.
So far, the two players are considered independently. Such a family of
equilibrium candidates satisfy the first-order optimality conditions and the
necessary conditions specified in Lemma 61 except conditions (iii) and (iv).
We next discuss the coupling between two players’ strategies characterized
by conditions (iii) and (iv), more specifically, the procedure to match two
players’ supports, i.e., find I1 and Ij such that S
min
1 (I1) = S
min
2 (I2) and
I1I2 = 0 . Mathematically, this procedure is equivalent to drive the solution
to the DDE to zero for a given Smin.
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Lemma 68. Consider pˆ ∈ (Smini , pmax), suppose with some boundary condi-
tion Ii ∈ [0, 1], Fi(p, Ii) > 0, then, there exist some boundary value Iˆi ∈ (Ii, 1],
such that Fi(p, Iˆi) = 0.
Proof. Consider the same subintervals as proving Proposition 66, then the
lemma is proved by induction.
(i) Base case: Consider the first subinterval [pmax − sj/K, pmax).
If p ∈ [pmax − sj/K, pmax), then p + sj/K ≥ pmax, consequently, Fi(p +
sj/K, Ii) = 1. Accordingly, the DDE given by (5.20) reduces to the following
ODE
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − d − Fi(p)
]
,
with initial condition Fi(p
max−, Ii) = 1− Ii. The solution to the above ODE
is
Fi(p) =
K
2K − d ∗
(
p
p− cj −
pmax
pmax − cj
)
+ (1− Ii). (5.28)
It is trivial that Fi(p) ≤ 0 over such a subinterval if Ii = 1. By continuity
of Fi(p, Ii) in Ii and intermediate value theorem, there exists some boundary
value Iˆi ∈ (Ii, 1], such that Fi(p, Iˆi) = 0 in such a subinterval.
(ii) Inductive step: Suppose there exists a boundary value Iˆi ∈ (Ii, 1], such
that Fi(p, Iˆi) = 0 over the (n− 1)-th subinterval. In particular, select
p = pmax − (n− 1) sj
K
, and Fi(p
max − (n− 1) sj
K
, Iˆi) = 0.
Then by Lemma 67, Fi(p, Iˆi) is strictly increasing over the n-th subinterval
[pmax − nsj/K, pmax − (n− 1)sj/K).
Hence, for any p ∈ [pmax − nsj/K, pmax − (n− 1)sj/K),
Fi(p, Iˆi) < Fi(p
max − (n− 1) sj
K
, Iˆi) = 0.
Then by continuity of Fi(p, Ii) in Ii and intermediate value theorem, there
exists some boundary value
ˆˆ
Ii ∈ (Iˆ , 1) ∈ (Ii, 1] such that Fi(p, ˆˆIi) = 0.
Combining the base step and the inductive step, the lemma is proved.
Condition (i) of Lemma 61 implies the point masses may only located at
the max(c1, c2) or p
max while condition (iv) implies that at most one player
offer at max(c1, c2) or at p
max with strictly positive probability. Condition (iv)
could be enforced by selecting boundary values I1, and I2 such that I1I2 = 0,
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while the following lemma guarantees that P(p1 = p2 = max(c1, c2)) = 0 by
showing max(c1, c2) 6∈ S .
Lemma 69. The solution to (5.20) satisfies the following condition:
Smini (Ii) > cj.
Proof. Be definition of Smini ,
Smini (Ii) ≥ inf {pˆ|Fi(p, Ii) ≥ 0,∀p ≥ pˆ} .
Therefore, the lemma can be proven if the following condition holds.
inf {pˆ|Fi(p, Ii) ≥ 0,∀p ≥ pˆ} > cj.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there does not exist p ∈ (cj, pmax]
such that Fi(p, Ii) = 0. Then for all p ∈ (cj, pmax] , Fi(p, Ii) > 0; otherwise, by
continuity of Fi(p, Ii) over p and intermediate value theorem, points satisfying
the specified condition in the lemma exist.
By Lemma 67, Fi(p, Ii) strictly increasing. On the other hand Fi(p, Ii)
is bounded below by 0, by monotone convergence theorem, lim
p→cj
Fi(p, Ii) is
bounded. Further, due to the continuity of Fi(p, Ii) over p,
Fi(cj, Ii) = lim
p→cj
Fi(p, Ii).
Therefore the differential equation holds at point p = cj. That is,
0 = Fi(cj)(d−K) + [Fi(cj + sj
K
)− Fi(cj)]K − fi(cj)(cj − cj)(2K − d)
= Fi(cj)(d− 2K) + Fi(cj + sj
K
)K.
This equation cannot hold because Fi(cj) ≥ 0 and Fi(cj + sj
K
) > 0.
With the continuity of the solution Fi(p, Ii) in terms of the boundary
value Ii, the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are now ready
to establish.
Theorem 70. Suppose d ∈ (K, 2K), then, the marginal-cost pricing with a
make-whole payment mechanism admits a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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Proof. The proof has two parts: (i) First, we show that there exists a solution
to (5.18) or (5.19) satisfying all necessary conditions specified in Lemma 61.
(ii) Subsequently, we show that such a solution is indeed an equilibrium.
(i) Let I1 = I2 = F1(p
max−) = F2(pmax−) = 1, solve (5.20) for both player,
whose solvability is guaranteed by Proposition 66.
In the solutions, Smin1 (1) and S
min
2 (1) are specified. If S
min
1 (1) = S
min
2 (1),
the mixed strategy candidate equilibrium is given by
{
Fi(p, 1), Fj(p, 1)|p ∈ [Smin1 (1), pmax]
}
.
If Smin1 (1) 6= Smin2 (1), without loss of generational, suppose Smini (1) >
Sminj (1). By Lemma 67
Fj(S
min
i (1), 1) > Fj(S
min
j (1), 1) = 0.
By Lemma 68, there exists an a ∈ (0, 1), such that Fj(Smini (1), a) = 0. Thus,
we obtain a mixed strategy given by
{
Fi(p, 1), Fj(p, a)|p ∈ [Smini (1), pmax]
}
,
that satisfies the all the necessary conditions of the equilibrium.
(ii) To show that the mixed strategy above is indeed an equilibrium, we
need to further prove that neither player can profit by unilaterally deviating
to another strategy. There are two possible deviations: randomizing over a
different support or employing a different distribution on the same support.
By Lemma 69 and construction, the candidate equilibrium satisfies
Smin > max(c1, c2), and P(p1 = Smin) = P(p2 = Smin) = 0.
Because of the piecewise increasing payoff function, given one player’s rival’s
strategy, any offer lower than Smin will be at least weakly dominated by of-
fering at Smin. Therefore, there is no incentive for either layer to randomize
its strategy over a different support. On the other hand, by Proposition 63,
all pure strategy in the support against the rival’s mixed strategy leads to
constant payoff, implying that a player cannot profit from deviating to a dif-
ferent density over the same support. In effect, neither player can profit from
unilateral deviations and therefore, the mixed strategy candidate equilibrium
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is indeed an equilibrium.
Convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift By Lemma 58,
under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift, the profit of player 1
is
pi1(p1, p2) =

(s2
K
+ p2 − c1
)
K − s1, if p1 < p2,(s2
K
+ p2 − p1
)
K − s1
+(p1 − c1)(d−K), if p2 < p1 < p2 + s2 − s1
K
,
(p1 − c1)(d−K), if p1 ≥ p2 + s2 − s1
K
,
while the profit of player 2 is given by
pi2(p1, p2) =

(
s1
K
+ p1 − c2)K − s2, if p2 ≤ p1 − s2 − s1
K
,
(p2 − c2)K, if p1 − s2 − s1
K
< p2 < p1,
(p2 − c2)(d−K), if p2 > p1.
Based on the payoff functions, the pure-strategy equilibria are character-
ized in the following proposition.
Proposition 71. If K < d < 2K, convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost
uplift mechanism admits pure-strategy Nash equilibria,
{(p∗1, p∗2)|p∗1 ∈ [0,
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2]; p
∗
2 = p
max}.
Furthermore, if c1 > c2 and
d ≤ min(K + s2 − s1
pmax − c1 , K +
c1 − c2
pmax − c2K),
there is another class of pure-strategy Nash equilibria,
{(p∗1, p∗2)|p∗1 = p∗2 ∈ [max(
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2, p
max − s2 − s1
d−K ), c1]}.
Proof. Consider two regimes for identifying equilibria:
(i) (p1 < p2): If p1 < p2, then firm 1 will sell K units and firm 2 will sell
d −K units. Consequently, based on the payoff function, firm 1 gets a
121
payoff of (p2 − c1)K + (s2 − s1) regardless of p1. Furthermore, firm 2’s
best response in this regime is setting p2 = p
max with profit given by
(pmax− c2)(d−K). Furthermore pmax is the best response of firm 2 over
its entire set of strategies if
(pmax − c2)(d−K) > (p1 − c2)K
implying that pmax is the best response if
p1 <
[
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2
]
. (5.29)
It suffices to show that, given p2 = p
max, firm 1’s best response is indeed
to set it at p1 < p2. But, given p2 = p
max, firm 1’s profit is a constant
and any p1 < p2 suffices. Consequently, (p, p
max) is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium where p satisfies
p <
[
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2
]
. (5.30)
(ii) (p2 < p1): If p2 < p1, then firm 1 generates d − K units while firm
2 generates K units. Based on the structure of the payoff functions,
firm 2 will bid p2 = p1 − δ where δ is a positive scalar. This strategy
will garner a profit of (p2 − c2)K. Furthermore, this strategy will be a
best response for firm 2 if it dominates p2 = p
max which has a profit of
(pmax − c2)(d−K) or
(p1 − δ − c2)K ≥ (pmax − c2)(d−K).
In effect, if p2 satisfies
p2 = p1 − δ >
[
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2
]
, (5.31)
then p2 = p1 − δ is the best response. Given that p2 = p1 − δ, firm 1’s
best response is either p2 + δ or p
max. Specifically, firm 1’s best response,
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given that firm 2 offers p, is captured by:
pbr1 (p) =
p+ δ, (p+ δ − c1)(d−K) + s2 − s1 > (pmax − c1)(d−K)pmax, (p+ δ − c1)(d−K) + s2 − s1 < (pmax − c1)(d−K).
(5.32)
However, if we consider the best response of p2 as being p
max − δ, then
the second of the above conditions cannot hold since
(pmax − c1)(d−K) > (p+ δ − c1)(d−K) + s2 − s1
= (pmax − c1)(d−K) + s2 − s1
=⇒ (s2 − s1) < 0,
which is a contradiction, given that s2 ≥ s1. The first condition of (5.32)
implies that
(p+ δ − c1)(d−K) + s2 − s1 > (pmax − c1)(d−K)
=⇒ pδ >
[
pmax −
(
s2 − s1
d−K
)]
. (5.33)
Combining (5.31) and (5.33), we have that
p ≥ max
(
pmax −
(
s2 − s1
d−K
)
,
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2
)
.
Consequently, only the first condition in (5.32) holds and the best re-
sponse of firm 1 is p + δ in the regime (p1 > p2). In addition, firm 1
has no incentive to reduce its bid below p2 if the payoff in the constant
segment p1 < p2 is less than that at p2 + δ. This is assured by requiring
that p < c1 as the following sequence of inequalities demonstrates:
(p− c1)K + s2 − s1 < δK + (p− c1)(d−K) + s2 − s1
(p− c1)(2K − d) < δK
p < c1 +
δK
2K − d
=⇒ p ≤ c1.
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Consequently, if the open interval B, given by
B ,
[
max
(
pmax −
(
s2 − s1
d−K
)
,
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2
)
, c1
]
,
is nonempty, then the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is given by
(p, p− δ) where p ∈ B.
For B 6= ∅, the following condition must hold:
max
(
pmax −
(
s2 − s1
d−K
)
,
(pmax − c2)(d−K)
K
+ c2
)
≤ c1,
which implies that
d ≤ min(K + s2 − s1
pmax − c1 , K +
c1 − c2
pmax − c2K).
Recall that K < d < 2K, hence,
K +
c1 − c2
pmax − c2K ≥ K,
which implying c1 > c2. As a result, by the least-true-cost tire-breaking
rule, player 2 will be fully dispatched if there is a tire. Therefore, the
argument holds when δ = 0. In the other words, the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium is given by (p, p) where p ∈ B.
In the second family of equilibria, the two players has to simultaneously
select the same offer price over a continuous range, which is less likely to
happen without coordination or sequential moves. Therefore, such a family
of equilibria is less likely to prevail. In contrast, the first family of equilibria
does not need an accurate guess of competitor’s offer and all equilibria in this
family is strategically equal in terms of each firm’s payoff. In the numerical
section, only the first set of pure-strategy equilibria are considered as it is
more likely to prevail.
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5.4.3 Equilibrium Computation
While it is easy to identify the pure-strategy equilibria, this subsection is
devoted to discussing the iterative scheme to obtain mixed-strategy equilibria
for marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift, when K < D < 2K.
Equations (5.18) and (5.19) provide a unique solution for every initial con-
dition. With a family of initial conditions, we are able to obtain a family
of solutions. Besides the general requirement of probability measures, these
solutions also need to satisfy the properties specified in Lemma 61. In par-
ticular, one requirement is that the supports of the two distributions have to
match.
With initial guess of 0 point mass of player i’s strategy at pmax, or I1 =
I2 = F1(p
max−) = F2(pmax−) = 1, the left boundaries of the two players’
supports, Smin1 (1) and S
min
2 (1), can be obtained. If S
min
1 (1) = S
min
2 (1), the
mixed strategy candidate equilibrium is given by
{
Fi(p, 1), Fj(p, 1)|p ∈ [Smin1 (1), pmax]
}
.
If Smin1 (1) 6= Smin2 (1), without loss of generational, suppose Smini (1) > Sminj (1).
Then a bisection search of player j’s probability of offering at pmax is trig-
gered. Such a point mass is identified by aligning the lower boundary of
player j’s support with that of player i. The bisection search algorithm is
stated as follows.
Algorithm 72 (Bisection Scheme for Computing Mixed-Strategy Equilib-
ria).
1: Initialization: target point ptarget = Smini (1); target c.d.f. F
target = 0 at
point ptarget; lower and upper bound of the searching range for point mass
at pmax, PM left = 0 and PM right = 1, respectively; iteration index ν = 1;
initial guess PMν ; tolerance ; error = inf.
2: while error ≥  do
3: Solve6 the DDE to obtain F ν(ptarget);
4: error = |F ν(ptarget)− F target|;
5: if F ν(ptarget)− F target > 0 then
6: PM left = PMν−1
7: else
6The dde23 solver in Matlab is used to solve the DDE.
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8: PM right = PM ν−1
9: end if
10: ν = ν + 1
11: PM ν = PM
left+PMright
2
12: end while
The convergence of the bisection algorithm 72 is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 73. Suppose K < D < 2K and consider the marginal-cost pricing
with make-whole uplift. For any  > 0, the above algorithm terminates with
a distribution function within tolerance  for at most log2(1/) + 2 iterations.
Proof. In Algorithm 72, the initial solution lies in an interval of size 1, and
in the ν-th iterates, the solution, if it is not found, lies in an interval of size
1/2ν−1. Therefore, with any tolerance  > 0, the algorithm guarantees a
guess within that tolerance for at most log2(1/) + 2 iterations.
Another approach to analyze the continuous game is to approximate it
through discretization. More specifically, the action sets of both players are
limited to some finite set and the payoff functions remains the same. By doing
that, the continuous game reduces to a finite bimatrix game. The mixed-
strategy equilibria of bimatrix games are known to exist [94]. However, there
is no guarantee that the outcomes of such an approximation will converge to
the equilibria of the continuous game. Equilibria of the bimatrix game with
those of the original game obtained by solving the DDEs will be compared
in the next section.
5.5 Numerical Tests
The mixed-strategy equilibrium under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole
uplift payment and the pure-strategy equilibrium under convex hull pricing
with opportunity-cost uplift payment are calculated and compared in this
section. As shown before, both payment mechanisms share the same total
payment in low demand cases, we only focus the cases when the demand
is higher than any of player’s capacity. Unless stated otherwise, a duopoly
market is studied with following parameters: d = 170 MW, pmax = 250
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$/MW, K = 100 MW, s1 = 1, 000 $, s2 = 5, 000 $, c1 = 100 $/MW, c2 = 30
$/MW. In Section 5.5.1, the computational behavior to identify the mixed-
strategy equilibria is discussed, and Section 5.5.2 is devoted to discussing the
sensitivity of the market outcome to parameters.
5.5.1 Computational Behavior
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Figure 5.4: (a) Equilibrium through iterates (b) Equilibrium for a finite
approximation
Figure 5.4(a) shows the convergence of equilibrium for the testing example.
In this case, the strategy converges after 65 iterations. The point mass at
pmax is zero in the initial guess. Given this initial guess, the support of
player 1 is [182.2, 250.0], while player 2 has a support of [149.9, 250.0]. The
left boundary points of both supports are above max(c1, c2). By Lemma 61,
there is no point mass in the open interval (max(c1, c2), p
max). Further, the
iterative scheme computes the point mass of player 2’s strategy is at pmax to
drive its left boundary of support to 182.2.
We further compare the results presented above to a finite approximation
of the continuous game. In the finite approximation, the strategy set of both
player are discretized, resulting in a bimatrix game. As Fig. 5.4(b) shows,
the mixed strategies of player 1 and player 2 in equilibrium in the finite
game approximate the solutions to the continues game from above and from
below, respectively. This is because the tie-breaking rule favors player 2,
whose actual marginal cost is lower, over player 1. With a more restrictive
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action set in the finite game, player 1 has to offer lower in general, leading
to higher values in the distribution function.
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Figure 5.5: (a) Mixed-strategy equilibrium under marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift (b) Expected payoff under marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift
First, the mixed-strategy equilibrium under marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift payment mechanisms is shown in terms of cumulative
distribution functions in Fig. 5.5(a). The support of both cumulative dis-
tribution functions ranges from 182.2$/MW to 250.0$/MW, the price cap.
Player 2’s offer is concentrated at the high end of the support, especially the
price cap with probability 0.7382 offering at. In contrast, player 1’s offer is
randomized more homogeneously on the whole support.
To verify the mixed-strategy equilibrium given in Fig. 5.5(a), the expected
payoff of each player’s pure strategy against its rival’s equilibrium mixed
strategy is plotted in Fig. 5.5(b). As shown in the plot, the expected payoff
of each player is maximized in the range from 182.2$/MW to 250.0$/MW.
Notably, the numerical results show player 1’s expected payoff remains almost
constant along the whole possible action space, implying the strategies in its
support only weakly dominate the rest strategies in this case.7
The equilibrium outcomes under both payment mechanism are also com-
pared with the idealized scenario in which payers offer-at-cost (OAC) in Ta-
ble 5.1. The equilibrium offering strategy lead to prices well above those
7Other numerical tests shows the pure strategies on both firms’ supports may strongly
dominate the other strategies.
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Table 5.1: Market outcomes under both payment mechanisms
MCMW CHOC
equilibrium OAC equilibrium OAC
price ($/MW) 248.33 100 300 110
actual cost ($) 18,058.85 16,000 18,000 16,000
total payment ($) 47,281.74 18,000 52,500 19,000
total uplift payment ($) 5,065.16 1,000 1,500 300
total profit ($) 29222.89 2,000 34,400 3,000
player 1’s output (MW) 99.40 70 100 70
player 2’s output (MW) 70.60 100 70 100
in the ideal OAC markets. Notably, the convex hull prices may exceed the
offering prices, consequently, the price cap on offer prices fails to cap the
resulting convex hull prices. In contrast, under marginal-cost pricing, there
is always a “marginal” unit whose set the price to be its offer. As a conse-
quence, the offer price cap is essentially also a upper bound on the resulting
prices. Therefore, the concept of price cap in convex hull pricing mechanism
should be reconsidered to assume its usual regulatory role.
It is also observed that the uplift payment decreases under convex hull
pricing for this market. However, because the uplift payment only account
for a small segment of the total payment, the increase in energy prices over-
whelms the decrease in uplift, resulting in a higher total payment borne by
consumers. The increase in total payment is exacerbated by the strategic
behavior: the total payment increase is 5.6% for the OAC case and 11.0%
for the strategic offering case. It is true that higher total payment does not
necessary harm the market, because a reachable level of profit is essential to
attract investment to keep pace with demand increase. However, we should
also be aware of that the convex hull pricing provides more freedom to game,
unless more strict regulatory measures, such as lower price cap, are imposed.
For the efficiency of the system measured by true cost, because the market
is operated based on self-reported marginal costs, the strategic behavior un-
der both mechanisms makes the true information inaccessible to the market
operator, and consequently lead to inefficient allocation in terms of actual
total cost. In fact, under both mechanisms, the player with less true marginal
cost offers more aggressively high at the cost of less market share in the case
studied.
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5.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity to price cap
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Figure 5.6: (a) Sensitivity of expected price to price cap; (b) Sensitivity of
expected actual cost to price cap; (c) Sensitivity of expected uplift payment
to price cap
The sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes to price cap is first studied. As
Fig. 5.6(a) shows, the resulting price is roughly an affine function of price
cap. Notably, the marginal-cost price approaches the price cap while the
convex hull prices are 50$/MW higher than the price cap. The number 50
equals s2/K, because player 2 always offers at the price cap at equilibria.
Next, the actual cost of the system to meet the demand in Fig. 5.6(b)
is studied. Under marginal-cost pricing, when the price cap is low, the to-
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tal actual cost is also low, which indicates a more efficient system operation.
When the price cap increases, driven by profits, the generator with less actual
marginal cost offers more aggressively high, resulting in less efficient alloca-
tions. Such decrease in efficiency is essentially dead-weight loss that no one
in the market captures. In contrast, under convex hull pricing mechanism,
the generator with higher start-up cost always offers more aggressively high.
Such generators are typically base load generators, and therefore inefficient
allocations are expected.
The uplift payment with respect to the price cap is plotted in Fig. 5.6(c).
The opportunity-cost uplift payments under convex hull prices, indepen-
dent of the price cap, are less than the make-whole uplift payments under
marginal-cost prices. The make-whole uplift payments under marginal-cost
prices decrease from around 5,900 $ to 5,000 $ when the prices cap changes
from 105$/MW to 200 $/MW. The decrease is because the increased price
cap results in higher expected energy price, which makes the allocated quan-
tity more valuable. To secure the market share, generators have more in-
centive to offer low with higher probability, leading to less probability to be
compensated by uplift payments.
Sensitivity to demand
Next, the sensitivity of market outcomes to demand level is considered. As
Fig. 5.7(a) shows, the equilibrium convex hull prices are independent of the
demand while the expected equilibrium marginal-cost prices show complex
dependency, representing the tradeoffs between price and quantity in select-
ing strategies. The expect marginal-cost price has three segments, reflecting
changes in equilibrium offering strategies: when the demand is less than 150
MW or larger than 185 MW, player 1 offers more aggressively high than
player 2 in the sense of offering at the price cap with strictly positive proba-
bility, while player 2 offers more aggressively high when demand lies between
150 MW and 185 MW. The expected marginal-cost prices are characterized
by possible jumps. Within each segment, the expected marginal-cost prices
represent monotonic behavior, however, a monotonic behavior with demand
is not observed. It is unclear whether marginal-cost prices are increasing or
decreasing with respect to the demand.
The different equilibrium offering strategies under different demand are
also reflected in expected cost Fig. 5.7(b). If the players offer at cost, then
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Figure 5.7: (a) Sensitivity of expected price to demand; (b) Sensitivity of
expected actual cost to demand; (c) Sensitivity of expected uplift payment
to demand
by the definition of allocation problem, the most efficient allocation is always
achieved. Under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift mechanism,
the generator with high start-up costs, typically the base-load unit, offers
at price cap, leading to the most inefficient allocation. The efficiency of
markets under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift mechanism lies
in between the OAC and CHOC. Notably, larger deviation from the most
efficient allocation is observed between 150 MW and 185 MW due to the
fact that the more efficient generator offers with the purpose to set the price
high, at the cost of losing market share.
The uplift payment with demand is plotted in Fig. 5.7(c). As shown in
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the figure, the opportunity-cost uplift payment is monotonically decreasing
with demand, from 5,000 $ to 0 $, while the make-whole uplift payment is
monotonically increasing from 1,000 $ to 6,000 $. As the start-up cost is
included in convex hull prices, it is compensated by the prices proportionally
to the dispatched level. In the market in question, no matter what strategy
is adopted, the opportunity-cost uplift payment is always zero if it is fully
dispatched. In contrast, under marginal-cost pricing, when the demand ap-
proaches the system capacity, both players are able to exercise market power
to not only set the price to be the price cap but also grab the maximal
amount of uplift payment, which is the sum of both players’ start-up costs.
5.6 Conclusions
Uplift payments are employed today in an attempt to improve power mar-
kets operations and incentivize participation. However, such payment mech-
anisms are incorporated despite the absence of a clear understanding of their
impact on the market in a strategic setting. This chapter attempts to pro-
vide an understanding of precisely such challenges in a duopolistic setting.
Commitment-dependent costs associated with uplift introduce discrete deci-
sions into the electricity market, thereby making firm problems nonconvex
and discontinuous. Consequently, this precludes leveraging sufficient equilib-
rium conditions for the analysis of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Motivated by the need to reduce or eliminate the out-of-market uplift pay-
ment, convex hull pricing has been proposed and will be implemented in the
Midwest ISO. However, preliminary results show that in a strategic regime,
convex hull pricing is not necessarily superior to marginal-cost pricing in
terms of efficiency, consumer’s total payments, or uplift payments. There is,
of course, much more work that must be done to truly understand these pric-
ing mechanisms in real-world settings. The larger question of how to create
better markets for electric power is the long-term goal of our research. This
topic is difficult, in part, because the optimal allocation of resources may
have multiple solutions. For example, coal generators of similar technology
are subject to similar costs. From a social planner’s point of view this is a
blessing – any of the N coal generators will serve the needs of the grid at a
particular time. However, the owners of the generators have a very differ-
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ent perspective: they will not accept an arbitrary mechanism to break ties.
This fundamental issue must be addressed when attempting to solve the unit
commitment problem through market mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 6
ON NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DUOPOLISTIC
POWER MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC
CAPACITY AND START-UP COST
OFFERING
To compare the marginal-cost pricing with the make-whole uplift mechanism
with the convex hull pricing with the opportunity-cost uplift mechanism in
the strategic regime, pure-strategy and/or mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are
characterized and computed for duopolistic markets with identical capacities
in which firms bid in marginal cost offers in Chapter 5. In this chapter, we
allow firms to have different capacities. Based on the equilibrium results for
markets with asymmetric capacities, the capacity expansion problem is stud-
ied numerically. Results show that different pricing schemes have different
incentives for market participant to upgrade their capacity, which eventually
lead to a different long-term equilibrium generation mix. Possible market
designs that allow market participant to offer their start-up costs are also
discussed. Analytical results suggest that such an additional dimension of
freedom granted to market participants fails to enhance the competition in
general but provides an additional gaming opportunity to firms.
6.1 Introduction
Convex hull pricing has been introduced to address undesirable properties of
current marginal-cost pricing mechanisms [25,26]. In contrast to the current
pricing scheme, convex hull prices take start-up costs into account without
fixing commitment decisions a priori. One of the most important advantages
of the convex hull pricing over marginal-cost pricing is the capability to min-
imize “opportunity-cost” uplift payments [26]. However, such a conclusion
only holds under the assumption of identical offering behavior under differ-
ent pricing rules. In reality, the firms’ offering behavior is usually driven
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by profit maximization and true costs are not revealed in offers in general.
Meanwhile, the firms’ profits are determined by the pricing scheme in force,
and it is unrealistic to assume that firms employ the same offering strategies
under different pricing schemes. Therefore it is unclear whether the claimed
advantages of convex hull pricing can be realized in the presence of the firms’
strategic behavior. To conduct a thorough comparison of these two pricing
mechanisms, especially in the strategic regime, a duopolistic model was in-
troduced in Chapter 5. Analytical and numerical results for such a model
were presented under the assumptions that firms have identical capacities
and bid in marginal-cost offers.
This chapter is devoted to two extensions of the duopolistic power market
analysis in Chapter 5 to more realistic cases, including non-identical capac-
ities, and markets that allow for start-up cost offers. Under marginal-cost
pricing with make-whole uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost
uplift, the firms’ equilibrium offering behaviors are characterized. At these
equilibrium outcomes, long-term effects of pricing schemes on generation mix
and markets design allowing start-up cost offers are discussed. The remain-
der of this chapter contains three additional sections and is organized as
follows. In Section 6.2, pure-strategy and/or mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
for markets with asymmetric capacities are characterized, based on which the
long-term capacity expansion problem is studied sequentially. In Section 6.3,
markets with start-up cost offers are discussed, and the chapter concludes
with some remarks and final thoughts in Section 6.4.
6.2 Duopolistic Markets with Asymmetric Capacity
Duopolistic markets with asymmetric capacity are studied in this section.
The equilibrium outcomes characterized in Section 6.2.1 provide a stepping
stone for the study of impacts of different pricing mechanisms on long-term
capacity expansion decisions in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Equilibrium Analysis
Consider the same duopolistic model as that in Chapter 5 except that the
generators 1 and 2 have capacities K1 and K2, respectively. Specifically,
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consider markets with allocation problems defined as in (5.1), marginal-cost
pricing with make-whole uplift defined as in (5.2) and (5.3), and convex hull
pricing with opportunity-cost uplift as in (5.4) and (5.6). Define Kmax ,
max{K1, K2} and Kmin , min{K1, K2} . It is convenient to categorize the
demand into three groups: the low demand case when 0 < d ≤ Kmin; the
medium demand case when Kmin < d ≤ Kmax; and the high demand case
when Kmax < d < K1 +K2. Then, the equilibria under marginal-cost pricing
with make-whole uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift
are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 74. Suppose 0 < d < K1 + K2 and i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. Then the
following hold:
(i) (Low Demand) When 0 < d ≤ Kmin, if si + cid < sj + cjd, both
marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift and convex hull pricing with
opportunity-cost uplift mechanisms admit a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium given by (p∗i , p
∗
j), where
p∗i = cj +
sj − si
d
and p∗j = cj.
If si + cid = sj + cjd, then p
∗
i = ci, p
∗
j = cj, and player 1 is dispatched.
(ii) (Medium Demand) When Kmin < d ≤ Kmax, without loss of general-
ity, suppose Ki < Kj. Then both marginal-cost pricing with make-whole
uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift mechanisms
admit pure-strategy Nash equilibria given by (p∗i , p
∗
j), where
p∗i ∈
[
0, cj − si
Ki
+
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki)
Kj
]
and p∗j = p
max.
Further, if d ≤ Ki + (si + ciKi − cjKi)Kj
(pmax − cj)Ki , another family of equilibria
are given by (p∗i , p
∗
j), where
p∗i ∈
[
cj − si
Ki
+
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki)
Kj
, ci
]
and p∗j = p
∗
i +
si
Ki
.
(iii) (High Demand) When Kmax < d < K1 + K2, the marginal-cost
pricing with make-whole uplift mechanism admits mixed-strategy Nash
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equilibrium characterized by cumulative distribution functions of offer-
ing price (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) with identical supports S = [S
min, pmax] that solve
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
Kj
Ki +Kj − dFi
(
p+
sj
Kj
)
− Fi(p)
]
, (6.1)
where p < pmax, i = 1 or 2 and j 6= i; and satisfying P(pi = pj =
pmax) = 0. Furthermore, the convex hull pricing and opportunity-cost
uplift mechanism admits a family of pure-strategy Nash equilibria{
(p∗1, p
∗
2)|p∗1 ∈
[
0,
(pmax − c2)(d−K1)
K2
+ c2
]
; p∗2 = p
max
}
.
Furthermore, if c1 > c2 and
d ≤ min
{
K2 +
s2K1 − s1K2
(pmax − c1)K2 , K1 +
c1 − c2
pmax − c2K2
}
,
there is another class of pure-strategy Nash equilibria {p∗1, p∗2}, where
p∗1 = p
∗
2 ∈
[
max
(
(pmax − c2)(d−K1)
K2
+ c2, p
max − s2K1 − s1K2
(d−K2)K2
)
, c1
]
.
Proof. The conclusions corresponding to the low demand and high demand
cases can be reached following a similar analysis to that used in duopolistic
markets with identical capacities. Here the focus is on the medium demand
case. Regarding the allocation, recall Ki < d ≤ Kj. As a result, generator
i alone cannot supply enough power to meet the demand while generator
j must start up. In other words, the feasible commitment decisions are
ui = 0 or 1 and uj = 1. In fact, generator i, at best, competes for the
right to serve an incremental part of generator j’s capacity: ui = 1 only if
si + piKi ≤ pjKi.
First, consider the marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift mecha-
nism. The condition for generator i to start up also implies the marginal-
cost price is set to pj, because pi ≤ pj − si/Ki < pj. This condition also
implies that even if generator i is dispatched, it receives zero make-whole
uplift payment because the energy price pj is high enough to compensate
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both its start-up and marginal costs. Therefore, player i’s payoff is given by1
pimc−mwi (pi, pj) =
 (pj − ci)Ki − si, if pi < pj −
si
Ki
,
0, if pi > pj − si
Ki
.
Given this payoff function, generator i’s best response to generator j’s offer
is given as follows
pbr−mc−mwi (pj) =

{
p|p ∈
(
pj − si
Ki
, pmax
]}
, if pj < ci +
si
Ki
,{
p|p ∈
[
0, pj − si
Ki
]}
, if pj > ci +
si
Ki
.
In generator i’s best response, when pj < ci + si/Ki, generator j’s offer price
is so low that generator i opts out from the market by offering at a high
enough price. By doing so, generator i receives no revenue and attains zero
profit. In contrast, when the generator j’s offer price is sufficiently high,
or pj > ci + si/Ki, it becomes profitable for generator i to start up. In
this case, since generator i cannot impact the clearing price and receives no
uplift payment, any offer that results in a full dispatch will lead to the same
maximal profit.
On the other hand, since the price is always set to be pj, which is only
sufficient to compensate the marginal-cost offer, generator j always receives
an uplift payment equal to its start-up cost sj. Therefore, generator j’s profit
is a product of its mark-up over its actual marginal cost and its dispatched
capacity.
pimc−mwj (pi, pj) =
 (pj − cj)(d−Ki), if pi < pj −
si
Ki
,
(pj − cj)Kj, if pi > pj − si
Ki
.
Hence, generator j’s best response to generator i’s offer is
pbr−mc−mwj (pi) =

pmax, if (pmax − cj)(d−Ki) ≥
(
pi +
si
Ki
− cj
)
Kj,
pi +
si
Ki
− δ, if (pmax − cj)(d−Ki) ≤
(
pi +
si
Ki
− cj
)
Kj.
1For simplify, ties are ignored for the profit analysis and will be revisited in the equi-
librium analysis.
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Generator j’s best response function reflects the tradeoff between controls
over the quantity and price. The (pmax−cj)(d−Ki) is generator j’s maximal
profit if it chooses to set the price as high as possible, while it can attain a
profit of (pi + si/Ki − cj)Kj if it undercuts its competitor’s offer for more
market share. Generator j is able to either set the price at the price cap or
capture the entire market, but not both.
With the payoff functions, equilibria are analyzed for two possible alloca-
tion outcomes: generator i starts up or generator i is off-line. These two
possible allocation outcome cases correspond to the two scenarios in both
generator i’s and generator j’s best responses, respectively. By definition,
the Nash equilibria of this game are fixed points of the best response map.
For the game in question, there are two sets of fixed points corresponding
to the two possible allocation outcomes. When generator i starts up, by
the best-response functions, the equilibrium condition is equivalent to the
following fixed point conditions:
pi ∈ [0, pj − si
Ki
]},
pj > ci +
si
Ki
,
pj = p
max,
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki) ≥ (pi + si
Ki
− cj)Kj.
With a sufficiently large price cap, the equilibria are given by (p∗i , p
∗
j) where
p∗i ∈ [0, cj −
si
Ki
+
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki)
Kj
] and p∗j = p
max.
Likewise, when generator i is off-line, the equilibrium conditions are
pi ∈ (pj − si
Ki
, pmax],
pj < ci +
si
Ki
,
pj = pi +
si
Ki
− δ,
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki) ≤ (pi + si
Ki
− cj)Kj,
which reduce to
p∗i = p
∗
j −
si
Ki
+ δ and p∗i ∈
[
cj − si
Ki
+
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki)
Kj
, ci
]
.
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For the interval [
cj − si
Ki
+
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki)
Kj
, ci
]
to be nonempty, the following equation must hold
cj − si
Ki
+
(pmax − cj)(d−Ki)
Kj
≤ ci, (6.2)
which is equivalent to
d ≤ Ki + (si + ciKi − cjKi)Kj
(pmax − cj)Ki .
Further, (6.2) also implies cj−si/Ki < ci. By the tie-breaking rule, allocation
favors generation with less actual cost, or δ = 0.
For convex hull pricing, recall that the sufficient and necessary condition
for a price to be a convex hull price is that the demand belongs to the convex
hull of the aggregate auction-surplus-maximization best responses to such a
price (cf. Proposition 29).2 In the duopolistic market in question, due to the
positive start-up cost, both players’ best responses to any price are to supply
either at zero or at full capacity. Because the demand in question cannot
be met by generator i alone, i.e., d > Ki, the convex hull price has to be
sufficiently large to include generator j’s capacity in the best response, i.e.,
ρch−oc ≥ pj + sj/Kj. In fact, ρch−oc = pj + sj/Kj, leading to the aggregate
best response of {0, Kj} or {Ki, Ki + Kj}. Generator i is off-line only if
pi > pj − si/Ki. However, it may still received an opportunity-cost uplift
payment if pi− si/Ki < ρch−oc = pj + sj/Kj, because the energy price ρch−oc
appears profitable to player i. Player i’s payoff is given by the following
pich−oci (pi, pj) =

(pj +
sj
Kj
− ci)Ki − si, if pi < pj − si
Ki
,
(pj +
sj
Kj
− pi)Ki − si, if pj − si
Ki
< pi ≤ pj + sj
Kj
− si
Ki
,
0, if pi > pj +
sj
Kj
− si
Ki
.
Given this payoff, generator i’s best response to generator j’s offer is given
2Such a response is the best allocation response to the energy price that maximize
the firm’s auction surplus, from the market operator’s viewpoint, assuming away strategic
behaviors.
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as follows
pbr−ch−oci (pj) =

pj − si
Ki
+ δ, if pj < ci +
si
Ki
,{
p|p ∈
[
0, pj − si
Ki
]}
, if pj > ci +
si
Ki
.
When pj < ci+ si/Ki, it is unprofitable for generator i to start up. However,
it can manipulate the uplift payment by offering at a low price. By doing
so, generator i appears to give up profit by following the market operator’s
allocation instruction. On the other hand, when pj > ci+si/Ki, it is not eco-
nomically beneficial for generator i to manipulate the uplift payment because
the price is so high that selling all its capacity is a better choice.
On the other hand, since generator j sets the price, the opportunity-cost
uplift will compensate it so that its auction surplus is zero. Therefore, its
profit is the product of its mark-up over the marginal cost and its allocated
capacity, which is identical to its payoff under marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift.
pich−ocj (pi, pj) =
 (pj − cj)(d−Ki), if pi < pj −
si
Ki
,
(pj − cj)Kj, if pi > pj − si
Ki
.
Generator j’s payoff is identical to that under marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift, therefore, its best response remains the same.
pbr−ch−ocj (pi) =
 p
max, if (pmax − cj)(d−Ki) ≥ (pi + si
Ki
− cj)Kj,
pi +
si
Ki
− δ, if (pmax − cj)(d−Ki) ≤ (pi + si
Ki
− cj)Kj.
Generator i’s best response under the convex hull pricing with opportunity-
cost uplift is a subset of its best response under marginal-cost pricing with
make-whole uplift, and generator j’s best response is identical under two
mechanisms. Furthermore, the equilibria identified under marginal-cost pric-
ing with make-whole uplift satisfy the best response requirement for convex
hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift. Therefore, both mechanisms admit
the same equilibria.
The impacts of capacity on the firms’ offering behavior depend on the
demand level and the pricing rules in force. When the demand is lower than
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either firm’s capacity, the capacity asymmetry has no impacts at all on the
firms’ offering behavior. In these cases, due to the intense competition, prices
close to the competitive level are expected.
When the demand is between the individual capacities of the two gener-
ators, the firm with the larger capacity appears to have an advantage over
the competitor in the sense that its start-up cost is sunk cost in the alloca-
tion determination problem. However, such an advantage may not lead to
a higher profit. To offset the competitive disadvantage, the firm with the
smaller capacity may aggressively mark down its offer price, which forces the
firm with the larger capacity to give up market share and increase its offer
prices, as shown in the first family of equilibria in (ii) of Proposition 74. If
such equilibria are realized, the larger capacity will not be fully utilized. It
is true that when the parameters of the game permit and the firm with the
smaller capacity offers sufficiently high, the firm with the larger capacity may
be able to undercut the competitor’s offer price profitably, as shown in the
second family of equilibria in (ii) of Proposition 74. However, the resulting
profits in those equilibria are small for both firms. We will only focus on the
first set of equilibria in numerical studies.
In medium demand cases, the equilibrium strategies are the same for both
pricing mechanisms, but the resulting prices, profits and total payments are
not the same. Notably, under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost
uplift, the firm with the smaller capacity is able to manipulate the uplift
payment by deliberately underbidding its marginal costs, even if it is off-
line. The opportunity-cost uplift, in these cases, provides players additional
avenues to game, and may lead to larger consumer payment.
When the demand cannot be met by any of the firms, the duopolistic
markets with asymmetric capacity admit equilibria that share similar forms
with those in markets with identical capacities. In fact, markets with iden-
tical capacities can be viewed as a special case of the more general markets
with possibly asymmetric capacity. However, this does not mean that the
firms’ equilibrium offers, which further depend on solutions to differential
equations, are similar. The impact of asymmetry in capacities is studied
numerically next.
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6.2.2 Capacity Expansion Problem
This section is devoted to the capacity expansion problem in the strategic
regime. The firms’ capacities cannot be changed in the short term, therefore,
they can be viewed as parameters in energy markets. In the long term, firms
are able to strategically upgrade their generators, which introduce capacities
into strategic spaces. The capacity expansion problem can be viewed as a
two-stage game. Suppose the capacities of the two firms are upgraded to
K1 and K2 from K
0
1 and K
0
2 , respectively, then the second stage is the price
competition as studied before in Chapter 5 and Section 6.2.1. Formally,
in the general mixed-strategy form, the second stage equilibria satisfy the
following two equations.
SSE(K1, K2) : F
∗
1 ∈ arg max
F1
∫ ∫
pi1(K1, K2, p1, p2)dF1dF
∗
2 ,
F ∗2 ∈ arg max
F2
∫ ∫
pi2(K1, K2, p1, p2)dF
∗
1 dF2,
where p1, p2 are the marginal-cost offers, and F1, F2 are the cumulative dis-
tribution functions of marginal-cost offers.
The first stage involves decisions of new capacities to build, considering the
impact on market outcomes in the scened stage game. In terms of competi-
tion, the impact of capacity expansion could be a two-edged sword. On one
hand, it leads to a higher capacity margin which may result in more intense
competition. On the other hand, it may also strengthen one player’s market
power by increasing its competitive advantage over its rival. The first stage
game can be formulated as
K∗1 ∈ arg maxK1,F ∗1 ,F ∗2
(∫ ∫
pi1(K1, K
∗
2 , p1, p2)dF
∗
1 dF
∗
2 − C1(K1 −K01)
)
subject to (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) ∈ SSE(K1, K∗2),
and
K∗2 ∈ arg maxK2,F ∗1 ,F ∗2
(∫ ∫
pi1(K
∗
1 , K2, p1, p2)dF
∗
1 dF
∗
2 − C2(K2 −K02)
)
subject to (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) ∈ SSE(K∗1 , K2),
where C1(K1 −K01) and C2(K2 −K02) are the investment costs for capacity
expansion, respectively.
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In this section, a duopoly market is numerically studied with the following
parameters: demand d = 170 MW, price cap pmax = 250 $/MW, initial
capacities K01 = K
0
2 = 100 MW, start-up costs s1 = 1000 $, s2 = 5000 $,
and marginal costs c1 = 100 $/MW, c2 = 30 $/MW. For simplicity, assume
the capacity expansion cost is zero, C1(K1 − K01) = C2(K2 − K02) = 0, for
all K1, K2. The decision variables for the capacity expansion problem is the
updated capacity denoted by K1 and K2. Due to physical limits, generators
can be only upgraded to some discrete values of capacity. Here, assume both
K1 −K01 , K2 −K02 are multiples of 5 MW.
The expected payoff of the two firms from energy markets with different
generation mix under marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift are shown
in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, respectively. Since the capacity of an individual
generator that exceeds the demand has no impact on market outcomes, the
generators’ capacities are studied up to 170 MW.
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Table 6.1: Expected profit of generator 1 with different capacities under marginal-cost pricing
XXXXXXXXXXXXK1 (MW)
K2(MW) 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170
100 13822 13861 13885 13902 13915 13924 13932 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 14000
105 14611 14636 14652 14665 14674 14682 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 749.99 14750
110 15386 15403 15415 15425 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 15500
115 16153 16165 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 749.99 16250
120 10500 9750 8998 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.01 17000
125 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 17750
130 10500 9749 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.01 18500
135 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 19250
140 10497 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 749.99 20000
145 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.02 20750
150 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 21500
155 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 22250
160 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 23000
165 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 23750
170 10500 9750 9000 8250 7500 6750 6000 5250 4500 3750 3000 2250 1500 750.00 0
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Table 6.2: Expected profit of generator 2 with different capacities under marginal-cost pricing
XXXXXXXXXXXXK1(MW)
K2(MW) 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170
100 15400 15400 15400 15400 15400 15400 15400 16885 21544 24100 25941 27470 28843 30130 15400
105 14300 14300 14300 14300 14300 14300 18195 21107 23211 24909 26390 27746 29028 30262 14300
110 13200 13200 13200 13200 15268 18136 20401 22260 23864 25307 26648 27925 29158 30361 13200
115 12100 12100 13069 15452 17644 19573 21277 22810 24222 25551 26822 28053 29257 30440 12100
120 11527 13240 15114 16958 18683 20275 21752 23137 24453 25720 26949 28152 29336 30504 11000
125 12948 14542 16171 17755 19263 20692 22053 23357 24618 25845 27048 28232 29401 30559 9900
130 13847 15326 16805 18245 19632 20970 22262 23517 24742 25944 27127 28297 29456 30606 8800
135 14448 15840 17223 18574 19889 21168 22417 23639 24840 26023 27193 28352 29503 30647 7700
140 14868 16199 17517 18810 20077 21318 22537 23736 24919 26090 27249 28400 29544 30683 6600
145 15178 16462 17735 18988 20221 21436 22633 23816 24986 26145 27297 28441 29580 30715 5500
150 15412 16662 17902 19127 20336 21531 22712 23882 25042 26194 27338 28478 29613 30743 4400
155 15594 16819 18034 19238 20429 21609 22778 23938 25090 26235 27375 28510 29641 30769 3300
160 15740 16945 18142 19329 20507 21675 22835 23987 25132 26272 27408 28539 29667 30793 2200
165 15858 17048 18231 19406 20572 21731 22883 24029 25170 26305 27437 28565 29691 30814 1100
170 17000 18100 19200 20300 21400 22500 23600 24700 25800 26900 28000 29100 30200 31300 7900
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According to these two tables, the capacity decisions and the corresponding
generation mixes could be categorized into five regimes. The first regime is
the semi-triangles shown in the left corner of the tables, where K1 ranges
from 100 MW to 115 MW while K2 ranges from 100 MW to 130 MW. The
regime represents generation mixes with a relatively tight capacity margin.
In these scenarios, firm 1’s expected profit increases with its own capacity
until it reaches a threshold that depends on firms 2’s capacity. In contrast,
firm 2’s expected profit remains unchanged with respect to a change in its
capacity within this regime.
The second regime of generation mixes is from the rest of these tables
except the last row and last column of each. In this regime, due to the strictly
increasing profit, firm 2 has a strong incentive to expand its capacity while
firm 1’s profit remains flat. These different patterns of the dependence of
profit on a firm’s own capacity in regimes 1 and 2 are due to the asymmetry
in the firms’ offering distributions. In regime 1, generator 2’s offer in the
energy market is concentrated around the price cap, therefore it is more likely
to get partially dispatched. In these cases, a larger capacity for generator
2 does not help because it rarely reaches the capacity limit. In contrast,
generator 1 benefits from a larger capacity because it is more likely to get
fully dispatched. Vice versa, in regime 2, generator 1 sets the price more
frequently, resulting in exactly the opposite effects of capacities to regime 1.
Regimes 3 and 4 represent cases in which only one of the firms has large
enough capacity to serve the load. As discussed in Section 6.2, in these cases,
the firm with the smaller capacity will offer aggressively lower while the other
firm offers at the price cap. Therefore, the firm with the smaller capacity
has an incentive to expand its capacity, but not to equal or to exceed the
demand.
The last regime of the capacity mixes includes cases when both firms’
capacities are equal or larger than the demand. In these cases, only the
generator with less actual cost, or generator 2, is online.
The capacity expansion game admits a unique pure-strategy equilibrium,
in which generator 1 expands its capacity to 145 MW and generator 2 ex-
pands to 165 MW, realizing 750.02 $/hour and 30, 714.68 $/hour profits,
respectively. Generator 1 is almost indifferent with all capacity options: Its
best response to generator 2 with a 165 MW capacity is only 0.003% better
than its worst response. In fact, any capacity for generator 2 should lead to
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the identical payoff and the specific selection of equilibrium are influenced
by computational error.
Next, the possible path to the equilibrium generation mix from the ini-
tial capacities is discussed. When the capacity margin is relatively small,
generator 2 is more likely to set the price. Consequently, generator 1 has
an incentive to increase its capacity while generate j’s payoff remains flat.
In contrast, when the capacity margin becomes higher, generator 1 is more
likely to set the price and generator 2 could expand its capacity to realize
higher profit.
If the generation capacity can be upgraded only gradually, the equilib-
rium generation mix can be path-dependent. Suppose the capacity expan-
sion game is played repeatedly and the firms are myopic in that only consider
electricity energy markets in the immediate planning period. Further sup-
pose at each capacity expansion stage, firms can only choose to upgrade its
capacity by 50 MW or to do nothing at each step. Then the equilibrium
realized in this game may be K1 = 115 MW and K2 = 100 MW.
Under convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift, by Proposition 74,
generator 1 with lower start-up costs is always get fulling dispatched while
generator 2 always sets the price, as long as the demand is strictly higher
than each generator’s capacity. Therefore, the pure-strategy equilibrium is
for generator 1 to expand its capacity to 165 MW and generator 2 with any
capacity.
Under convex hull pricing, the equilibrium generation mix is path inde-
pendent. This is because generator 1 has consistent incentives to upgrade its
capacity. Therefore, in the gradual upgrading cases, convex hull pricing may
lead to a higher capacity margin than marginal-cost pricing.
Under both pricing mechanisms, the firm that reaches the capacity limit
more frequently has more incentive to expand its capacity. Pricing mecha-
nisms impact the firms’ offering strategies and consequently the allocation in
the short term and the generation mix in the long term.
6.3 Competition in Start-up Cost Offers
A duopolistic market has been studied under different pricing rules in Chap-
ter 5 with the assumption that the start-up costs are known a priori. A
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natural extension of this model is to include start-up costs in the strategic
regime.
For simplicity, assume that K1 = K2 = K. The duopolistic model studied
in Chapter 5 is extended by allowing generators to submit their start-up
costs, denoted by bi ∈ [0, bmax], i = 1, 2. As the action sets of marginal cost
and start-up cost offers are independent, markets with start-up cost offers
can be modeled as two-stage games.
The study of the second stage is similar to the previous study except the
uplift payment is calculated based on the reported start-up costs rather than
the actual ones. In this stage, the start-up costs are already sunk decisions,
and the only decision variable for the generators is the marginal cost offer.
Equilibria with similar structure are expected with the start-up cost offers
as a parameter. Due to the absence of pure-strategy equilibria in certain
circumstances, probability distribution functions are needed to characterize
the equilibria. Formally, the second stage equilibria satisfy the following two
equations.
SSE(b1, b2) : F
∗
1 ∈ arg max
F1
∫ ∫
pi1(b1, b2, p1, p2)dF1dF
∗
2 ,
F ∗2 ∈ arg max
F2
∫ ∫
pi2(b1, b2, p1, p2)dF
∗
1 dF2,
where b1, b2 are the start-up cost offers, p1, p2 are the marginal-cost offers,
and F1, F2 are the cumulative distribution functions of marginal cost offers.
In the first state, generators submit their start-up cost offer with the ex-
pectation of equilibria in the second stage. In other words, the equilibrium
conditions are
b∗1 ∈ arg maxb1,F ∗1 ,F ∗2
∫ ∫
pi1(b1, b
∗
2, p1, p2)dF
∗
1 dF
∗
2
subject to (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) ∈ SSE(b1, b∗2),
and
b∗2 ∈ arg maxb2,F ∗1 ,F ∗2
∫ ∫
pi1(b
∗
1, b2, p1, p2)dF
∗
1 dF
∗
2
subject to (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) ∈ SSE(b∗1, b2).
When the demand may be satisfied by either player alone, due to the
intense competition, the additional dimension of start-up price in the gener-
ators’ offer does not change their behavior. Following a similar argument to
Proposition 59, the following conclusion can be reached.
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Proposition 75. Suppose 0 < d ≤ K and i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. Then the following
hold:
(a) Suppose si + cid < sj + cjd. Both marginal-cost pricing with make-
whole uplift and convex hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift mecha-
nisms admit a family of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium given by ({b∗i , p∗i }, {b∗j , p∗j}),
where
b∗i + p
∗
i d = cj + sjd and b
∗
j = sj, p
∗
j = cj.
(b) Suppose si + cid = sj + cjd. Then, b
∗
i = si, p
∗
i = ci, b
∗
j = sj, p
∗
j = cj,
and player 1 is dispatched.
Next, consider the equilibrium under marginal-cost pricing with make-
whole uplift when demand exceeds capacity of either player, as specified by
K < d < 2K.
Proposition 76. When K < d < 2K, marginal-cost pricing with make-
whole uplift mechanisms admits a Nash equilibrium in which b∗1 = b
∗
2 = b
max
and the marginal-cost offer prices are characterized by cumulative distribution
functions of offering price (F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) with identical supports S = [S
min, pmax]
that solves
fi(p) =
1
p− cj
[
K
2K − dFi
(
p+
bmax
K
)
− Fi(p)
]
, (6.3)
where p < pmax, i = 1 or 2 and j 6= i; and satisfying P(pi = pj = pmax) = 0.
Proof. In high demand cases, K < d < 2K, both generators are online.
Whether a generator is fully or partially dispatched depends only on the
marginal-cost offers. In other words, the start-up offer will not change the
generators’ allocation. Meanwhile, the energy price is set to be max(p1, p2),
which is also independent of the start-up cost offer. Therefore, the start-up
cost offer only impacts the generators’ uplift revenue. Formally, the profit of
player i with start-up cost offer bi is defined as follows:
pimc−mwi =

(pj − ci)K − si, if pi ≤ pj − bi
K
,
(pi − ci)K + bi − si, if pj − bi
K
< pi < pj,
(pi − ci)(d−K) + bi − si, if pi > pj.
(6.4)
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Thus the profit is strictly increasing with respect to the start-up offer bi,
if generator i is eligible to uplift payment.
For any given start-cost offer pairs (b1, b2), following the same argument
in cases where the start-up cost offer is not allowed, the absence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium and the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium can
be shown. Therefore, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium if the action
space is extended to include the start-up offers. On the other hand, in any
mixed-strategy equilibrium, both generators receive uplift with strictly pos-
itive probability, and increased start-up cost offer prices do not change the
allocation and energy price in any realization. Therefore, offering at the start-
up cost offer cap is the strictly dominant strategy for both generators.
From the viewpoint of market design, at least for the duopoly in ques-
tion, it is unnecessary to allow the players to offer their start-up costs under
marginal-cost pricing with make-whole uplift. When the demand is low, the
start-up offer does not improve the market outcomes. When the demand
is high, the generators always offer at the start-up offer price cap: as a re-
sult, competition is not enhanced and the consumer suffers from higher total
payment.
On the other hand, the firms’ equilibrium offering strategies under convex
hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift are characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 77. When K < d < 2K, convex hull pricing with opportunity-
cost uplift mechanism admits two families of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
given by ({b∗i , p∗i }, {b∗j , p∗j}), where
b∗i = b
max, p∗i = p
max and b∗j ∈ [0, bmax], p∗j ∈
[
0, ci +
(pmax − ci)(d−K)
K
)
where i = 1 or 2 and j 6= i.
Proof. When K < d < 2K, regardless of the offering strategies, one generator
supplies at K and the other at d − K. Without loss of generality, suppose
generator i supplies d−K, implying pj < pi. Given this allocation, the payoff
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of player i is
pii =

(
bj
K
+ pj − pi
)
K − si
+(pi − ci)(d−K), if bj ≥ bi and pj < pi < pj + bj − bi
K
,
(pi − ci)(d−K) + (bi − si), if bj ≥ bi and pi ≥ pj + bj − bi
K
,
(pi − ci)(d−K) + (bi − si), if bj < bi and pi ≥ pj.
Next, study the maximal profit of generator i under the previous three
scenarios. If bj ≥ bi and pj < pi < pj + (bj − bi)/K, when generator i offers
at pi = pj + δ, it attains maximal profit of
bj + δK − di + (pj + δ − ci)(d−K).
If bj ≥ bi and pi ≥ pj + (bj − bi)/K, generator i attains maximal profit of
(pmax − ci)(d−K) + (bj − si).
Otherwise, if bj < bi and pi ≥ pj, generator i attains maximal profit of
(pmax − ci)(d−K) + (bmax − si).
Comparing the maximal profit of these three scenarios, an offer with b∗i =
bmax and p∗i = p
max maximizes generator i’s profit.
On the other hand, given b∗i = b
max, p∗i = p
max, generator j is unable to
further increase either the price or its uplift payment. Therefore, any offer
will be a best response for generator j to generator i’s offer.
Finally, still needed is the study of the conditions under which player i has
no incentive to deviate from this allocation, which requires
pj < ci +
(pmax − ci)(d−K)
K
.
Therefore, the conclusion follows.
Under a design in which start-up costs are offered, markets under convex
hull pricing with opportunity-cost uplift admit two families of equilibria. In
either family, one firm offers sufficiently low so that its competitor has to offer
at the price cap. However, these two families of equilibria are symmetric, it
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is unclear which firm will adopt what strategy. In extreme cases,
b∗1 = b
max, p∗1 = p
max, b∗2 = 0, p
∗
2 = 0
and
b∗1 = 0, p
∗
1 = 0, b
∗
2 = b
max, p∗2 = p
max
are both equilibria. In these two equilibria, the actual start-up costs and
marginal costs have no impact at all and markets are reduced to purely
financial games.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, equilibrium outcomes in duopolistic markets under differ-
ent pricing mechanisms are studied, based on which the long-term effects of
pricing mechanisms are compared. None of the firms are willing to expand
their capacity beyond the demand, even if the investment cost is zero. In
the numerical case studied, convex hull pricing provides an incentive to the
generator characterized by lower start-up cost and higher marginal cost to
expand, while the marginal-cost pricing provides the opposite incentives.
Another contribution of this chapter is the discussion of market designs re-
garding whether or not to allow the start-up cost offering. Analytical results
show that, if start-up cost offering is allowed, under marginal-cost pricing,
both firms will offer at the start-up cost offer cap; under convex hull pricing,
the market outcomes will be independent of the actual cost structures.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the work presented in this dissertation is summarized. Based
on the reported results, possible extensions and future research avenues are
discussed.
7.1 Summary
A key contribution of this dissertation is the understanding of the impact,
viewed from the ideal competitive equilibrium setting, of dynamics, con-
straints, and uncertainty which are inherent to transmission and generation.
These issues become more acute with the increased deployment of renew-
able resources and smart grid technologies. In a general dynamic setting,
many of the standard conclusions of competitive equilibrium theory are es-
tablished: Market equilibria are efficient, and average prices coincide with
average marginal costs. However, these conclusions hold only on average.
An important contribution lies in the explanation of the exotic behavior of
electricity prices. Through theory and examples it is explained why, in the
competitive equilibrium, prices can range from negative values, to values far
beyond the “choke up” price, which is usually considered to be the maximum
price consumers are willing to pay.
The second problem of interest in this dissertation is the pricing prob-
lem in the presence of binary commitment decisions, nonconvex costs, and
physical and operational constraints. A common practice is to derive prices,
referred to as “marginal-cost prices,” from the solution of the correspond-
ing economic dispatch problem in which commitment decisions are obtained
from the unit commitment problem. As a result, the commitment-dependent
start-up and no-load costs are ignored in these prices. Thus, the payments
collected through the auction may be insufficient to compensate the gen-
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erators. To overcome this problem, uplift payment mechanisms have been
introduced, through which additional side payments are made to the gener-
ators in recognition of the costs incurred due to commitment decisions. The
large amount of uplift brings potentially new difficulties for both the oper-
ator and the market participants. An alternative pricing mechanism known
as convex hull pricing has been proposed and will be implemented in the
Midwest ISO in the near future. Computation of these prices requires the
global maximization of an associated Lagrangian dual problem, which is usu-
ally ill-conditioned. It has been observed that existing methods display poor
local convergence behavior and premature termination. This dissertation
contributes to the solution of the convex hull pricing problem by proposing
an Extreme-Point Subdifferential (EPSD) Method. A salient advantage of
the EPSD method is the ability to obtain the global maximizer after a finite
number of steps. Numerical experiments show that the EPSD scheme com-
pares well with standard subgradient methods on the examples considered.
Based on the equilibrium results, long-term effects of these pricing schemes
on capacity expansion and design elements to include the start-up costs as
part of offers are discussed
A natural question that emerges from two alternate pricing schemes is
whether one can get a deeper understanding of the equilibria that may arise
in the resulting markets. In particular, do the benefits promised by convex
hull pricing hold in strategic regimes? To contribute to the understand-
ing of the impact of these pricing rules, a duopoly with explicit considera-
tions of start-up costs is studied. Generator operators are assumed to be
rational profit-maximizing entities. However, profit depends closely on the
pricing mechanism in force, especially in concentrated electricity markets.
The existence of pure-strategy and/or mixed-strategy Nash-equilibria for the
market under marginal-cost pricing and convex hull pricing mechanisms is
established. Furthermore, a numerical method is proposed to identify these
equilibria. The numerical results show that in strategic regimes, convex hull
pricing is not necessarily superior to marginal-cost pricing in terms of effi-
ciency, consumer’s total payments, or amount of uplift payment.
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7.2 Future Research
The research results presented in this dissertation deepen the understanding
of the impact of the physical characteristics of electricity on the competition
and pricing of electricity markets. These insights serves as a starting point
for the design and operation of more efficient and reliable markets tailored
for electricity. Although the best architecture to manage the grid is not yet
obvious, it is clear that we must consider the tradeoff among reliability, sus-
tainability and economic efficiency. Along this line of thought, the following
directions may be part of the solution and deserve further investigation.
(i) Multi-attribute products: Static perfectly competitive market mod-
els have been traditionally adopted as a benchmark in market design and op-
eration. However, as shown in Chapter 2, even in the most idealized settings,
the market outcomes are highly undesirable due to the market friction result-
ing from the physical constraints. The electricity cannot be simply measured
by the energy unit, MWh, because not all MWhs are created equal. The last
decade has witnessed the incorporation of additional attributes of electric-
ity into markets: some of those attributes have lead to new markets while
others have introduced distinctions across products. Examples include the
MW power consideration as in reserve and capacity markets, temporal con-
sideration as in dynamic pricing, and spatial considerations as in zonal or
locational pricing. Despite this progress, the current markets employ, by and
large, snap-shot based models which capture only one instant of the market
conditions. With smart grid technologies, the system needs to appropriately
evaluate volatile resources and compensate the flexibility, controllability, and
other technological features of interest. Nowadays, these attributes are im-
plicitly considered by contingency constraints such as the N-1 and N-2 se-
curity criteria. However, the current practice may fail in settings with deep
penetration of renewables and demand response. We believe that these crit-
ical attributes must be explicitly acknowledged in the future and stochastic
and dynamic market models are essential for capturing these attributes [95].
(ii) Transmission pricing and congestion management: A prescrip-
tion of prices is a key component of any market design. Currently, all ISOs in
the North America employ a nodal pricing scheme and operate the markets
with transmission constraints. In the nodal pricing scheme, the transmission
constraints are priced in the congestion component of locational marginal
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prices (LMPs). LMPs are used as a market-based congestion management
framework. Conceptually, the convex hull pricing model is compatible with
network constraints and nodal pricing. However, the main challenge to in-
corporate transmission constraints is computational issues: All transmission
constraints are systemwide, which couple all the generators’ output. There-
fore, each of the transmission constraints, as well as the supply-demand
balance constraint, requires at least one dual variable to relax, leading to
(1 + L) × H dual variables, where H is the number of hours and L is the
number of transmission lines. Furthermore, convex hull pricing may result
in another layer of complication over the revenue adequacy problem of Fi-
nancial Transmission Rights (FTRs). Under locational prices, suppliers and
consumers at different locations are subject to different prices. Positive differ-
ence between the consumer payment and suppler revenue is usually observed,
which is referred to as “congestion rent.” Revenue adequacy implies that the
congestion rent is enough to make the necessary FTR payoffs. A well-known
condition for revenue adequacy under marginal-cost pricing is that all issued
FTRs can simultaneously satisfy the network constraints, or pass the Simul-
taneous Feasibility Test (SFT). Unfortunately, this conclusion fails to hold
under convex hull pricing. In fact, it can be shown that this test cannot
guarantee revenue adequacy even with more restrictive transmission limits.
It seems the only solution is to collect money to cover the FTR deficiency
through some uplift mechanism, which is essentially a taxing mechanism. It
is not clear whether an FTR tax undermines the efficiency of the congestion
management, and this issue deserves further investigation.
(iii) Coordinated and restricted behavior: The idealized markets em-
ploy prices as a signal and incentive for suppliers and consumers, while sup-
pliers and consumers are able to adjust their behavior freely as a response
to prices. However, such a purely market-based approach does not work in
the power system, because prices alone cannot capture the complexity of the
system and the individual market participants lack the ability and incentive
to collectively maintain system reliability. As smart grid technologies grant
market participants more freedom, the current market design may fail to
achieve system wide objectives, such as reliability. For example, the uncoor-
dinated and unrestricted demand response may create a positive closed-loop
feedback which eventually destabilizes the system [96]. Therefore, control
signals beyond prices are essential for the future grid, which poses additional
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constraints on the players’ behavior. This justifies the existence of central-
ized authorities for collecting information, defining system needs, arbitrating
grid-friendly or grid-harmful behavior and taking predictive actions. This
path contrasts sharply with the “free market” mechanisms; however we be-
lieve that the centralized control is the key to realize the smart grid, given
the complexities and physical characteristics of power systems.
(iv) Cost/benefit sharing: The smart grid technologies are expected
to bring significant benefit to the society as a whole, while the cost associ-
ated with them is also substantial. A recent report by EPRI estimates the
investment cost required in the United States for the next 20 years ranges
from 338 million to 476 million dollars and the expected benefit amounts
to 1,294 to 2,028 million dollars [97]. Despite this attractive benefit-to-cost
ratio, the smart grid does create winners and losers. The work in this disser-
tation has shown that increased wind penetration may lead the distribution
of social welfare to be skewed in favor of suppliers and result in huge costs to
consumers [42]. Thus, different parties have incentives to promote or block
particular technologies and the transit may present undesired benefit-to-cost
ratio. We believe that the long-term cost/benefit sharing contracts can help
reduce the conflict between participants.
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